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Abstract of Thesis
This thesis explains the decline of biological diversity as the result of a particular form of dynamic 
externality inherent within the global development process. Agricultural technology and learning have 
become embedded within particular species, by reason of species-specific investments, and the diffusion 
of these technologies has implied the adoption of these particular species as well. The decline of 
biological diversity has been the consequence of this development process, which carries with it the by­
product of a homogenised biosphere.
This theory has important implications for the regulation of diverse biological resources, and especially 
their extinction. It implies that the fundamental force driving extinctions is relative underinvestment in 
these non-specialised resources and in their ancillary resources: base resources (land) and management 
requirements. When particular species do not attract investment, they are subject to disinvestment by 
reason of "mining" (for investment of rents elsewhere), "land use conversions" (for investment of base 
resources elsewhere), or "overexploitation" (for investment of management resources elsewhere).
Decisions concerning the conversion of diverse resources made by individual states are necessarily 
suboptimal. The mere existence of a range of diversity in biological resources confers global benefits, 
specifically insurance and informational services. No single state will take these global benefits into 
consideration when making its disinvestment decisions.
The internalisation of these benefits, through international environmental agreements to that effect, is the 
means by which the decline of biological diversity might be controlled. The international regulation of 
extinction may take three distinct forms: 1) the creation of dynamically consistent transfer systems to 
compensate for reduced rates of conversion of diverse resources ("international franchise agreements"); 
2) the creation of rent enhancement systems to render nonconversion a more profitable alternative 
("international wildlife trade regimes"); or, 3) the creation of appropriation mechanisms that render the 
nonappriable appropriable ("international intellectual property right regimes").
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction: The International Regulation of Extinction
This is a book about the conservation of the diversity of life forms that exists on earth. That is, it is 
a book about evolved biological diversity, or "biodiversity". Biological diversity is important 
because it is the primary output from a four and a half billion year evolutionary process, which is the 
direction of life itself. The evolutionary process has endowed the earth with this range of diversity 
for important reasons, from the perspective of humans and from the perspective of life itself. 
Therefore, it is a book about the conservation of this unique global endowment.
This is also a book about global development and North-South relations; that is, this is a book about 
the "uneven" character of global development. This is because the historical pattern of global 
development has resulted in a clear asymmetry in the world, between those states with material riches 
and those with species richness. For example, a majority of the earth’s biological variety now resides 
in the last, vast tropical forests existing in a few countries in the Southern hemisphere: the Latin 
American Amazon, the Zairean and the Indonesian forests. Given this starting point, this book 
focuses primarily on the conservation of these last great wildernesses. And, given the rights of these 
states to control their own destinies, and hence to control the resources within their borders, this book 
focuses ultimately on the resource allocation decisions of a handful of Southern states, their impact 
on the global environment, and the capability of the global community to influence those (land use) 
decisions.
This book is also about the cumulative impact of global development; that is, it is a book about the 
expansion of the human niche, and the appropriation of many others. Over time, general global 
development has resulted in a systematic narrowing of the variety of life forms on earth, with the 
prospect of a much more severe narrowing in the next one hundred years; for example, many of the 
world’s leading biological scientists are now predicting losses of a substantial proportion of all life 
forms on earth over the next century. In order to understand the nature of the problem of biodiversity
12
depletion, it is necessary to examine how and why global development results in the systematic 
reallocation of basic resources away from a wide range of the world’s species.
Primarily, however, this is a book about the human institutions required for the management of 
biological diversity. It concerns the economic incentives that drive the human-made extinction 
process. It concerns the institutions (primarily domestic) that exist at present that do not adequately 
manage this process. Most importantly, it concerns the institutions (primarily international) that do 
not exist at present, but are necessary for the adequate management of biodiversity. These are the 
core concerns of this book.
The human management of the extinction process might sound like a typically anthropocentric 
perspective on a problem that concerns primarily non-human life forms. Or, at a minimum, it might 
appear to most to be a highly impracticable objective. However, the point of this book is that the 
human regulation of extinction is something that is already taking place - only on a wasteful and 
inefficient basis. This is true, even from the human perspective. Therefore, this book does not make 
the case for exclusive human dominion over the other species of the planet; rather, it appeals for the 
reasonable exercise of that power which already exists. It appeals for this through the vehicle of 
human interest because it is human interests that drive extinctions at present, and these same interests 
may instead be channeled to the conservation (rather than the elimination) of diversity. Also, human 
interests are preeminent in this book because the loss of diversity is likely to threaten human 
production systems, and hence human life forms, long before it constitutes a threat to life itself.
Therefore, the human regulation of extinction is a system that already exists, but it is a poorly 
managed group of forces and incentives that appear set to generate a near-term mass extinction of 
species. The issue is whether this extinction process will be allowed to continue through human 
ignorance and avoidance of responsibility, or not. This book demonstrates the wasteful nature of the 
existing system of regulation, and indicates the direction for potential reforms for the conservation 
of biological diversity.
1.2 Methodology: The Biology-Economics-Institutions Interface
There is little choice in a book of this nature but to create a broad interdisciplinary framework for 
analysis. This is because the nature of the problems involved cannot be addressed in a context that
13
omits consideration of any of the fundamental contributing forces to the management of the 
extinction process.
v /  First, this subject requires the incorporation of biological analysis, especially the understanding of 
some evolutionary biology, because the biodiversity resource is essentially the output of the 
evolutionary process. That is, although each of the constituent resources of biodiversity is biological 
in nature (in that they grow and reproduce), the relevant characteristic of biodiversity is instead the 
range and variety of life forms, its "diversity", rather than their biological character. It is the 
aggregation of the differences between biological organisms that matters in the management of 
biodiversity, and these differences are the output from the evolutionary process.
y  Secondly, it is necessary to incorporate economic analysis into the enquiry because, as indicated
previously, it is the human drive for wealth and fitness that underlies much diversity depletion. In 
effect, the extinction process is now a distinctively social rather than a natural process. Human 
societies have usurped the evolutionary function of allocating base resources (i.e. those required for 
the sustenance of life) between competing life forms, and this is what now drives the extinction 
process. The fundamental nature of the biodiversity problem is a human choice problem, where 
human societies are systematically reshaping the biosphere across the face of the earth. Economic 
analysis lies at the core of the examination of this problem because it is the study of human choices, 
especially those choices concerning the human allocation of resources. This is the nature of the 
human-sourced extinction process, even though the issues involved here concern the allocation of 
resources by humans to other species.
v Finally, it is most important to combine these two approaches with a third: the analysis of the 
institutions that provide the interface between human societies and biological resources. The 
evolutionary process endowed the earth with this resource. The human drive for wealth and fitness 
has placed it under threat. It is the institutions of human society that will determine the final outcome 
of this interaction between man and biosphere. In the event that the human drive for wealth and 
fitness cannot be tempered, then it will be the re-channeling of this force, in a manner made 
compatible with biological diversity, that will halt the process of diversity depletion. This is the role 
of human institutions - to manage constructively the forces of human society.
v / Therefore, the methodology of this book must be distinctly interdisciplinary, combining various
aspects of evolutionary biology, natural resource economics and institutional development. The
14
analysis of a problem of this type and scale requires this approach.
1.3 Biological Diversity: A Depletable Endowment from the Evolutionary Process
Biological diversity, in the biologist’s sense of the word, is the natural stock of genetic material 
within an ecosystem. This stock may be determined by the actual number of genes existing within 
the system. The number of genes range between organisms from about 1,000 in bacteria to 10,000 
in some fungi, and to around 100,000 for a typical mammal. The greatest number of genes actually 
belong to the flowering plants, whose genes often number in excess o f400,000 or more. Genes are 
important because they determine the particular characteristics of a given organism. They encode 
the information which determines the specific capabilities of that organism. The greater the variety 
in the gene pool, the greater is the variety of organisms which exist or which will exist in the near 
future.
The usual unit of analysis in studies of biodiversity is the number of existing species. This is because 
biological diversity may be conceived of as the net result of the processes of speciation and 
extinction. The number of currently described species number around 1.4 million; however, the 
number of species which have not yet been catalogued far exceeds that number. Best estimates place 
the total number of species somewhere between 5 and 30 million. The vast majority of these species 
are insects, and other smaller organisms. Among the more well-studied categories, vertebrates and 
flowering plants, the numbers are much lower and more certain. For example, it is known that there 
are about 43,853 vertebrates currently in existence, of which only 4,000 are mammals, 9,000 are 
birds, 6,300 are reptiles and 4,184 are amphibians. By way of contrast, it is known that there exist 
at least 50,000 different species of mollusks. [Wilson (1988)].
This diversity of species has resulted from the process of "radiation": the mutation of species and their 
consequent expansion into unoccupied niches. It is a process that has occurred over many hundreds 
of millions of years to produce the diversity this world currently contains. [Raup,D. (1988)]. The 
fossil record indicates that there is about 4.5 billion years of earth’s biological history. The record 
of the first 4 billion years, so-called "deep time", indicates that there was very little adaptive radiation 
occurring over that very long period. Simple one-cell organisms (blue-green algaes) were all that 
came to exist over the first 2 billion years of the earth’s existence, and only very simple multicelluar 
organisms are found to have evolved over the next 2 billion years.
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At the beginning of the next half-billion years (ranging to the present and known as "shallow time"), 
some unknown event triggered a revolution in adaptive radiation. The evolution of complex 
organisms, and their subsequent speciation, occurred all in a rush at the beginning of the Paleozoic 
era. Almost all of the major phyla presently existing appeared at that time, over a relatively short 
period of one hundred million years. The size and range of the biodiversity resource was determined 
by this revolution. [(Stanley,S. (1986)].
Since that time the average rates of speciation and extinction have been approximately equal. 
Therefore, the amount of biological diversity existing at present, in terms of the number and variety 
of species, is probably very close to its historical maximum. Nature, at the beginning of the Paleozoic 
period, endowed the earth with approximately its present amount of diversity, and there is very little 
known about why this occurred.
Of course, extinction has itself been a natural process. Studies of the fossil record show that the 
natural longevity of any species lies in the range of 1 to 10 million years. The threat to biological 
diversity arises when the rate of extinction of species far exceeds the rate of speciation. In these eras 
of "mass extinctions”, there is the potential for a threat to the entire global biology. In the distant 
past, so-called "deep time", there have been a number of occasions of such mass extinctions. There 
are at least five occasions indicated in the fossil record during which over 50% of the then-existing 
animal species were rendered extinct. [Raup (1988)]. '
Even averaging in these periods of mass extinctions, the natural rate of extinction over deep time 
appears to have been in the neighbourhood of 9% per million years, or approximately .000009% per 
year. That is, the current stock of biological diversity is the result of several billion years of mostly 
low frequency mutation and extinction. Mass extinction has been an infrequent "unnatural" 
occurrence brought on by exogenous shocks to the earth’s life support system, such as collisions with 
meteors.
This brief account of speciation and extinction demonstrates the facet of biological diversity that is 
of the nature of a nonrenewable resource. The diversity of biological resources is a one-time 
endowment from the evolutionary process. Therefore, although individual biological organisms may 
be treated as renewable resources, the aggregation of differences between these resources, the 
diversity that they represent, is best conceptualised as a nonrenewable resource. Biodiversity exists 
at the interface between the spheres of renewable and nonrenewable resources.
It is also important to note why it is the case that human technology is incapable of resolving this 
problem. Humans now have control of the rate of speciation as well as that of extinction, through 
the use of biotechnological methods. However, there is a very substantial difference between that 
variety which has developed through the process of evolution and coevolution over a period of six 
hundred million years, and that which can be created by experimentation in the laboratory.
The output from the evolutionary process, by the definition of evolution, has been selected for by 
reason of its capability to interact within the system, including its biological activity and its role in 
its ecosystem. That is, the evolution of a particular life form is an indicator of its capacity to act upon 
and contribute to the other organisms within its environment. Biodiversity is valuable precisely 
because it is the output from this four billion year old evolutionary process, not for the sake of variety 
itself. Existing life forms are an encapsulated history of this process, and this constitutes an entirely 
unique body of information.
Another value of biodiversity lies in the fact that evolution has produced this particular range of 
variety. Although still subject to debate, it is generally agreed that the direction of evolution is life- 
sustaining, i.e. its "object" is to create a system that can continue to persist under a wide range of 
physical conditions. For this reason, evolution has a built-in capacity for adaptation, and the variety 
that exists is then an indicator of the requisite range of potential responses life requires for meeting 
changes in the physical environment. The range of existing life forms developed by the evolutionary 
process then constitute a uniquely formulated insurance policy against shocks to the life system itself.
Therefore, in biological diversity we are dealing with one of the ancient nonrenewable resources, 
such as the fossil fuels, rich soils and great aquifers; however, in another important respect, biological 
diversity is very different from these other resources. It is similar to these other nonrenewables in 
the sense that it is a one-off endowment from nature to the earth, in that it cannot be replaced on any 
timescale that is relevant to humanity. However, it is distinct from these other resources because it 
is impossible, by definition, to substitute human innovations for this resource. That is, biological 
diversity is distinguishable from most other natural endowments by reason of the fact that it is 
valuable primarily by virtue of its "naturalness". It is not possible to substitute human synthesised 
inputs or processes for the important characteristics of biodiversity, precisely because their 
importance derives from the nature of the evolutionary process that generated them. Biodiversity 
management concerns the management of the unique characteristics of this one-time endowment
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from the evolutionary process.
1.4 The Global Conversion Process: Human Development and Diversity Depletion
Although the retention of this evolutionary endowment renders important benefits to all life forms 
and thus to human societies as well, it is clear that the depletion of diversity has also generated 
important benefits for human societies. Human societies have been expanding and developing for 
many centuries through a process closely linked to biodiversity depletion. This is because one of the 
fundamental avenues to human development has been the conversion of the naturally-existing forms 
of assets to other forms more highly valued by human societies. (Solow, 1974). This trade-off, 
between the benefits and opportunity costs of conversion, constitutes the fundamental problem of 
biodiversity management.
This is because conversion has taken a special form which necessarily implies diversity depletion. 
Over the past ten thousand years, human societies converting their resources have done so by 
replacing the naturally-existing slate of species with a selection from the same small menu of 
"specialised species". These are the domesticated and cultivated varieties that have been developed 
for use in agriculture, and are now substituted for the resident diversity worldwide.
The global conversion process is the observable result from the sequential application of this process 
of the replacement of the diverse with the specialised, in country after country across the face of the 
earth. The nature of this conversion process implies two direct consequences: Human societies (and 
their associated species) have advanced via this conversion strategy, and all other species have been 
in relative decline.
It is important to sort out the line of argument concerning causation in biodiversity decline. First, the 
fundamental source of these related phenomena is the human drive for resources and fitness. Second, 
one of the basic strategies used by the human species in this pursuit is the conversion between asset 
forms. Third, conversion has taken a very special form in the context of the biosphere; the form that 
it has taken has resulted in the re-allocation of base resources toward a very small selection of species 
(the domesticated and cultivated species). Fourth, this re-allocation of resources as a means of 
conversion has greatly benefited human societies, while simultaneously reducing the resources
18
available to the vast majority of species on earth.
Therefore, the development process has been closely linked with diversity decline over the past ten 
thousand years. In addition, to date much of this development gain has been squandered on niche 
expansion. Over the past ten thousand years, the human population has expanded from about ten 
million to approaching ten billion individuals.
One important point to note is that human population expansion is not a cause of biodiversity decline, 
but its linked outcome. Biodiversity decline is caused by the process of conversion, which has the 
twin consequences of human advancement and diversity decline. In the past, human advancement 
has often equated with human population expansion (increased relative "fitness"). However, this 
need not necessarily be the case. At base it is the human drive for wealth or fitness that motivates 
conversion, and consequently diversity decline.
The costs of conversions are less obvious, but equally inherent in this process. Although conversion 
does not necessarily imply the expansion of the human niche, it clearly does imply the expansion of 
others. This is because the conversion process has taken the particular form of the replacement of 
the "diverse" with a selection from the menu of the "specialised". This approach to conversion also 
has twin outcomes: its expands the niche of a small selection of (cultivated and domesticated) species, 
while contracting virtually all others. This has guaranteed the loss of a large portion of the world’s 
natural variety, when used as a strategy for global development
The loss of any single species is difficult to value (hence the ongoing debate concerning the "sign of 
option value"). However, there is no ambiguity concerning the meaningfulness of the loss of large 
swathes of the world’s diversity. The homogenisation of the biosphere implies the decline of 
evolutionarily-supplied
diversity. It is the loss of this product, rather than the costliness of the loss of individual species, that 
is the opportunity cost implicit within the conversion process.
Therefore, the use of a conversion strategy of this nature has created the close link between the 
outcomes of diversity decline and human development. However, there probably is no real necessity 
of a link between the two. Even assuming that human development requires uniformly "high" 
population densities across the world (such as presently exist only in Europe and parts of Asia), this 
still does not require that the life forms on earth be homogenised in the fashion that has occurred in
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those places. That is, it is possible for human societies to develop alternative development paths that 
build on the existing natural base of diversity rather than on the conversion to the uniform, specialised 
resources.
It is this option - of development compatible with diversity - that is the focus of this enquiry. Other 
authors believe that it is only possible to sustain global resources through a policy of non­
development; they advocate a pursuit of the policy of the "steady-state", (e.g. Daly, 1992). The past 
twenty years have seen the first questioning of the fundamental human pursuits of wealth and fitness, 
in the context of the debate concerning the "Limits to Growth". (Meadows, eL al., 1972). I have no 
quarrels with this policy in theory, but I view it as either infeasible or highly objectionable in practice.
A policy of the "steady-state" would either require all human societies to disavow further growth and 
development, or it would require that only some societies pursue further wealth and fitness while 
others maintain or contract. The former option is infeasible, simply because there are many human 
societies that still exist in a poverty-stricken state. Most of these states would be unwilling to make 
a commitment to steady-state policies. It would be unfair to commit some societies to perpetual 
poverty while others live in great surplus.
The latter option (the selective assumption of development constraints) depends entirely on the 
identity of the states assuming the constraints. As currently practiced, this option is unfair and highly 
objectionable. It gives rise to allegations of "environmental imperialism", precisely because these 
development constraints are usually proposed for imposition upon the most undeveloped states. For 
example, proposals that states such as Brazil, Zaire and Indonesia should not engage in deforestation 
and conversion are highly objectionable when they come from the already-converted states of the 
North.
The only equitable alternative is to pursue development in the unconverted states by means of 
investments received from the developed (i.e. to make such investments a method for "evening out" 
global asymmetries in development). It is only by way of clear inducements that the North will be 
caused to invest in a manner that will even out development This is the economic role of these 
unique natural resources; they provide the foundation on which the unconverted states may stake their 
claim to a fair share of the global product. The converted states have had the ability to claim a 
disproportionate share of that product, by virtue of the relative uniqueness of the converted forms of 
assets. [KrugmanJ*. 1974.] However, with an ever greater share of the world’s societies
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undertaking the same conversions, the truly unique assets now lie in those states that retain the unique 
endowments of evolutionary product. It is the recognition of this monopoly over this important asset 
that will cause the converted states to invest significant funds (and thus assume their own 
development constraints) for the benefit of the unconverted states.
Therefore, the policy pathway advocated here is for the unconverted state to pursue development in 
a manner that is consistent with the environmental resource. This will allow development to continue 
in those parts of the world that are still "catching up", while simultaneously inducing the converted 
states to invest in that development process. This strategy recognises biodiversity as a global 
resource for its universal flow of benefits, but focuses on its character as an exclusive "national 
resource" for use as a mechanism for inducing international transfers. This is the policy pathway 
selected, for reasons of feasibility, sustainability and equity.
1.5 The Regulation of Biodiversity: Managing the Global Conversion Process
The management of extinction (and hence biodiversity) equates with the management of the global 
conversion process. The objective is to halt these conversions at least at that point where the human 
welfare losses from the narrowing of diversity exceed the welfare gains from conversion. Although 
there are many reasons to halt the process prior to this point (thereby preserving more of nature’s life 
forms), even the most ardent believer in growth and development cannot argue with an objective that 
maximises human benefits - provided that these benefits are distributed in accordance with the 
burdens undertaken.
Therefore, this book argues that the optimal management of biological diversity equates with the 
channeling of the values of diverse resources from the global community to the suppliers of those 
benefits, i.e. to those states in the "South" harbouring significant diverse resources. In that fashion 
the optimal policy for biodiversity conservation is effected - through a policy geared to harnessing 
the value of diversity in order to halt conversions - while the burden of diversity conservation is 
compensated - through the instrument of channeling the value of diversity to its suppliers.
In addition, this manner of diversity management equates with the creation of alternative 
development paths for states with large areas of remaining wilderness. Development may be made 
compatible with the retention of diversity; that is, it is not a universal pre-condition to development
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that the naturally-existing slate of biological resources be replaced with a pre-selected slate. Investing 
in institutions for the appropriation and transfer of the values of biodiversity equates with investment 
in the creation of these alternative development paths.
For this approach to be effective in conserving biodiversity, however, it is necessary to characterise 
the nature of the extinction process, as it currently exists. Although a wholly natural and life- 
sustaining process ten thousand years ago, it is now driven largely by social forces (i.e. the conversion 
process). However, conversion can be effected via a number of different routes: direct mining for 
rents (affecting, e.g., many slow-growing tropical forests); indirect conversion to other land uses 
(affecting, e.g., many virtually unknown plants and insects); and/or the withholding of management 
of species exploitation (affecting, e.g., many of the large land mammals - elephants and rhinos). Each 
form that conversion may take is an equally effective potential avenue to extinction.
Despite the multiplicity in the avenues to extinction, each is based in the same fundamental source: 
a societal-level determination of investment unworthiness (i.e. the conversion decision). If a society 
views a species as sufficiently investment-worthy, then stocks of that species will be maintained 
(through adequate levels of investment in it and its ancillary resources). If the species is not viewed 
as relatively investment-worthy, then it will suffer disinvestment (via one of the routes described 
above), and ultimately extinction. It is through the process of investment and disinvestment (in 
species and their ancillary resources) that conversion operates.
Therefore, this book argues that the "host state" must perceive diversity as investment-worthy, if its 
citizens are going to take actions to conserve i t  Of course, this implies a fairly innocuous vision of 
the relationship between individuals, society and the state. Specifically, it assumes that the structure 
of the state is reponsive to the needs of its individual citizens, and especially their joint interests. This 
implies that societal objectives will be inherent in state decision making, and that interventions within 
the state’s decision making framework will impact directly upon the ways in which individual 
decisions are taken in that society.
This set of limiting assumptions necessarily excludes many other potential sources of conflict and 
inefficiency in resource management; however, the object here is to demonstrate that, even should 
host states be responsive to the needs of their citizens, this would not imply the existence of resource 
management and investment policies that are first-best from the global perspective. Environmental 
problems are inherent in the division of the global environment into many separate states, as much
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so as they are inherent in the division of a society into many interdependent individuals. Then, the 
argument is that it is role of the "global community" to intervene within the state's decision making 
framework in order to make diversity investment worthy.
This book also argues that the existing schemes for the international regulation of endangered species 
are ill-conceived, because they are based upon less fundamental explanations of extinction. In 
essence, international policies concerning species decline usually focus on the proximate causes of 
their destruction, such as poaching or unmanaged exploitation, without asking why such phenomena 
occur. When this is the received basis for poicy making, the indicated optimal policies can be the 
opposite of those mentioned above, i.e. the advocated policies are often addressed to the elimination 
of all incentives to invest in the endangered species. For example, much of the previous economic 
literature on the regulation of extinction has argued for policies of "bans" on species exploitation and 
the withdrawal of consumer markets. (Clark, 1973; Spence, 1975). This approach has been 
incorporated into the existing international scheme for the regulation of endangered species: the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).
A more fundamental approach to endangered species policy recognises that the proximate causes of 
species decline (poaching, unmanaged exploitation etc.) are equally the effects of the more 
fundamental causes of endangerment, i.e. the failure to acquire a sufficient proportion of the value 
of the diverse resource to warrant the allocation of resources to the species. A biodiversity policy 
based on the arguments developed within this book would imply the need for substantial reforms to 
the existing regulatory framework.
Specifically, it points to the need to create a "global premium" that is to be conferred upon states 
investing in their diverse resources. This premium performs the function of rewarding investments 
in diverse resources for the nonappropriable services that they render. It also opens the door to the 
pursuit of these alternative pathways to development, so that states with diverse resources are able 
to see the advantages to development without the necessity of conversion.
1.6 The International Regulation of Extinction: Institution-Building for Biodiversity
The solution to the environmental problem of biodiversity losses is easily stated in the abstract; it is 
to compensate the supplier-states for the stock-related services that they render. The more difficult
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problem by far is the creation and implementation of the institution or institutions that will perform 
this task.
To a large extent, problem and solution are side-effects of a human world with many national 
governments. The impacts of state by state conversions are noninternalised on account of multi­
nationality. The difficulties of reintemalising the costliness of these conversions is again a function 
of this global decentralisation. We now live in an era when the global costliness of a world with 
many governments is becoming apparent, even without the costliness of direct conflicts.
The international regulation of extinction requires the creation of an international institution for 
transferring the values of diversity from consumer-states to supplier-states. It is an attempt to provide 
a transnational mechanism to compensate for services that are known as "public goods" in the 
national context. This institutional problem is at the core of the environmental problem of biological 
diversity.
Specifically, this book argues that there is a global community of interest derived from the fact that 
decentralised (multi-national) decision making regarding conversion will lead to local outcomes that 
diverge from global optima. The international regulation of extinction consists of investments by this 
"global community" in international institutions whose purpose it is to generate flows of benefits to 
host states in such a manner that state-level decision making results in local outcomes that more 
closely approximate the global optima.
Much of this book addresses the particular characteristics such an institution must have in order to 
be effective. For example, an effective international institution must provide some manner of 
assurance of future benefits if it is to impact upon the investment decisions of host states. This is 
because investment decisions are decisions regarding assets and the anticipated flows regarding them; 
a state will only deviate from its perceived first-best investment path if the present value of the entire 
flow of future net benefits from such an alteration would appear to warrant it. Therefore, in order to 
have a permanent impact on decision making concerning the selection of development paths, it is 
necessary to make an impact on the perceived benefits from alternative pathways at all points in time.
This indicates that international institution-building should be directed to the permanent alteration 
of the terms of trade between specialised and diverse investments. At present the terms of trade are 
biased toward the specialised forms of resources on account of the relative rates of appropriability
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and rent capture. International institutions could create enhanced benefit flows to investments in 
diversity by one of three potential routes: enhanced rent capture ("international wildlife trade 
regulation"); enhanced appropriability ("international intellectual property rights regimes"); or, direct 
subsidies to nonconversion ("international franchise agreements"). The former regimes operate 
indirectly, by enhancing the returns to diversity-related investments. The latter is direct intervention; 
it provides a stream of benefits in return for the act of nonconversion (also known as a "transferable 
development right").
The argument here is that international institution-building must focus instead on the creation of 
alternative pathways to development, not the acquisition of a society’s right to develop. The 
distinction is fine, but crucial. First, a focus on alternative pathways emphasises the importance of 
creating a constructive outlet for the fundamental human drive for advancement; purchasing rights 
to specific routes for advancement leaves this process undirected. Secondly, the particular pathway 
emphasised - development from diversity - implies an assumption about the specific nature of global 
environmental problems. The assumption is that these problems derive less from the general scale 
of all human activities than from the extreme scale of very specific human activities. Environmental 
systems are able to withstand higher levels of many diverse activities (drawing upon many different 
resources and systems) than lower levels of human activity concentrated on a single resource sector 
or system.
It is the uniformity of development as much as it scale that depletes environmental resources. 
Investing in diverse pathways for development is therefore synonymous with investment in a broad 
range of these resources and systems. International institution-building for biodiversity should have 
these considerations as its general objective.
1.7 The Internationa] Regulation of Extinction: Prospects and Prospectus
In the summer of 1992 the global community met in Rio de Janeiro and discussed most of the issues 
that are the subjects of this book. One of the end results of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development was the adoption of a text for an international convention on the 
conservation of biological diversity.
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The language and legal content of this convention is, at present, exceedingly vague, representing 
unspecified undertakings on the part of the developed world to "transfer technology" and to 
"compensate increased costliness" in return for unformed commitments on the part of the developing 
world to "conserve diverse resources" and to "manage biological diversity". This agreement is of the 
nature of a "framework convention". It identifies the issues being discussed and the parties to the 
negotiations, but it goes only a very small distance in the direction of a solution.
It is the thesis of this book that the major difficulty facing the parties to these ongoing negotiations 
is an understanding of the problem with which they are dealing. Only after a common conceptual 
framework for viewing the problem is agreed can the nature of a solution be identified. It is the 
purpose of this book to make a first attempt at these tasks. First, it attempts to define and defend a 
scientific framework within which the global problem of biodiversity might be approached. Then, 
with the nature of the problem identified, it attempts to specify the nature of the solution indicated 
by the form of the problem.
Therefore, the purpose of this volume is to provide afsubstantive basis for the development of an 
effective international management regime for the conservation of biological diversity. That is, it is 
an attempt to "fill in the blanks" of the biodiversity convention.
/f
ThisFtaskJis accomplished in the context of ten chapters, in the following fashion. First, chaptei/two]
\  J
provides the reader with some concrete illustrations of some of the theoretical points that underlie the 
argument It provides some background material in order to substantiate the "stylised facts" on which 
the remainder of the analysis is built.
ChapterFthreej^ a review of the economics literature of extinction, and an introduction to a more 
fundamental approach to the issue. This chapter demonstrates that the existing literature focuses on 
the proximate, rather than the more fundamental causes o f extinction, and therefore provides 
misleading conclusions for extinction policies. It argues for an overhaul of both extinction theory 
and policy.
Chapte^fbur)s an attempt to provide a new theory of human-sourced extinctions. It commences with 
a very brief review of some of the biological literature on extinction. It then draws the distinction 
between the natural process of extinction and the current, human-sourced, extinction problem. And, 
most importantly, it demonstrates that the prior explanations of human-sourced extinctions,
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mismanagement and overexploitation, cannot explain the nature of the current extinction process. 
Extinctions, and diverse species decline, have been too closely linked with the expansion of the
"management", i.e. human re-shaping, of the biosphere for the purposes of the advancement of human 
wealth and fitness is the base explanation for the decline of diverse species. Therefore, chapter four 
outlines the nature of the global conversion process, and argues that this is the fundamental 
explanation for diversity depletion.
Chapt the previous two chapters with the following two. It provides a theoretical analysis
of state decision making regarding the management of its natural resources. Since all natural 
resources are potentially "common" resources, it is necessary to discern why the state decides to 
allocate different forms of management structures to different resources. Chapter 5 demonstrates that 
one of the investment decisions that a state must make is the extent to which it will invest in the 
development of institutions to manage its resources, and that when investments are not justifiable then 
resources go unmanaged. When biological resources are unmanaged, overexploitation is assured. 
Therefore, chapter five demonstrates that overexploitation is underinvestment, i.e. even species 
declines that match up with the previous ("open access overexploitation") theories of extinction are 
determined by more fundamental forces. In this way, this chapter demonstrates in specifics what 
chapters three and four argued in generalities.
More importantly, chapter five also provides the underlying model of the state’s decision making 
framework which establishes the basis for the ensuing four chapters on the international regulation 
of biological diversity. That is, since terrestrial resources are national resources, the nature of 
international regulation must necessarily be one of intervening within national decision making 
processes. Chapter five (specifically, equation (5.16)) establishes the basic model upon which the 
remainder of the book is built
Chapter jsixestablishes the general objective of the optimal policy for biodiversity conservation. It 
shows that the fundamental objective of biodiversity policy is to manage the global conversion 
process in order to maximise global benefits. Then, it demonstrates the nature of those global 
benefits, specifically the nature of the value of evolutionary outputs. This chapter studies the trade­
off between the benefits received from further conversions and the global costliness implicit in the 
further decline of diversity.
human niche to have been the result of mismanagement. Rather, it is the case that human
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Chapter seven analyses the general nature of the international agreement required for biodiversity 
conservation. Biodiversity conservation requires intervention within the host state's decision making 
framework, and this institution-building of a very specific form. Specifically, it requires ongoing 
investments by the global community in order to alter the present value of the flow of benefits from 
further conversions. This chapter investigates how this objective might be accomplished via the 
instrument of direct subsidies within the context of international agreements.
An alternative to the alteration of the net benefits from conversion is intervention to enhance the 
benefits received from investments in diverse resources. This implies institution-building to either 
enhance rent capture or appropriability with regard to diverse resource flows. Chapter eight provides 
a case study in the difficulties in implementing an international institution for this object It does so 
in the context of analysing the use of another instrument trade regulation, for the conferral of 
enhanced benefits upon diversity suppliers. The international regulation of wildlife trade could be 
translated into a mechanism for rent appropriation, thus making the production of diversity a 
relatively more attractive pathway for development.
Since international institutions have existed in the area of wildlife trade regulation for over twenty 
years, this chapter provides the opportunity for examining the difficulties involved in the actual 
implementation and evolution of an international instrument for diversity conservation. It 
demonstrates the maze of legal and institutional complexities that arise in the implementation of a 
simple concept such as rent enhancement.
Chapter nine examines the most controversial element in the diversity regulator’s arsenal: intellectual 
property rights. It analyses the basic character of this instrument, used for the purpose of providing 
incentives for informational investments. It then examines its applicability in the conservation 
context. The idea of intellectual property right regimes is to render certain forms of inappropriable 
services appropriable, by state sequestration of a product market monopoly. The range of societal 
objectives to which this instrument has been applied has to date been fairly narrow, essentially 
consisting of those forms of services that result from investments in human capital. Chapter nine 
argues for the extension of the same regime for the protection of investments in natural capital.
1.8 Conclusion
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The international regulation of extinction requires international institution-building for the purpose 
of creating alternative pathways to development. To the present, the incentives for international 
institution-building have of course been based around already existing industries and the development 
path that they imply. The problem with this approach to international institutions is that this dictates 
the use of the same development paths by those states considering their initial steps toward 
development as were used by those states which have already developed. In this way, existing 
institutions generate a progression toward a uniform, nondiverse world.
The problem with this is that the depletion of diversity has its own costliness. As each successive 
state embarks upon the precise same pathway to development, commencing with the conversion of 
its biological resources, the costliness of this conversion decision is increasing. The sequential 
selection of the same development path, and the consequent concentration on the same resources and 
systems, creates unnecessary pressures on these sectors. As the last states to embark on this 
development path convert the remainders of diversity, the global costliness of their decisions could 
be virtually limitless. Global environmental problems derive as much from the sameness of human 
activities as from their scale.
International institution-building must be re-focused in order to provide development options suited 
to the initial conditions of these last, developing countries. That is, it is necessary to invest in 
institutions that are suited only to the encouragement of development from diversity, as much as it 
is to invest in institutions that are suited only to conversion. This is the first step to conserving 
diversity on earth: institutional, economical and biological.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF EXTINCTION - AN OVERVIEW
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an/overview of the argument bf the book, together with 
some concrete examples of its primary and policy implications. Section two presents an outline of 
the nature of the global conversion process, and its impact on global extinction and development. 
Section three presents a depiction of the global biodiversity problem; it is shown that this problem 
results from the existing decentralised approach to the global conversion process. It is necessary to 
construct an international system of regulation for a global resource. Section four provides an outline 
of the optimal policy for managing the global conversion process. It shows that an optimal policy 
will work through internalising the values of diversity, in order to counterbalance the values of 
conversion. This will bring the global effects of national conversion policies within the decision 
making processes of the owner-states.
2.2 The Global Conversion Process: Forces Driving the Global Extinction Process
Extinctions now result from the failure of human societies to invest in certain species. The 
fundamental source of the global extinction process is the human reconstruction of the global 
portfolio of biological resources on which they rely, from which most biological resources (the so- 
called "diverse" resources) are being excluded. When a given species is not selected for inclusion 
within this portfolio, then it is subjected to the forces for disinvestment that lead to its decline.
This process is termed the globed conversion process, and it has existed on earth for nearly ten 
thousand years. Since that time, human societies have applied new technologies which are imbedded 
in a small slate of specific species (the domesticated and cultivated varieties). It is the extension of 
this technological change, for the advancement of human wealth and fitness, that is the fundamental 
force for extinction operational today.
2.2.1 Distinguishing Fundamental and Consequential Causation in Extinction
Although the fundamental force generating biodiversity losses is the omission of many species from 
this global portfolio, the proximate cause of a given species* decline may be one of several, 
consequential types. Exclusion implies disinvestment in the species, but the nature of the 
disinvestment process depends upon the nature of the species and its relationship to human society.
First, the species may be seen as valuable, but not as an asset (i.e. not as a resource with potential for 
growth); then it will be perceived to be optimal to harvest the entire stock of the species in order to 
invest the return in another, more productive asset This is direct "stock disinvestment" for 
conversion to another, preferred asset An example of this form of disinvestment would probably be 
much of the deforestation that has occured over the past few hundred years.
Second, a species may not be perceived as valuable, as an asset or otherwise, and thus it will not be 
worthy of substantial investments in the ancillary resources required for its maintenance. The most 
obvious requirement for species survival is an allocation of "base resources": the natural habitat that 
it requires for its sustenance. When a species is not selected for society’s asset portfolio, then the 
allocation of base resources which it depends upon for survival is usually diverted to the use of other, 
chosen assets. An example of this form of disinvestment would probably be the projected losses of 
general diversity (unclassified insects, plants, etc.) set to occur in the tropical zones over the next 
century.
Third, the species may be seen as valuable, but not valuable enough to warrant the allocation of the 
resources required for a managed disinvestment programme. Then the species will again incur 
disinvestment, but on this occasion the disinvestment will occur by reason of the lack of investment 
in the management of access to the species or its habitat. This results in what is commonly called 
"open access overexploitation". An example of this form of disinvestment would probably be the 
decline of many of the large land mammal species, such as the rhinoceros and the elephant.
Although these three routes to disinvestment are the visible layer of causation in the extinction 
process, the more fundamental forces lie beneath these within the decision making processes 
regarding society’s asset portfolio. The important issues concern the nature of this selection process, 
and the forces driving it toward global homogenisation.
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The process of the selection of assets for society’s portfolio is an economic decision, determined by 
forces that shape the perceived relative advantageousness of different assets. These fundamental 
forces are re-shaping the biosphere by creating the impression that nondiverse resources are relatively 
advantageous assets as compared with diverse resources. The next three sections discuss this 
distinction between diverse and nondiverse, and the forces that operate to cause humans to uniformly 
select the latter over the former.
2.2.2 The Conversion Process and the Biosphere
In composing their optimal portfolio of assets, human societies must choose between the many 
different forms of assets in which they might hold their aggregate wealth. If the optimal portfolio 
determined by this process is different from the initial, then there will be incentives to convert some 
existing assets to other forms. This implies disinvestment in some naturally occurring assets, and 
investment in some other human-preferred ones.
This incentive to disinvest in the naturally-occurring stock of assets in order to invest in the human- 
selected is the "conversion process". The natural form of any resource is necessarily competitive with 
other forms in which humans might hold these same assets. This derives from the fact that humans 
now have the capability to choose whether to hold terrestrial natural resources in their original form, 
or to substitute another. (Solow,R. 1974).
This force for conversion applies even to biological resources. For example, a given hectare of land, 
which is originally growing diverse native grasses, may be converted directly to another grassy plant 
form such as wheat, because of the enhanced productivity of this resource. Alternatively (and less 
directly), a tropical forest may be logged and sold with the funds then invested in other national assets 
(such as education), resulting in the conversion of the natural asset to, e.g., human capital.
Economic development in human societies derives in part from the substitution of the more 
productive assets for the less productive, i.e. from the conversion process. However, the application 
of this economic process on a global basis is one of the primary forces contributing to diversity 
losses. The initial, local conversions of natural resources had little impact on the global portfolio of 
assets, but the occurrence of thousands and millions of these discrete conversions has generated a 
phenomenon of worldwide importance.
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In effect, the global conversion process may be conceived of as the diffusion of the idea of asset 
conversion across the globe, from state to state. On its arrival, the state on the existing margin has 
the opportunity to restructure its national investment portfolio, and hence its natural resources. The 
global biodiversity problem comes to our attention at this point in time because these processes of 
conversion are now working their way towards the last refugia on earth. The majority of the world’s 
remaining species reside in a small number of the world’s states. (Table 2.1) These are the same states 
that have been the last to have substantial parts of their territories remaining unconverted.
Table 2.1: Countries with Greatest "Species Richness"
Mammals Birds Reptiles
Indonesia (515) Colombia (1721) Mexico (717)
Mexico (449) Peru (1701) Australia (686)
Brazil (428) Brazil (1622) Indonesia (600)
Zaire (409) Indonesia (1519) India (383)
China (394) Ecuador (1447) Colombia (383)
Peru (361) Venezuela (1275) Ecuador (345)
Colombia (359) Bolivia (1250) Peru (297)
India (350) India (1200) Malaysia (294)
Uganda (311) Malaysia (1200) Thailand (282)
Tanzania (310) China (1195) Papua N.G. (282)
Source: McNeely et. al. 1990. Conserving the World’s Biological Diversity. International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature: Gland,Switzerland.
Asset conversion that has occurred for millenia on a local and regional scale has now aggregated to 
become a force at the global level. At base, this restructuring of the global portfolio of biological 
assets is driven by the desire for human development gains obtained from the conversion of assets 
to more productive forms. However, as this basic strategy for human development reaches the final 
refugia of many of the world’s species, it is projected that a cataclysmic "mass extinction" of species 
may result. (Hhrlich^P. and Ehrlich,A. 1981; Lovejoy,T„ 1980).
Therefore, at the very base of the biodiversity problem is the capability of humans to change the 
nature of the biosphere from its natural to a human-preferred form. The gains from conversion, and
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the drive for human development and fitness, have been causing the restructuring of the biosphere 
on a regional basis for several millenia. Now, with the diffusion of this strategy to the final terrestrial 
frontiers, conversion of the biosphere seems set to occur on a global basis.
2.23  The Nature of the Global Conversion Process
Reconstruction of the portfolio of biological assets on a global basis is a powerful force, capable of 
re-shaping the whole of the earth’s biosphere. However, it is not in itself sufficient to explain the 
potential for a mass extinction. For this, an explanation must be found that will generate not only an 
expected reshaping of the global portfolio of natural assets, but also a narrowing of that portfolio.
Conversion as an economic force explains only why it is the case that the natural slate of biological 
resources might be replaced by another on any given parcel of land, depending upon relative 
productivities, but it does not explain why a small number of species would replace millions across 
the whole of the earth. That is, this force implies conversion but not necessarily homogenisation. 
In order to explain the global losses of biodiversity, i.e. a narrowing o f the global portfolio, it is 
necessary to identify the nature of the force that would generate this homogenisation of the global 
biosphere.
It is unlikely that a wholly natural process would drive the world toward less diversity. This would 
require the evolution of both biological generalists (species with superior productivity across many 
niches) and uniform human tastes (across the globe). In fact, the current drive toward uniformity is 
contrary to the very idea of evolutionary fitness. Fitness implies competitive adaptation to the 
specific contours of a certain niche. The evolutionary process generates species that are well-adapted 
to their own specific niches through a process of niche refinement; that is, a surviving species 
represents a "good fit" to its own niche. (Eltringham, 1985).
It is equally unlikely that human tastes are so uniform as to demand the homogenisation of biological 
resources. Communities "co-evolve" in order to better fit with the system in which they participate. 
It would be expected that the preferences of predators would be determined generally by their 
available prey species. In fact, there is ample evidence to support this expectation that human 
communities would prefer to consume the resources they depended upon traditionally.
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This indicates that the depletion of diversity is not a natural phenomenon; rather, it is a socio­
economic one. There are good reasons to believe that prevailing methods of production are biased 
against the maintenance of a wide range of diversity. The idea of agriculture, that originated about 
ten thousand years ago in the Near East, was centred on the idea of creating species-specific 
technologies. This implied the inclusion of two new important factors of production in the production 
of biological goods: species-specific capital goods and species-specific learning.
In terms of biological resources, the capital goods applied in production are the chemicals, machinery 
and other tools of agriculture. These capital goods usually do not enhance the photosynthetic 
productivity of the biosphere; rather, they increase its productivity by means of the mass production 
of large quantities of a homogeneous output from much-reduced inputs from other factors, e.g. 
labour.
The productivity gains in agriculture go hand-in-hand with diversity losses; in fact, they are often 
derived from the reductions in diversity. For example, farm machinery is developed to work in fields 
that are planted uniformly in a single crop. Chemicals are fine-tuned to eliminate all competitors of 
a single species. The fields themselves are "cleared", for the introduction of the machinery and 
chemicals of the production process. These capital goods are effective precisely because of the 
homogeneous environment within which they operate, and they create incentives for conversion by 
reason of their effectiveness.
At present, this process of conversion is working its way across the developing world, having 
completed its journey through the developed world. The frontier is discernible by reference to the 
relative rates of conversion and capital good accumulation. For example, the number of tractors in 
Africa increased by 29% over the past ten years; they increased by 82% in South America; and by 
128% in Asia. During the same period the number of tractors decreased by 4% in North America. 
(World Resources Institute, 1990). It is the extension of this previously successful strategy for 
development to the four comers of the earth that is at the base of the concerns about what is presently 
happening to the biosphere.
The other important factor introduced into the production of biological goods was species-specific 
learning. With more experience with a particular species, it was possible to become even more
2.2.3 Global Nonconvexities: Convergence on Specialised Varieties of Species
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efficient in its production (by reason of increased understanding of its biological nature, as well 
intervention to determine the same). This information became another crucial factor for agricultural 
production, but it existed only in one form - embedded in the received forms of the domesticated and 
cultivated varieties.
Agriculture originated approximately ten thousand years ago in the Near East. It consisted of a set 
of ideas, a set of tools, and a set of selected species. At that time and in that locale, each of these 
selections was locally optimal. However, the set of ideas-technology-species were transported out 
of that region as a single unit, as the continuing investments in this combination caused the ideas and 
tools to become embedded in the chosen species.
A nonconvexity was introduced within the decision making process, by reason of the nonrival nature 
of the information embedded in the specialised species (that would be costly to produce for any 
diverse species). The is the essential difference between the specialised (domesticated) species and 
the diverse (wildlife) species. For one group, an information set is publicly available as an input into 
their production; for the other, it is necessary to construct that same information.
The global conversion process has consisted of the extension of these chosen species’ ranges. As a 
consequence, much of the face of the earth has been re-shaped in order to suit these few species and 
the tools used in their production. It is the diffusion of this "bundle" of ideas-tools-species that is at 
the base of the biodiversity problem.
Therefore, it is not simply the globalisation of the strategy of asset conversion that is determining the 
global portfolio, it is also the special way in which conversion occurs under agriculture. It is the 
perceived gain from the substitution of the specialised biological resources for the diverse that is 
generating an ever more narrow portfolio. It is this force, now acting globally, that is shaping the 
incentives for investment, and hence extinction.
This is a form of dynamic externality in operation with regard to decision making concerning the 
production of biological goods. That is, subsequent choices regarding conversions are being 
determined by previous ones. In the context of the biosphere, this nonconvexity is creating a "natural 
monopoly" for a small number of species. The biosphere is converging upon this small, select group 
of specialised species as the sole providers of biological goods to human societies.
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An increasingly narrow roster of species meets all of the needs of humankind. Of the thousands of 
plant species which are deemed edible and adequate substitutes for human consumption, there are 
now only twenty which produce the vast majority of the world’s food. (Plotkin,M. 1988). In fact, 
the four big carbohydrate crops (wheat, maize, rice and potatoes) feed more people than the next 
twenty-six crops together. (Witt,S. 1985). The same applies with regard to protein sources. The 
Production Yearbook of the Food and Agricultural Organisation lists only a handful of domesticated 
species (sheep, goats, cattle, pigs etc.) which supply nearly all of the terrestrial-sourced protein for 
the vast majority of humans. The number of domesticated cattle on the globe (currently over 1.2 
billion or one for every four humans) continues to increase, while the numbers of almost all other 
species continue in decline.
The same is true with regard to variety within a species. Not only are human societies becoming 
more reliant upon a narrower range of species, they are also becoming reliant upon specific varieties 
of these species. Specialisation works beyond the species level of genetic convergence to produce 
a technically calibrated uniform biological asset.
The global diffusion of specialised species is demonstrated in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. The first table 
provides a static portrait of the progress of this technological change in the period 1978-81. It shows 
that some developing countries had already embraced this strategy of specialisation (e.g. Philippines 
with 78% of their rice production converted) while others were only just initiating the process (e.g. 
Thailand with only 9% of the same).
Table 2.2 Area Devoted to Modern Rice Varieties (7 Asian Countries 1978-1981)
Country Year 1000 ha % of Rice Area
Bangladesh 1981 2325 22
India 1980 18495 47
Sri Lanka 1980 612 71
Burma 1980 1502 29
Indonesia 1980 5416 60
Philippines 1980 2710 78
Thailand 1979 800 9
Source: Hazell, P.B JR. (1985) "The Impact of the Green Revolution and the Prospects for the 
Future" Food Reviews International Vol.l, No.l, (1985)
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Table 2.3 shows the progress of this process within individual states. In those states that initiated 
modem agricultural specialisation (e.g. the U.S.A.), food production is now almost entirely 
specialised (the majority of food production involving only a few varieties of a small number of 
species). In the states adopting the strategy more recently, this "scoping in" process has reduced the 
number of varieties in production from thousands to a few in a small amount of time.
Table 23  Examples of Genetic Uniformity in Selected Crops
Crop Country Number of Varieties
Rice Sri Lanka
Rice India 
Rice Bangladesh 
Rice Indonesia 
Wheat USA 
Potato USA 
Cotton USA 
Soybean USA
from 2,000 varieties in 1959 to 5 major varieties today Rhoades 1991 
75 % of varieties descended from one maternal parent Hargrove et al. 1988 
from 30,000 varieties to 75% of production from less than 10 varieties 
62% ofvarieties descended from one maternal parent Hargroveetal. 1988 
74% of varieties descended from one maternal parent Hargrove et al. 1988 
50% of crop in 9 varieties National Academy of Science 1972
75% of crop in 4 varieties NAS 1972
50% of crop in 3 varieties NAS 1972
50% of crop in 6 varieties NAS 1972
Source: World Conservation Monitoring Centre, "Valuing Biodiversity" in World
Conservation Monitoring Centre, Global Biological Diversity, Chapman and Hall:London.
The fundamental nature of the biodiversity problem derives from this particular form of the global 
re-structuring of the biological asset portfolio. Diverse resources suffer from disinvestment primarily 
because these few specialised varieties monopolise society’s investments in biological assets. The 
net effect is the displacement of the former by the latter on a global basis.
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2.2.5 The "Uneven" Nature of Global Conversion: Human Development and Diversity
These conversions from diverse to specialised resources have generated substantial worldwide 
productivity gains. World cereal production grew at an average annual rate of 2.7% between 1960 
and 1983. (Hazell, 1989). For example, the substitution of specialised rice varieties for diverse is 
estimated to increase yields by 1.0 tonne/hectare on irrigated lands, and by 0.75 tonne/hectare on 
nonirrigated lands. (CIAT, 1981). Although the conversion of lands from diverse to specialised 
production methods must reduce global diversity, it is apparent that these losses are compensated for, 
and driven by, development gains.
The economic relationship between conversion and development is demonstrated in part by the state 
of human development in the "diversity rich" states. (Table 2.4) Almost without exception, these 
are some of poorest nations on earth in terms of human wealth. They range between one and seven 
per cent of the OECD average per capita income. Although non-human species are faring relatively 
well in these countries, the human species is doing comparatively poorly.
Table 2.4: GNP per capita in the Species Rich States
Country
Tanzania
Zaire
Uganda
Ecuador
China/India
1988 GNP p.c. Country
$ 160 
$ 170 
$ 280 
$ 284 
$ 340
Papua,NG
Thailand
Bolivia
Colombia
Peru
1988 GNP p.c. 
$ 810 
$ 1000 
$ 1099 
$ 1139 
$ 1300
OECD Average $ 17,400
Source: The World Bank 1990. World Development Report. World Bank:Washington, D.C.
From this perspective, the decline of diversity has been closely linked with the human development 
process. The drive for wealth and fitness has been the fundamental force causing humans to practice 
conversion. The conversion of biological resources took the form of substituting the specialised 
species for the diverse, causing diversity to decline. This then generated a gain for that human
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society, a gain that could be allocated to either increased wealth or fitness. Thus, conversion, and 
especially conversion to the specialised species, has been a strategy for generating human 
development gains.
To date, much of the gain achieved from this strategy has been expended on the expansion of the 
human niche. For the human species, a revolution in niche expansion has occurred over the last ten 
thousand years. Scientists estimate that the introduction of the ideas of agriculture at that time 
coincided with a "take off' in the level of the human population. Since that time, the human 
population has expanded from approximately ten million to approaching ten billion individuals.
Despite the scale of the human population, it remains the method of appropriation that is the gravest 
threat to diversity. This has been demonstrated in various ecological studies. The ultimate scarce 
resource, biologically speaking, is known as Net Primary Product (NPP). This is the total biomass 
generated by the process of photosynthesis on this planet. It is also the total amount of usable solar 
energy available for the sustenance of all life forms on earth. The expansion of the human niche has 
resulted in the exclusion of most other species from a substantial part of NPP. Ecological studies 
show that the human species now appropriates about forty per cent of this global product. 
(VitousekJ*., Ehrlich,P., Ehrlich, A. and MatsonJ3., 1986).
Most importantly, however, this study argues that the vast majority (90%) of all human niche 
appropriation occurs "indirectly", i.e. for reasons other than direct use. This demonstrates that it is 
human niche appropriation, rather than human niche expansion, that is currently endangering all of 
diversity. The concepts are able to be un-linked.
In essence, the global process of diversity depletion is an instrument for human societal advancement. 
Diversity depletion contributes to human development process through the enrichment of one species 
by means of the (indirect) appropriation of the resource bases of millions of others.
The conversion process has been working sequentially through the states of the earth. It is not 
difficult to ascertain the approximate location of the technological frontier in this context. For 
example, data on worldwide land use trends document the rates at which conversions of lands to uses 
in specialised agricultural production have been occurring. Between 1960 and 1980, the developing 
world in aggregate increased its land area dedicated to standard specialised crops by 37%, while the 
developed world experienced a small decrease in the same. (Repetto and Gillis, 1988). Therefore,
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deforestation and land use changes continue to occur on large scales in those countries with natural 
resources remaining to convert; it cannot do otherwise. For example, the amount of "wilderness" (i.e. 
20 sq. km. of unaltered landscape) on the European continent is now virtually zero, versus a global 
average of approximately thirty per cent. (World Resources Institute, 1990). These states of the 
"North" are the "already converted" states; it is only a small selection of the states of the "South" that 
retain a significant amount of diverse resources.
At present, the forces for specialised conversions have moved to the boundaries of the last handful 
of states with substantial amounts of unconverted territory: Brazil (and the other Amazonian states), 
Zaire, Indonesia and a few others. These states are in a rapid phase of development and conversion, 
following in the paths of all those states that have gone before. One indicator of the rate of this 
change is the scale and extent of the land use conversions and deforestation occurring in these 
countries. Another facet of such conversions is the routing of the productivity gains achieved. Still, 
these gains are usually routed initially to the expansion of the human niche, and this is indicated by 
the growth in the human populations on the conversion frontier. (Table 2.5)
Table 2.5: Population Growth in the Species-Rich States (Per cent per annum, 1980-90)
State Growth Rate State Growth Rate
Tanzania 3.1 Papua,NG 2.5
Zaire 3.2 Thailand 1.8
Uganda 2.5 Bolivia 2.5
Ecuador 2.4 Colombia 2.0
China 1.4 Peru 2.3
India 2.1
OECD Average 0.6
Source: The World Bank 1992. World Development Report. World Bank: Washington, D.C.
Therefore, development (human development) is a process that has been driven in part by the process 
of conversion. This has resulted in a remarkable asymmetry in the world. The states with high 
"material wealth" have low "diversity wealth", and vice versa. The problem of biodiversity stems 
primarily from the attempts of the remaining, unconverted states to follow this same development
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path. At present, the margin of the global conversion process rests at the threshhold of the last refugia 
for diverse biological resources.
2.3 The Global Problem of Biological Diversity: Regulating the Global Conversion Process
The global biodiversity problem (as a regulatory problem) derives from the fact that this conversion 
process has been regulated on a globally decentralised basis. That is, each state has been able to make 
the conversion decision regarding its resources without reference to the potential global effects. This 
creates an important regulatory problem because the cost - in terms of the value of lost services - of 
each successive conversion is not the same. The global stocks of biological diversity generate a flow 
of services to all societies on earth. The first subtractions from global stocks did little to hinder the 
flow of these services, but the final subtractions from these stocks will render these flows nonexistent. 
As the last refugia for diverse species dwindle, the cost of each successive conversion (in terms of 
diverse resource services lost) escalates rapidly.
Although it may be threatening the existence of a flow of services from global stocks of biological 
diversity, the continued depletion of these stocks may nevertheless be to the benefit of the individual 
or society that is undertaking i t  This is the nature of the regulatory problem of biodiversity losses - 
it is a conflict between what is in the interests of the development of the individual country and 
necessary for the protection of production system relied upon by the global community. The 
individual country simply wishes to undertake the conversion process, as have all states that have 
preceded it in this development process, while the global community wishes to internalise the global 
costliness of the final conversions to these last, unconverted states.
Therefore, the global policy problem of biodiversity losses involves the management of the global 
conversion process so as to reach the correct endpoint, taking into consideration the "global 
externalities" that individual societies do not. That is, it is necessary to ascertain a "global stopping 
rule" that will determine when the marginal conversion is not globally beneficial, and then alter the 
decision making framework of the marginal state so that the conversion will not occur.
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the nature of the global conversion process, and the regulatory problem 
concerning it (or, the global biodiversity problem). It shows that the development process drives 
society to convert more and more of its land area to specialised uses over time. Each such conversion
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confers a gain upon human society - the value of converting between assets - and thus continues to 
drive the conversion (and development) process. The pertinent question then becomes: What forces 
might halt the conversion process prior to total conversion? What countervailing force is there to 
offset the effects of the force for specialised conversions?
[Figure 2.1]
It is the value of diversity itself that should provide the stopping point in the global conversion 
process. That is, with successive conversions, the quantities of lands in specialised production will 
be increasing while the quantities in diverse resources decline; at some point in this process, the 
relative values of the two uses might switch, so that the use of the land in diverse resources is 
preferred. It is the value of biological diversity that should arrest the conversion process at its optimal 
point The stock of global diversity provides important inputs into the processes of biological 
production, and it is this value (and not the individual values of the biological materials themselves) 
that is the essential force to be given effect within the biodiversity regulatory process.
Without intervention, it is very unlikely that this force will be of any effect. As indicated, the main 
source of benefits from diverse resources lies in their "stock-related values". In other words, these 
are benefits that accrue to the world at large, rather than to the state hosting them. Such diffuse 
values will not in general be taken into consideration in state decision making regarding conversion. 
If diverse biological resources are systematically undervalued, then they will be too readily converted 
to their specialised substitutes. This will result in the retention of a quantity of diverse resource 
stocks that is less than optimal.
Figure 2.2 demonstrates how the nonappropriability of these stock-related values will lead to the 
mistargeting of the conversion process. That is, this is a diagram illustrating the impact of the 
conversion process over the very long run, as conversions erode the remaining diverse resource 
stocks, on the relative values of lands in specialised and diverse biological resources.
[Figure 2.2]
This diagram demonstrates that the quantities of lands dedicated to the production of specialised 
resources in the very long run (allowing all factors to adjust) will be determined by:
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1) Supply of Conversion (S) - This downward-sloping curve represents the internalised 
marginal cost of converting to specialised resources. This curve is perceived to be downward 
sloping because of the increasing returns to scale available to capital-intensive methods of 
production. Each state that decides to convert its resources incurs decreasing costliness 
because of the fixed costs incurred by its predecessors.
2) Demand for Conversion (D) - This is the perceived benefit to the marginal state from the 
conversion of its resources (i.e. re-shaping its portfolio from diversity to specialisation). This 
benefit is declining because there is consumer resistance to the acceptance of specialised 
substitutes for some natural resources. It is also declining because the by-products of 
conversion, i.e. human niche expansion and development, probably yield positive benefits 
(with consequent population growth, urbanisation and industrialisation) but at a declining 
rate as these characteristics become less scarce with additional conversions.
3) Marginal Cost of Conversion (MC) - One of the important marginal costs of the 
conversion of lands from diverse resources to specialised is the opportunity cost of foregone 
diverse resource stocks. These costs are included in MC, but not in S, because these 
represent the "true" rather than the "supply" costs of conversions.
The optimal quantity of lands dedicated to specialised production is represented by the point Q*, 
which is where the marginal piece of land remains unconverted because the benefits of conversion 
are no greater than the actual benefits flowing from its retention in its natural state.
The divergence of the S and the MC curves in Figure 2.2 provides the explanation for the 
mistargeting of the global conversion process. In this scenario, the supply curve for specialised lands 
is misperceived, because of the failure to internalise the full costliness of specialised production. The 
global externalities are not being considered in the supply cost of marginal lands, and as these are 
increasing with each successive conversion (and especially when the final stocks are endangered), 
the supply curves deviate from one another more substantially with each conversion. The individual 
or state making the conversion decision considers only this costliness (within a "decentralised" 
regulatory framework), and thus an excessive quantity of specialised lands (Qd) results (possibly even 
total conversion).
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The global problem of biodiversity is the result of this decentralised approach to the global 
conversion process. Each state has converted its lands to specialised resource production without 
consideration of the stock-related costliness of these decisions. Early conversions were able to be 
undertaken at low global costliness (because S and MC did not diverge significantly when substantial 
quantities of other stocks remained). However, as the final stages of the conversion process are 
undertaken, this divergence becomes increasingly severe and ultimately unbounded. The global 
problem of biodiversity involves the creation of an international regulatory mechanism which will 
bring this divergence within the decision making framework of the remaining, unconverted states.
2.4 Optimal Biodiversity Policy: Appropriating the Values of Global Biological Diversity
The divergence between the two supply curves (actual and perceived) in Figure 2.2 represents the 
value of biological diversity. The area between the two curves represents the total value of biological 
diversity (ultimately unbounded), while the distance between the two curves at any particular point 
in the conversion process is the marginal value of biological diversity. That is, the difference 
between MC and S at a particular point in the conversion process is the value of marginal stock of 
diversity resources under consideration for conversion. It is the marginal value o f biological diversity 
that should halt the conversion process, but is unable to do so when this value is not appropriable.
The optimal policy for the global problem of biological diversity is to ensure that the states acting as 
the providers of diverse resource services appropriate this marginal value of their remaining stocks 
of diverse resources. The implementation of this policy will halt the global conversion process at the 
optimal point from the global perspective. This means that the understanding and appropriation of 
the value of diverse resources is the key to optimal biodiversity policy.
Diverse resource stocks have always provided value to human societies. Besides their obvious 
existence values, they also have an important role as inputs into the biological production system, 
even into the very specialised system that currently exists. Specifically, diverse resource stocks are 
useful for the insurance and informational services that they supply for the maintenance of the 
biological production system that supports human societies.
In essence, unconverted lands contain the output from a four and a half billion year old evolutionary 
process, which is valuable for the information and insurance contained in the diversity that that
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process has generated. Evolution generates insurance as a core component of that process; a diversity 
of life forms has been generated in order to protect life itself against environmental shifts and shocks. 
Evolution generates information because this range of life forms have co-evolved in the context of 
biological communities, and the nature of these interactions constitutes a living glossary of the 
possible forms that biological activity may take. Therefore, diverse resource systems, as the endpoint 
of this four and a half billion year process, contain irreplaceable information and insurance services.
On the other hand, lands that have been subjected to the forces of human specialisation bear little 
relation to the biosphere that evolution originally placed there. Specialisation involves a clearing of 
the natural slate, a homogenisation of the environment, in order to allow for the use of the uniform 
varieties and their ancillary tools. Little of the information and insurance generated by evolution 
remains.
Therefore, it is the conservation of the output from the evolutionary process, that should be the core 
concern of biodiversity conservation. These evolutionary outputs may be categorised as information 
value and insurance values, respectively. The general manner in which these evolutionary outputs 
serve as inputs into the modem biological production system is sketched out below.
2.4.1 Information Value of Diverse Resource Stocks
The mere existence of greater diversity (irrespective of the specific components of that diversity) also 
has value. One of the most important services rendered by diversity is information. In fact, in 
Shannon’s meaning of the term, the mere presence of variation constitutes information, and 
uniformity is its absence.
It is also clear that much of the information to be found in biological resources will be particularly 
useful. This is because the process of evolution guarantees that most biological resources will contain 
biologically active ingredients. (Mabberley,D., 1992.) These types of chemicals necessarily result 
in the context of interaction within a biological environment. Hence, most plants, insects and animals 
contain chemicals that act upon the higher organisms that interact with or prey upon them.
The activity of these chemicals can be very constructive in some instances, if properly applied. The 
knowledge that biological resources have evolved in this way is equivalent to knowing the location 
of a massive unorganised library on the subject of "active ingredients". This knowledge does not
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identify where to look for a specific ingredient with a specific action, but it does narrow the scope 
of the search quite substantially away from complete randomness in chemical combinations.
The search for active chemical compounds is an ongoing and well-financed undertaking in the 
pharmaceutical industry. In 1988, this industry invested over $1 billion in the USA alone on 
"Biological Screening and Pharmacological Testing". (Pharmaceutical Manufacters Association: 
Annual Survey Report 1988-1990.) Although it is possible to synthesise chemical compounds from 
information derived from the understanding of the biochemical processes of the human body, there 
appears to be a periodic resurgence in plant-screening for the acquisition of this information. 
(Findeisen,C. 1991.) Only about 5000 plant species have been thoroughly screened for medicinal 
effectiveness, and 40 of these are in use in prescription drugs. One study identified 25% of all U.S. 
prescription drugs as plant-based. (Farnsworth, N., and Soejarto,D. 1985.) This represents a 
substantial amount of real economic value in a $10 billion per annum industry. (Principe,P. 1991.)
The screening process can be rendered even less random by means of the use of the information 
accumulated by the human communities living in contact with diverse resources. These people gather 
this information simply by interacting with their biological environment For example, the important 
drug Tubocurarine was developed from the poison known as curare used on poison-arrows by Latin 
American peoples. (Htis,H., 1988.)
Indigenous peoples’ information is much more useful than a single example demonstrates. A study 
by Farnsworth of 119 commercially useful plant-based drugs identified that 74% of them were in 
prior use by indigenous communities. (Farnsworth,N., 1988.) This is what a biologist would expect, 
and it provides the impetus behind industrial investments in "ethnobotany", the research into 
indigenous peoples’ traditional medicines.
The information emanating from diverse resources is used by industries other than the 
pharmaceutical. For example, many communities raising traditional non-specialised crops have 
known of useful traits of these species which were not incorporated into the standard commodities. 
The most closely related varieties - known as "landraces" - have periodically been used for 
improvements to the standard varieties. The crop breeding enterprise is in fact a major international 
industry, spending $330 million on the research and development of crop varieties in 1988. 
(Hobbelink,H. 1991.) Therefore, plant-screening occurs with regard to more than simply medicinal 
plants.
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In sum, biological diversity contains informational value because it maintains a wider choice set. 
This generates a "quasi-option value", i.e. the value of retaining a wider set of choices in the event 
that the decision making environment "shifts" (equivalently, information arrives) to render the 
retained choices relevant. (Conrad and Clark, 1989.)
It remains to explain why it is that information will necessarily arrive in this particular decision 
making process. In decision making over time, "information" is the occurrence of nondeterministic 
change in the decision making environment. The very nature of the biological world assures 
precisely this result. It is the very essence of a dynamic system, in which the processes of mutation, 
selection and dispersal continuously alter the natural "state of nature". In regard to small organisms, 
such as bacteria, viruses, and insects, these biological processes can occur very rapidly, literally 
reproducing thousands of generations in a single year. The biological process is evolutionary, not 
deterministic, and to the extent that it can be understood, it is too complex to predict. Therefore, in 
a biological world, the retention of a wider set of biological resources must necessarily have positive 
informational value.
2.4.2 Insurance Value of Diverse Resource Stocks
Diversity also represents value on account of the contribution that it makes to the aggregate value of 
a production portfolio. Biological assets are necessarily productive assets, in the sense that they 
naturally generate growth with time. The tendency towards specialisation in biological assets 
generates a global production method that is increasingly at risk, precisely because it necessarily 
generates a narrowing of the global portfolio.
Diverse resources have a role as the providers of insurance for ongoing biological production. Again, 
this role exists in the first instance by definition. This is because insurance services flow whenever 
the range of productive assets is broadened. If each of a large number of productive assets has a 
stochastic element to its rate of return, then (to the extent that these elements are uncorrelated) the 
return to the combined package of assets will have a reduced variance relative to the variances of the 
individual components. This is known as "the portfolio effect", and it derives from the fact that 
chance variations in output from different assets will tend to cancel each other out if the portfolio is 
large enough.
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Since all biological resources are productive assets (in the sense that they grow and reproduce), the 
retention of the greatest possible diversity will maximise this portfolio effect, thereby assuring the 
least amount of risk in biological production. The conversion process, on the other hand, substitutes 
specialisation for diversity, and therefore would be expected to increase average productivity while 
reducing the portfolio effect Table 2.6 demonstrates that, on a global basis and over the twenty-three 
year period studied, variability in annual production has been increasing along with the average.
Table 2.6. Impact of Worldwide Agricultural Specialisation on Average Productivity and
Variability in Productivity. (Worldwide Cereal Production, 1960-1970,1971-1983)
Years Average Productivity Gain Average Variability
(Ave. Annual Rate over 23 yrs.) (Coefficient of Variation)
2.7%
1960-1970 0.028
1971-1983 0.034
Source: HazellJ*. 1989. "Changing Patterns of Variability in World Cereal Production", in 
Anderson,J. and Hazell J*.. Variability in Grain Yields, World Bank: Washington,D.C.
This general worldwide phenomenon is much more pronounced in regard to those areas and those 
crops that have been most affected by the process of conversion to specialisation. For example, 
maize yields in the U.S. were substantially altered by conversion to uniform seed varieties and 
agricultural methods in the mid-1950s. In the twenty years prior to this, mean yields were about 57 
kgs. per hectare. However, in the thirty years following this conversion, the average productivity of 
a hectare in maize production increased by over 100%, to 133 kgs. per hectare (1955-1985). 
However, the coefficient of variability itself increased by almost 100% (from 0.06 to 0.105). 
(Duvick,D„ 1989.)
There are two distinct sources of increased variability resulting from increasing specialisation. The 
first is the loss of the "portfolio effect" across a geographical region when homogeneous production
adopted. In/^jJ^heiLa-gi^n4erfitory4sT^yajed4o4hSlani5^ofts-ofcrQprand— " 
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metfiofcs-arejisJoptedr-In short, when a given territory is converted to the same sorts of crops and 
methods, the fortunes of all producers then move together. If conditions are favourable to the chosen 
method, all do better; if conditions are not favourable, all do worse. Since there is no longer as much 
geographic "cancelling out", variability is increased. In terms of the proportion of the variability 
explained, this is by far the more significant of the two contributors. For example, in the state of 
India, it was discovered that this factor accounted for at least 90% of all of the increase in yield 
variability. (HazellJ5. 1984.)
This increase in variability is an unavoidable consequence of increased specialisation. Increased 
correlations between the yields of different sites necessarily result from the replacement of 
differentiated assets with homogeneous ones. These increased correlations then reduce the 
"cancelling out" effects of diversity, and thereby increase variability. The trade-off between 
biodiversity and this form of variability
The second reason for increased variability is the less significant contributor proportionately, but the 
more serious problem. This variability is inherent in the development of specialised species. The 
reduction of the diversity of the genetic base of a given crop reduces its own resistance to pests. In 
essence, the existence of variety within the species serves the same purpose of that variety across 
productive assets: it provides insurance. With increasing genetic uniformity at the level of the species 
(with regard to various high yield varieties in use), there is a loss of a "portfolio" of potential 
resistance. The specialised, homogeneous crops are consequently more vulnerable to external shocks: 
pests, droughts, diseases.
For example, in 1970 a particular form of com blight struck in the U.S., decimating the crop. 
Although there were only a few forms of maize susceptible to this pest, a substantial portion of the 
U.S. crop was planted in ahomogeneous strain of one of these types. As a result, approximately 15% 
of the U.S. maize crop was lost in that year. (WCMC, 1992.)
As noted, genetic uniformity contributes only a small proportion of total variability in production; 
however, it is by far the more serious environmental problem on account of the irreversibilities 
involved. Increased variability due to spatial uniformity can be removed at a single stroke, by the 
reintroduction of more diverse methods at any point in time. In contrast, increased variability 
resulting from global reliance upon a small number of specialised species cannot be reversed, unless 
there is a secure genetic bank to turn to in the event of a failure. The existence of diverse genetic
is an identity:
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resources provides a "portfolio effect" across time, rather than space. Any narrowing of this portfolio 
that we undertake now is unlikely to be able to be undone.
In essence, this intertemporal insurance provides a safety net against the possiblity of a fatal flaw in 
any of the specialised varieties. This manner of insurance can be essential for the safeguarding of a 
population. Anthropologists have hypothesised that the collapse of the classical Mayan population 
may have been the result of a maize virus. The potato blight in Ireland in the mid-1840s without 
doubt resulted in the death of over a million people and threatened the collapse of that society.
Table 2.8 Past Crop Failures from Genetic Uniformity
Date Location Crop Cause and Result Source
900 Central 
America 
1846 Ireland
1800s Ceylon 
1943 India
1953-54 USA 
1960s USA 
1970 USA 
1970 Phillipines 
& Indonesia 
1972 USSR 
1974 Indonesia
1984 Florida 
1940s USA
maize Potential collapse of the Classic Rhoades 1991
Mayan Civilization as a result of a maize virus 
potato potato blight led to famine in which 1 million died & Hoyt 1988
1.5 million emigrated from their homeland 
coffee fungus wiped out homogenous coffee plantations Rhoades 1991 
rice brown spot disease destroyed crop Hoyt 1988
starting the 'Great Bengal Famine.’ 
wheat wheat stem rust too most of hard wheat crop Hoyt 1988
wheat stripe rust in Pacific Northwest Oldfield 1989
maize decrease in yield of 15% - $1 billion lost NAS 1972
rice HYV rice attacked by tungro virus Hoyt 1988
wheat Crop badly affected by weather Plucknett 1987
rice the brown planthopper carrying the grassy stunt virus Hoyt 1988 
destroyed over 3 million tonnes of rice 
citrus disease destroyed 18 million fruit trees Rhoades 1991
US crops losses to insects have doubled since the 1940s Plucknett 1986
Source: World Conservation Monitoring Centre, 1992. Valuing Biodiversity in World 
Conservation Monitoring Centre, Global Biodiversity, Chapman and HalhLondon.
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Therefore, biological diversity affords a very significant service in the form of the insurance that it 
provides. A strategy of specialisation must necessarily entail greater risk-taking. Uniform 
specialisation at the global level would incorporate irreducible and irretrievable risks into the 
biological production systems.
2.43  The Value of Evolutionary Output
There are very real values emanating from diversity. These values derive from the fact that diversity 
is itself the output received from the evolutionary process. This process has been directed to the 
safeguarding of the life system across a wide range of possible environmental shifts and shocks, and 
the output that it has generated is a one-time endowment of diversity for this effect. This stock of 
diversity then generates the services (informational and insurance) that were created to safeguard life 
itself.
Of course, the maintenance of life on earth is of interest to the human species as well. The resilience 
of the human biological production system will be a function of the stability of the underlying 
biosphere. In fact, it is in the interest of the human species to enhance that systemic stability. It is 
nearly certain that life itself will continue on earth long after the collapse of the human support 
systems; all previous incidents of mass extinctions have had much more impact on the higher trophic 
animal species than on the plant species.
2.4.4 Optimal Biodiversity Policy
Therefore, the preservation of human society in the long run (or even the medium run) will depend 
upon the conservation of an adequate amount of the services endowed by the evolutionary process. 
That is, human society depends upon the diversity that evolution has generated. However, the nature 
of these services (diffusive and intangible) makes it difficult for their value to be translated into 
incentives for investments in stocks of diverse resources. The absence of these incentives is the 
global problem of biodiversity.
Information is the classic example of a public good. It is so diffusive and nonsegregable in nature 
that it is impossible to appropriate it through a property-based system. The informational values of
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diverse resources cannot be tied to a particular diverse biological resource, such as a medicinal plant, 
because the real value lies in the information it disseminates. Therefore, there must be a concern 
about the inability of host states to capture the informational values of diverse resource stocks.
Similarly with insurance services from diversity, these are values that flow to all who benefit from 
the biological production system, i.e. all of human society. As with informational value, this value 
is lost once the first sale of a valuable diverse resource occurs. Although all of human society is 
insured by the presence of diverse resources, there is no mechanism at present for the channeling of 
this value to the providers of the insurance.
Therefore, the evolutionary process has endowed the earth with a stock of biological diversity, 
created expressly for the purpose of generating the services which it does. However, the conservation 
of this endowment is not something that will appear to be to the individual interest of a person or state 
because the services which flow from diversity insure the entire life process, not simply the individual 
involved. The unchanneled nature of these services renders their values nonappropriable by their host 
states, and this nonappropriability makes these resources compare unfavourably with other resources. 
Paradoxically, the very breadth and generality of the benefits rendered by biodiversity (i.e. the 
safeguarding of the life system) renders in an untenable resource under human management.
The solution to the global biodiversity problem is a policy that halts the global conversion process 
at that point where the value of another conversion (in terms of increased flows of specialised 
resources) is outweighed by the costliness of that conversion (in terms of lost flows and stocks of 
diverse resources). A stopping rule that puts this into effect is necessary to halt global conversions 
at the optimal point.
Such a stopping rule does not currently exist. This is basis for the international regulation of the 
biodiversity problem. Since some of the primary values of diverse resources (information and 
insurance flows) are of the nature of global public goods, there is no consideration of these values 
in national decision making regarding conversions. Also, since these values flow to the entirety of 
human society, it will require global action to appropriate them and return them to the host states.
A mechanism that channels these values of diverse resources through the hands of the host states is 
the instrument required for the international regulation of biodiversity. This would translate these 
"stock-related" values into "flow-linked" values. Since terrestrial resources are all sovereign national
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resources, the decision regarding their conversion must ultimately be made by the host states. In 
order to influence their determinations, it will be necessary to shape the decision making framework 
within which the conversion choice is made. These host states must be persuaded that there are 
feasible development paths compatible with the retention of diversity. An optimal instrument will 
accomplish this by channeling the value of diverse resource stocks through the hands of the host 
states. Then, when the value of a piece of land in the production of diverse resources exceeds its 
value in the production of their specialised substitutes, the process of conversion would be halted. 
This is how an optimal stopping rule may be implemented with regard to the global conversion 
process.
2.5 Conclusion
The regulation of extinction is in fact the regulation of the global conversion process. Such a pursuit 
may sound impracticable or at least highly unlikely, but of course it already exists, only it now 
functions without consideration of the important global benefits of diverse resources.
These benefits exist because they are the basic output from the evolutionary process. This is a 
process that is driven by one fundamental force, the safeguarding of life on earth itself. The diversity 
of life forms on earth has been the result of four and a half billion years of niche resolution and 
refinement This mosaic of life allows the environment to shift quite a lot while still maintaining 
some successful life forms.
The human species has brought another fundamental force to earth, i.e. the force of conversion. This 
force is now re-shaping the face of the earth in the space of a few millenia, as fully as the 
evolutionary force has done over billions of years.
The regulation of extinction is the regulation of this socio-economic process. In particular it is the 
attempt to channel the benefits of the remaining diverse resource stocks to the states that host them 
in order to influence their conversion decisions. If it is accepted that all human societies should have 
an equal right to pursue development, then this is the only means available for influencing the 
conversion decisions of sovereign states on a year-by-year basis into the foreseeable future. It is 
necessary to institutionalise a mode of compensation in order to persuade the unconverted states that 
it is possible to pursue development within the context of diversity.
54
This is the meaning of the effective international regulation of extinction. It will require significant 
international institution-building in order to foster these alternative development paths. However, 
in its absence, the predictable pursuit of the same pathway by successive states will ultimately 
engender a world devoid of diversity. For this reason, it is especially important to think of this as an 
opportunity to diversify existing institutions to foster alternative modes of development, rather than 
the subsidisation of states for nondevelopment. The international regulation of extinction equates 
with the investment in diversity: biological, economic and institutional.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ECONOMICS OF EXTINCTION REVISITED AND REVISED
3.1 Introduction
f  '
The economics of species extinction was initially modeled by^I!larkjl973). (see also Clark and 
Munro, 1975; Clark, Clarke, and Munro, 1979). His work provided the framework for most of the 
analysis that has since followed. Given that these past twenty-five years have seen the first efforts 
to create policies to address the problem of species extinctions, the Clark model has assumed 
preeminent importance, at the national and international levels. The ideas contained within the 
models of "open access overexploitation" have provided the basis for most of the policies for 
remedying species extinction that currently exist
However, during this period, the perception of the nature of the problem of species extinctions has 
altered quite a lot, from well-focused concerns about the endangerment of individual well-recognised 
species to a much broader concern that includes potential losses of millions of virtually unknown 
breeds. The latter set of problems is usually categorised as "biodiversity losses".
v
This paper addresses both forms of extinction problems within a common framework. That is, it 
constructs a framework for addressing the general problem of species extinctions, entailing the nature 
of changes affecting habitats and species across the whole of the states of the developing world. This 
is a general problem that is usually discussed in different contexts, in regard to concerns about 
rainforests, individual species (such as the African elephant) or general genetic diversity.
It is important that the theory of species extinction is overhauled, as it has generated inappropriate 
policy conclusions. The main problem with the Clark model is that it placed species extinction 
analysis solidly within the previously existing literature on fishery economics. This is problematic 
because there are far fewer human uses competing for oceanic resources than there are for terrestrial 
ones. The Clark model simply elided this crucial factor from the analysis.
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As a result, the polices that were derived from the Clark analysis also ignored this factor, resulting 
in "endangered species" legislation that was blinkered against the most fundamental forces for 
extinction. This has resulted in the creation of some domestic and international policies which 
themselves represent important threats to many species.
Therefore, the objectives of this chapter are as follows: first, to integrate the problems of endangered 
species and biodiversity losses; second, to bring the analysis of species extinction back "onshore" by 
including competing land uses within the extinction model; and, third, to update the policy framework 
regarding endangered species as a result of the revised model. The chapter will initially revisit the 
economics of extinction in section 2 by giving an illustration of the Qark model, and its policy 
implications, in the context of an example regarding the African elephant. Section 3 will then 
integrate the problems of well-known species extinctions such as the elephant with the processes 
afflicting hundreds of thousands of lesser known species - the biodiversity problem. Here, the 
economics of extinction will be treated within a generalised framework of choice regarding 
productive biological assets. Then, in section 4, this investment-based model is revised to incorporate 
the forces of competition for the terrestrial habitat within its framework. The concluding section 
discusses the implications of these revisions to the economic model of extinctions. It demonstrates 
that the different types of endangerment (overexploitation, conversions, diversity losses) are in fact 
different routes to the same result, driven by the same fundamental forces. This indicates that the 
policies for addressing all forms of endangerment, extinction and diversity losses must be reformed 
to address this fundamental problem. These reforms will often require policies much different from 
those that have been created in order to address the proximate (as opposed to the fundamental) cause 
of endangerment.
3.1 The Economics of Extinction Revisited
Extinction is usually thought of in the context of a few very noticeable examples of endangered 
species, such as the African elephant. In fact, the decline of the African elephant during the decade 
of the 1980s is a classic example of the ostensibly good fit between the Clark model and actual 
species decline, as well as the policy implications that derive from that fit. It will be used to illustrate 
the convincing manner in which this framework misleads policymakers.
During the past decade it is generally estimated that the population of the African elephant declined
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by about half, from 1,343,340 in 1979 to 609,000 in 1989. (Douglas-Hamilton [1989]). In addition, 
the trade in ivory, the principal product derived from this species, also doubled between the early 
1970s and the early 1980s - from an average of about 550 tonnes to an average of about 1000 tonnes. 
(Pearce [1989]). On account of these trends, population modelers predicted the imminent extinction 
of the species, over a period of about twenty years. (Caughley [1989]; Renewable Resources 
Assessement Group [1989]).
How does the Gark model explain the decline and possible extinction of an individual species, such 
as the African elephant? It does so in relation to three factors:
a) open access to the resource;
b) relative price to cost of harvesting the resource; and
c) relative growth rate of the resource.
These three factors are sufficient to produce abioeconomic model showing that the optimal stock of 
the resource goes to zero in the steady-state, so long as: 1) there is open access to the resource; 2) the 
price of the resource remains high relative to its cost of harvest; and 3) it is a relatively slow-growing 
resource. In essence, these conditions create incentives for continued harvesting of the resource, even 
to an extent incompatible with the capacity of the resource to regenerate itself.
3.2.1 A Demonstration of the Clark Model
A simple model will illustrate how these conditions combine to provide the conditions for extinction. 
Let x represent the stock of a diverse biological resource, where y is the corresponding flow variable 
(the periodic harvest). The cost of harvesting the resource is then negatively related to the stock of 
the resource, while positively related to the flow, c(y,x).
Taking an example from Dasgupta (1982), we may say that the cost function is of the following 
generalised form.
Costs of Harvest:
(3.1)
C ( y j )  =  B y ax ^
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Using the first assumption above, open access conditions of harvest imply that the harvest will 
continue until the average cost of the harvest of another unit of the resource is equal to its price, i.e. 
P = AC. (Gordon [1954]).
OPEN ACCESS
EQUILIBRIUM: (3.2)
P = B y a~l x-i
We also know that the annual change in stock over time, x, will be equal to the intrinsic growth rate 
of the resource, H(x), less that year’s harvest, y.
ANNUAL CHANGE IN STOCK:
x = H(x) -  y (3.3)
Combining (3.2) and (3.3) gives an equation that demonstrates that the annual change in the resource 
stock is: a) a positive function of the growth rate of the resource; and b) a negative function of the 
"harvesting effort" (which is positively related to the price-cost ratio of harvests). Bioeconomic 
equilibrium results where these two forces are in balance:
BIOECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM:
(3.4)
1 -7
x = H(x) -  (P / B x ^
A steady-state solution to (3.4) exists where the stock does not change over time, i.e. x = 0. This 
occurs where the flow from the growth function is equated with that from the harvesting function. 
In Figure 3.1, the intersection of these two curves occurs at the stock that will exist in steady state 
equilibrium.
[FIGURE 3.1]
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The dashed line in Figure 3.1 indicates the nature of the possibility of "economic extinction". In the 
case of this harvesting function, there is no intersection between the growth function and the harvest 
function, at any stock level. This means that the incentives to continue harvesting the resource exist 
at all stock levels, and the growth of the resource is insufficient to maintain a population in the face 
of these pressures. The basic principle is: Low growth rates combined with high price-cost ratios, 
within the Clark model, result in forces pointing to the ultimate extinction of the species.
3.2.2 The Policy Implications derived from the Clark Model
The policy implications of Clark’s model are straightforward. Extinctions result from low growth 
rates and high price/cost ratios, in the context of poorly managed access. Since there is assumed to 
be little to be done about affecting resource growth rates, the implication is then to work through the 
price/cost ratio. That is, the probability of extinction can be reduced through policies that cause the 
price/cost ratio to decline. In the context of Figure 3.1, an endangered species would be found 
initially in the situation of a harvest function represented by the dashed line. Any act that would 
either decrease the price of the resulting products, or increase the costs of the production process, 
would shift the harvest function downwards (to the unbroken line in Figure 3.1) creating the 
possibility of a stable bioeconomic equilibrium.
The application of this paradigm leads to some fairly straightforward policy conclusions. A quick 
fix for the endangered species within this framework is the enforced criminalisation of the production 
process, as well as a ban on the international trade in its outputs. This policy reform is believed 
effective because it is intended to have two important positive impacts within the context of the 
model. First, by means of withdrawing the consumers’ support for the species’ products, it reduces 
the demand and hence the price paid for these products. Second, by means of encouraging domestic 
enforcement of this criminalization, it increases the costliness of accessing the resource. Therefore, 
the policy of enforced criminalization is intended to have positive impacts working on both sides of 
the price-cost ratio. The hoped-for result is that the resulting downward shift in the harvest function 
will be sufficient to restore bioeconomic equilibrium at a stock greater than zero.
This is precisely the policy shift that has occurred as a result of the decline of the African elephant 
in the 1980s. The international community has acted to impose an international "ban" on the trade 
in ivory effective from 1990. Acting within the context of the Convention on International Trade in
60
Endangered Species (CITES), the parties passed a resolution to list the African elephant on Appendix 
I of that treaty, effectively disallowing all further trade in that species’ products. [Barbier et. al. 
(1990)].
The application of this policy framework is much more general than a single example might indicate 
however, and the CITES convention demonstrates how pervasive the model’s conclusions have 
become. [Lyster(1985)]. This treaty is the leading international mechanism for addressing global 
extinction processes. It is nearly universal in coverage, with more than 120 states party to the treaty. 
It also applies to a very wide spectrum of species, over 5,000 are listed on Appendix I.
The policy framework outlined above is also applied at the domestic level in many states. All 
member states to CITES are required to adopt implementing legislation at the domestic level, and 
many of these states have extended the prohibitions within that treaty to criminalise internal wildlife 
use as well. For example, in the U.S. the Endangered Species Act provides that it is illegal to trade 
in any species, domestic or foreign, that is listed as endangered. Also, throughout many of the states 
of South America, there are national laws criminalising the trade in all "wildlife" products. 
[TRAFFIC (1986)]. In many of the states of Africa, the trade in wildlife products is also closely 
restricted or illegal. [IUCN(1985)]. In fact, the private trade in ivory had been a criminal offence 
throughout most of Africa for ten or twenty years prior to the elephant’s decline.
Therefore, the policies that derive from the "open access overexploitation" sort of analysis within the 
Clark model of extinction have been widely accepted and implemented across the world, both in 
domestic law and in international law. Across the globe, the regulation of extinctions is now handled 
primarily by attempts to narrow the price-of-product/cost-of-harvest margin in various wildlife and 
endangered species. There are probably few economic models that have had so global an impact as 
this one.
3.3 The Economics of Extinction Generalised: Biodiversity Losses
Despite the widespread application of this theory of extinction and the worldwide implementation 
of the policies that it suggests, the natural world is nevertheless heading toward a period of severe 
mass extinctions. Within the fossil record, there is evidence of about five occasions on which fifty 
per cent or more of the then-existing species became extinct over a short period of time. Several of
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the world’s most eminent scientists project a mass extinction rivaling these that is set to occur over 
the next century. [Ehrlich (1981); Lovejoy (1984)].
Even if the projections of a "doomsday scenario" are inaccurate, the current rate of extinction is 
presently far above the "natural". Averaged over the 4.5 billion years of biological history, the long 
term rate of extinction approximates to 9 species per million per annum. These scientists estimate 
that the current rate of extinction is about 1,000 to 10,000 times this. [Wilson (1988)].
Most of these extinctions are not as newsworthy as the elephant’s decline, and so they go largely 
unnoticed. In fact, many if not most of these disappearing species are being destroyed without ever 
having been classified. This is known as the problem of biodiversity losses, i.e. the narrowing of the 
genetic pool through the losses of many species as well as the loss of much of the heterogeneity 
within any given species.
This chapter initiates the integration of the framework within which these two problems are being 
considered. In fact, they are precisely the same general problem, only applied to more and less 
noticeable species.
33,1 The Problem of Endangered Species Generalised
The problems of specific endangered species and general biodiversity losses have their sources in the 
same fundamental economic problem, viz. the human choice of the set of biological assets upon 
which society relies. Human societies must select a portfolio of assets from which they then derive 
a flow of benefits, and one important part of this portfolio is the range of biological resources upon 
which we depend. These resources are assets (investments which generate flows) simply by virtue 
of being biological in nature.
Not all assets will be maintained at their existing stock levels. It is sometimes optimal to disinvest 
in one asset, receive a one-time benefit from that, and invest this receipt in another asset; that is, it 
is possible to engage in conversions between assets. This process will occur until the returns between 
assets are equilibriated, at the marginal return on capital (r).
Conversions occur with respect to biological assets as well. Sometimes a biological asset will be
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converted to a man-made asset. (Solow, 1974). That is, human society will disinvest in the 
biological resource in order to invest in human-made capital items, such as machinery. Other times 
a biological asset win be converted to a different form of biological asset, such as the clearing of a 
forest for a cattle ranch. (Swanson, 1991). The conversion process is at work, even when its 
workings are not so apparent as the direct conversion of forest land to pasture land. Any asset that 
yields a noncompetitive return will, in the process of equilibriation, experience disinvestment in order 
to provide resources for investment in the preferred assets, even though the replacement asset may 
be very different (man-made) or very distant.
It is this process of disinvestment that lies at the base of the decline of all diverse biological assets. 
Although there are various ways in which this process is manifested (direct conversion, 
overexploitation, land conversion), the fundamental force determining species decline is the relative 
rates of investment by the human species. It is the human choice of another asset, over the biological 
asset, that results in the inevitable decline of species. Extinctions, whether of specific breeds or of 
general diversity, are the result of their noninclusion in the human asset portfolio. The remainder of 
this chapter demonstrates how this is the case.
3.3.2 Species as Productive Assets - The Model Generalised
The generalised model of biological extinction focuses on the investment potential of different 
varieties of biological resources. It is based on both the Clark model, and the Solow model of asset 
substitution. [Solow (1974)]. It analyses extinction as a process of human choice of the productive 
assets to retain in the natural portfolio.
The generalised model, building upon that found in the fisheries literature, may be set up as follows, 
(see, e.g., Conrad and Clark, 1988). The following variables must be defined, each assumed to be 
subscripted for time. Also, the variables will all be assumed to apply to a specific diverse resource 
within a given country. This terminology will be retained throughout the remainder of the chapter, 
and throughout most of this book.
p(y) the inverse demand curve - a function of aggregate harvest, y
y, the harvest of the ith agent accessing the resource
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c(x) the (constant) average cost of harvest - a function of stock at beginning 
of the period
H(x) the growth of the resource - a function of the stock of the resource
r the marginal cost of capital within a country
Jt the "shadow price" of a unit of resource stock 
(equates with resource "rent" in equilibrium)
At this juncture it is necessary to interject a few stylised facts in order to define the appropriate 
societal objective regarding its diverse resource stocks. First, when discussing the problem of global 
diversity, it is necessary for the discussion to focus on a few states in the developing world, as the 
vast majority of the world’s biological diversity resides in a mere handful of states. (McNeely, et. 
al., 1990). Secondly, these states are some of the poorest in the world, and they are therefore 
justifiably interested in the maximisation of the appropriable values from their diverse resources. 
Thirdly, the greatest values that are attached to diverse resources generally flow from the developed 
world, where these forms of resources are relatively more scarce.
This implies that the owner-state with diverse resources is primarily concerned with the capture of 
the maximum appropriable producer surplus to be derived from its natural assets. This is the societal 
objective depicted in equation (3.5). From the perspective of this society, species (differing 
biological life forms) are differentially valuable as productive assets depending upon the appropriable 
values that they generate. Given scarce resources to invest, the decision as to which species to 
maintain in the portfolio of biological assets will depend upon this relative productivity. Therefore, 
with respect to a given diverse resource (stock x, flow y), the decision as to the stock level to maintain 
(not to disinvest) will be made in order to maximise societal benefits from that resource.
SOCIETAL OBJECTIVE:
[pOOy -  c(x)y] e ~rt dt
(3.5)
s.t. x = H(x)-y
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This society will solve this problem in order to determine the optimal stock levels for this diverse 
resource. First, for purposes of later comparisons, the optimal flow (y*) is shown in equation (3.6), 
then the optimal stock level (x*) is depicted in (3.7).
OPTIMAL FLOW OF DIVERSE RESOURCE:
(3.6)
y '  : X =p[—  * 1] - c
where eD is the elasticity of demand for the diverse resource 
OPTIMAL STOCK OF THE DIVERSE RESOURCE:
+ H \x )  = r  (3.7)
We are concerned here with the steady-state stock levels (i.e. for X = 0 x = 0), because these are 
indicative of the societally targeted stock levels for this particular biological asset. (Of course, this 
target might take quite a long time to reach, but the entirety of the analysis in this book is of the very 
long run). Equation (3.7) implies that, in the steady state, the resource should be maintained at a 
stock level that equates the return from that asset with the return from other assets. The return to the 
stock of a given diverse resource is dependent upon two factors: 1) the relative growth rate (which 
slows as the stock level reaches carrying capacity); and 2) the cost of access - "search costs" (which 
decline with increasing stocks). Society will target the stock level (through investments or 
disinvestments) that generates a competitive return (r).
Figure 3.2 demonstrates this point. An investment-based model indicates that the stock level for each 
biological resource would be targeted at the level that equilibrates its returns with all other productive 
assets in the economy. Since the marginal return on further investments in the stocks of a given 
biological asset will decline, as the carrying capacity of its habitat is reached, there will always exist 
an equilibrium stock level for species.
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[Figure 3.2]
It is clear, within this framework, that the nature of an extinct resource is that of an noncompetitive 
asset. The dashed line in Figure 3.2 represents a very slow growing resource which fails to reach the 
prevailing marginal rate of growth of assets in the economy. In the steady state, there is no stock of 
this resource that generates a competitive return. Therefore, there is an economic force for the 
conversion of the entire stock of this asset to other, more productive forms in order to acquire a better 
return.
Therefore, slow growth relative to other assets in the economy is in and of itself a route to species 
extinction. Resources, even biological resources, must be competitive as productive assets if there 
is to be a force for their retention in a world of scarce resources. This point was developed by Clark 
in the context of his 1973 model. It was further analysed by Clark and co-authors, and several others 
in a series of articles. (Cropper, 1979; Cropper, 1988; Swallow, 1990; Swallow, Parks, and Wear, 
1990).
33 3  Open Access Regimes and Investment Incentives
The results derived in the previous section are true even from the perspective of a perfectly well- 
managed biological resource; noncompetitive growth rates are sufficient conditions for asset 
disinvestment. This point was first discussed in the context of the debate concerning the "optimal 
harvest strategy" applicable to the Blue Whale; certain very slow-growing biological resources are 
subject to pressures for their complete disinvestment (Clark, 1976; Spence, 1978).
Slow growth is not the only route to extinction however. An alternative route to the creation of a 
force for disinvestment is the operation of an open access regime. Open access regimes can render 
otherwise viable biological resources largely valueless as economic assets.
The impact of uncontrolled access on a resource can be demonstrated within the generalised model 
discussed above; however, this time in the context of a decentralised group of resource harvesters. 
In this case, each of a large number of competing harvesters attempts to maximise its own profits 
from individual harvesting activity (y). The maximisation problem for each individual harvester is 
then as follows:
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INDIVIDUAL HARVESTER MAXIMISATION PROBLEM:
Max J [p(y)y{ -  c(x)yf] e ~n dt
y t
s.t. x = H(x)-y
(3.8)
Open loop Nash equilibrium conjectures will be used to determine how the competing harvesters will
use the common resource. Open loop conjectures imply that harvesters do not take account of stock 
effects in their decision making. That is, the future impacts of current harvests (increased harvest 
costs and changed growth rates in the next period) are not considered because of the small individual 
impact on the common resource. Nash conjectures imply that there is no strategic interaction; that 
is, each harvester takes the harvests of others as a given, not influenced by one’s own harvest 
decision. Open loop Nash equilibrium conjectures are plausible in the context of an open access 
regime, precisely because open access implies a large number of competing harvesters.
Under these assumptions, the first order conditions for an optimal solution to each of the harvester’s 
decision problems are as follows:
OPTIMAL FLOW:
(for competitive entry)
y* : X = p -c (3.9)
OPTIMAL STOCK:
(3.10)
(a) OR X = c ,(x)y
(r -  H'(x))N
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Open access operates to remove all incentives for investment in the diverse resource, and it does so 
through the process of "rent dissipation". That is, under open access, the shadow price of a unit of 
the resource left unharvested (equivalently, a unit of stock remaining invested in that asset) goes to 
zero. With a value of zero, there are no incentives for the asset to remain invested in that particular 
form.
This is because the rent from a natural resource is the wedge between harvest costs and the producer ’ s 
received price; it is this residual value which is given to the natural resource itself by its human 
producer. Of course, other inputs are required in order to produce a natural resource, e.g. the labour 
and capital required to harvest and market it. If a resource is vastly overproduced (through open 
access management), then the only factors earning returns will be the other inputs used in its 
production. That is, when rents are dissipated, this means that harvesting is occurring until that point 
where the returns on the other factors are reaching their competitive levels, not leaving a residual for 
any return on the resource itself. There is then no difference between the marketed price and the 
combined costs of the other inputs into the production process. The rent from the natural resource 
is being dissipated amongst the other factors of production.
Equations (3.9) and (3.10) together demonstrate this process of rent dissipation occurring in the 
context of open access management From (3.10), as N --> X —> 0. From (3.9), this implies that 
p=c; that is, the price of the diverse resource is equal to the costs (of the other factors) involved in its 
production. Therefore, under open access management regimes, the resource rent value is driven to 
zero through competitive access.
Open access management of a resource is inefficient in two respects. First it is inefficient because 
the returns from individual investments are distributed across all harvesters of the resource; investors 
receive an averaged rather than an individualised return, as indicated in equation (3.10). This 
inefficiently reduces the incentives for individual investments on account of free riding.
Secondly, under open access, there will be nothing to constrain the number of competing harvesters 
from increasing boundlessly, in pursuit of any available rents. This rent seeking behaviour, in the 
absence of any barriers to entry, must drive the average return from investments to zero.
Therefore, under open access management, the investment decision devolves to a choice between a 
return of r (the available marginal on capital) from conversion or a return of zero from investment.
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Irrespective of the natural capacity of the natural asset for growth, the open access regime renders it 
an unworthy investment
3.3.4 Conclusion - Extinctions as the Result of Conversion
In sum, all biological resources are by their nature productive assets. Assets are kept in society’s 
portfolio on account of the flows they return. Since nature endowed this world with positive stock 
levels of all biological assets, it requires a human decision to not disinvest in order to maintain these. 
However, investments across assets equilibriate where the returns are roughly equivalent. That is, 
some assets will experience disinvestment, and others investment, until the returns on assets are 
equalised. Some biological resources are naturally incapable of meeting the available rate of return, 
and they are then converted to more productive forms of assets. This force of conversion is the 
general force that underlies all extinctions.
This process of conversion between assets threatens all biological assets (i.e. species) with depletion 
in accord with their relative productivities. The general nature of the extinction threat to all species, 
the more and the less noticeable, is the same. The threat is that a species will be seen as an inferior 
asset, and thus will be excluded from the human portfolio.
A
3.4 The Economics of Extinction Revised
Exclusion from the human portfolio of biological assets is a sufficient condition for biological 
extinction, but it is not the force that acts directly upon the species to work its decline. Exclusion 
from the human portfolio is only the most fundamental force at work; it is the "targeting" of a zero 
stock level for a given species. This brings into play the forces for conversions; the stocks of the 
omitted species are then subject to disinvestment.
However, the forces for conversion do not directly work extinctions. There are even more 
consequential actions, as a result of this more fundamental forces, that actually bring about the 
decline of the species. It is the confusion between the consequential and the fundamental that gave 
rise to the Clark model (and its policies), and thus it is important to clearly segregate between the two.
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There are three "consequential” forces that actually work species decline. That is, the fundamental 
decision not to include a specific biological asset within the human portfolio will ultimately affect 
the stock level of that asset through:
1) stock disinvestments - the removal of the stocks of the asset for sale and allocation of 
receipts to the acquisition of other, more competitive assets;
2) base resource re-allocations - the refusal of an allocation of base resources (land, water, 
foods) to the asset, and allocation of these base resources to other, more competitive assets; 
or
3) management services re- allocations - the refusal of an allocation of management services 
to the asset, and allocation of these services to other, more competitive assets.
All of these routes have the same observable effect (i.e. species decline); however, it is more 
important to show how each has the same fundamental source (i.e. noninclusion in the portfolio of 
assets).
3.4.1 Investment in Resource Stocks
The requirement of asset competitiveness for investment in resource stocks was discussed in the 
previous section. As indicated in Figure 3.2, if a resource is unable to generate a competitive return, 
there will be the incentive to remove and market its stocks in order to invest in other assets. This is 
the scenario of "optimal extinction" developed by Clark (1973).
Although investment in stocks is necessary in order to avoid extinction, it is not often the case that 
a species is eradicated by virtue of this manner of stock disinvestment. For example, if there is no 
demand for the species products, then there is no incentive for stock level disinvestments of this type. 
Therefore, inadequate growth rates do little to explain the nature of the "biodiversity problem", i.e. 
the loss of millions of unknown and unclassified species.
Also, there is mounting empirical evidence that the decline of many of the well-known and well- 
documented species also does not fit this pattern. This is because, although there are clear and
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substantial markets for these species' products, their values are not being realised by their producers. 
For example, studies have documented little, if any, rent appropriation by the producers of the 
products of elephants, rhinos, and live birds. (Swanson and Barbier, 1992; Swanson, 1992; Repetto, 
1988).
Therefore, the noncompetitiveness of the stocks of a resource in terms of growth certainly does 
generate incentives for direct disinvestment in its stock levels for the acquisition of other assets, but 
this does not explain a very substantial proportion of the current (and projected) extinctions. In order 
to explain most species endangerments and general diversity depletion, it is necessary to appeal to 
other considerations.
3.4.2 Investment in Base Resources for Diverse Resources
A noncompetitive biological asset can be disinvested in less direct ways than harvesting and 
marketing. In particular, all living organisms are dependent upon various biological necessities for 
their sustenance (food, light, air, water etc.) Since human societies now have control of these basic 
natural resources (by virtue of their control over land-use decisions), biological assets must compete 
for an allocation of these resources as well. This implies two fundamental revisions to the basic 
bioeconomic model.
First, the bioeconomic model of extinction must be revised in order to focus on the fundamental 
importance of investments in these base resources for the survival of terrestrial species. What is 
required is the jettisoning of an implicit assumption derived from fishery economics, with the effect 
of bringing the economics of extinction "on shore". Specifically, it is important to revise the model 
in order to provide for the possibility of competing uses for the resources that a species relies upon, 
and therefore to provide for the necessity of realising a competitive return for the species’ use of these 
resources.
The growth function is the focal point for this revision of the preexisting model. In general, a logistic 
form of growth function has been applied for the analysis of population dynamics for most of the past 
one hundred and fifty years. This function relates the flow from a stock - H(x) - to the level of the 
existing stock, x, and to the extent to which that level is less than the available carrying capacity, R.
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In essence, the logistic growth function implies that if there exists a vacant niche to be filled, the 
individuals of a species will jointly place more of their aggregate energy into reproduction in order 
to fill that niche. However, if the species has previously expanded to fill its niche, then most of the 
energy used by the species will be absorbed in maintenance rather than growth. Therefore, growth 
rates are linked to the existing stock of a species relative to its available niche. This provides the 
growth function of the general form, H(x)=x(R-x), with its distinctive logistic shape.
Since the bioeconomic model was developed within the literature of fishery economics, it has always 
been assumed that the carrying capacity for a given species was a fixed, exogenously given 
characteristic of the seas it inhabited. And, since humans had few other competing uses for this 
habitat, the opportunity cost of using it for fish production was assumed to be near zero.
These assumptions are wildly off the mark in regard to terrestrial resources. On land, the amount of 
habitat available to a given species is endogenous to the process of determining how many 
individuals of that species will continue to exist, and it is probably the single most important factor 
determining species viability in the short and medium run. The decision concerning how many base 
resources to allocate to a species shifts the growth function for that species, determining (in part) the 
rate of productivity of that species. The nature of that shift is indicated by the two different logistic 
functions shown in Figure 3.3, below, each corresponding to the same species, but with different base 
resource allotments.
[Insert Figure 3.3]
Therefore, the "natural" growth rate of a biological resource is affected by the allotment of natural 
habitat. However, the cost of providing that habitat is not without a price. The total opportunity cost 
of that habitat equals the flow of benefits expected to be received from the best alternative use of the 
land, together with the potential returns available from mining the existing stock of natural resources 
on that land and investing the proceeds elsewhere in the economy. The cost of these implicit 
investments must be incorporated into the basic model determining the feasibility of investments in 
diverse resources, (see Swallow, 1990; Tahvonen, 1991; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 1991 for 
related analyses).
The changes in the extinction model that these alterations imply are as below.
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REVISED SOCIETAL 
OBJECTIVE FUNCTION:
Max [** [p(y)y -  c(x)y-rpjR]e ~n dt
y*  *  (3.11)
s.t. x  =  H(x'Jl)-y
where pR is the price of a unit of the base resource R (land)
These alterations indicate that, if this species is to continue to have the use of the resources (R) on 
which it depends, then it must be able to afford a competitive return (r) on those. The relevant return 
accords with the marginal rate of return available on investments in this society.
This is now a dynamic model with two decision variables (y and R), and a single state variable (x). 
One flow variable (y) continues to represent the flow of outputs out of the system. However, the new 
flow variable (R) represents the flow of inputs into the system. That is, this variable represents the 
necessity of continuously investing in a system if a flow of outputs is to result Since (for a stock of 
any given species to continue to exist) there must be ongoing investment in its resource base, this 
model captures the importance of this investment
The implicit assumption in preexisting bioeconomic models was that biological resources were 
naturally "free goods" that did not require investment. It was believed that biological product resulted 
from natural processes of growth deriving from the biosphere's capture of photosynthetic energy. 
This is definitely true in an aggregate sense. The earth does produce a continuous flow of biological 
product as the result of natural photosynthetic processes.
However, the particular form that this biosphere will take is critically dependent upon relative 
investment rates, i.e. on the rate at which base resources are allocated to individual species. At the 
level of the individual species, investment is the crucial decision determining whether a given stock 
of that species will continue to exist.
A determination of noncompetitiveness renders not only investments in stocks of that species 
inefficient, but also renders inefficient any investments in the base resources required for the
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sustenance of that species. Without that natural resource base the species will be undercut, resulting 
in its inevitable decline. Therefore, a determination of asset noncompetitiveness is sufficient to 
determine species decline, but the routes to extinction are more than one.
This alternative route to extinction may also be illustrated in the context of this model. When the 
additional decision variable (R) is included in this analysis, there is an additional first order condition 
that must obtain in the steady state.
OPTIMAL INVESTMENT 
IN RESOURCE BASE:
X-H.
R*:  i  = r (3.12)
P*
This condition states that the a particular species will receive allocations of base resources 
(approximated by its surrogate - land) only to the extent that the species is able to generate a 
competitive rate of return from this use. The particular life forms inhabiting a parcel of land are 
viewed by biologists as a simple outgrowth of that land, using its siting for the appropriation of the 
sun’s energy for regeneration and growth. Equation (3.12) implies that life forms must now compete 
for their "place in the sun", subject to human decisions concerning land use. In short, this condition 
says that the species must compete for the base natural resources which it relies upon; this condition 
is illustrated in Figure 3.4.
[FIGURE 3.4]
Therefore, a noncompetitive biological asset is subject to more than one means of removal. It might 
be removed through an active disinvestment programme (for rent appropriation and asset conversion), 
but this does not appear empirically to be the most pervasive threat. Most of the extinctions and 
endangerments occurring today are occurring without notice or knowledge; those that are well- 
publicised usually occur without the appropriation of many rents. Human-sourced extinctions are 
working, but not very often through the medium of active, exploitative activities.
In most cases, extinctions are the direct result of passive "undercutting". That is, for most threatened
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life forms, the problem is an unwillingness by humans to invest in the required ancillary resources 
(such as the terrestrial resources required for biological survival). It is this manner of noninvestment 
that threatens most life forms today.
3.43  Investment in Management Services for Diverse Resources
Although the passive "undercutting" of species through base resource re-allocations probably explains 
most species endangerments, it does not explain them all. In fact, there is a sub-set of endangerments 
that fit neither the "optimal extinction" paradigm or the "base resource" paradigm discussed in the 
preceding two sections. This is the case with regard to the endangerment of those well-recognised 
species (rhinos, birds, elephants etc.) whose decline appears to be most closely linked to the 
"overexploitation model" discussed above. This is the model developed by Gordon (1954) and Clark 
(1976) in the context of the fishery, and in which the decline of a species is explained by reference 
to the existence of an "open access" management regime. In the overexploitation model, species 
decline is shown to be "caused" by open access forms of resource management
In that case, it is important to ask why productive assets potentially worthy of investment would be 
subjected to such a regime. The answer within this framework is straightforward. From the 
perspective of the generalised investment model, it is more likely that open access regimes are caused 
by decisions not to invest in diverse resources, rather than a cause of such decisions.
That is, management services are just another form of ancillary resource required for the survival of 
many forms of life, especially the more noticeable and charismatic species. In fact, these services are 
just as necessary for their survival as are the base resources of land and water. As demonstrated 
previously, if there are demand pressures specific to a resource, open access conditions doom such 
a resource to disinvestment. The failure to provide management resources for such a resource is 
equivalent to a decision not to provide an essential requirement for its survival; such a decision is 
determined by more fundamental considerations.
This point may also be generated within the analytical framework of the investment model of 
extinction. All that is required is a more complete listing of the essential requirements for the 
sustenance of a species; these are now seen to be both biological and institutional in nature.
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The resources required to sustain a species involve, in the first instance, the natural resource base on 
which the species depends (R). The next layer of necessary investment is institutional. As indicated 
above, even with the dedication of substantial areas of lands to certain species, governmental 
resources are still required for their maintenance and protection. This could be considered in the 
context of the above model by including another input, M, representing the management services 
allocated to the resource. These services might be considered as a "stock", in the sense that 
investments in these services are used for "institution-building": the creation of a management regime 
that will yield a flow over the course of many years.
SOCIETAL OBJECTIVE 
REGARDING DIVERSE RESOURCE:
(3.13)
Max e"* [StyJRM) -  c(x)y -  rpJA. -  rp^R] dt
y £ M
s.t. x -  H(x) ~ y
Where S(y;M,R) is the flow of Social Benefits from y
given the quality of resource management generated by
the level of investment in management services ( M )
OPTIMAL INVESTMENT 
IN MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS:
(3.14)
M*: J L  = r 
Pm
Equation (3.14) states that the decision to invest in institution-building with regard to a diverse 
resource depends upon the perceived benefits that will flow from such an investment As with all 
other resources, those available for resource management are scarce and competitively allocated. A 
resource will only receive an allocation of management services, as in Figure 3.5, if it is able to afford 
a competitive return to these.
[Figure 3.5]
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This indicates the true nature of the open access regime. It is not an exogenous "state of nature”, but 
rather an endogenous "notion of the state". That is, open access regimes are caused by a state-level 
decision to invest at the lowest possible level for the management of certain resources, i.e. M=0. 
Under open access, the "quality" of resource management is at its lowest possible threshhold. When 
this occurs, we are returned to the world of the Clark model (in which "open access" was the assumed 
state of the world). In this state of the world, there are no incentives to invest in any way that is 
associated with the unmanaged species, as the prospects for the return of future benefit flows are 
severely discounted. Then, all that stands between a resource and its extinction is the net costliness 
of its harvesting (i.e. its price/cost ratio), as is described in the Clark model.
A positive level of institutional investment (i.e. M > 0) is indeed a precondition to all other 
investment However, open access regimes are not base forces for extinction, but merely links in the 
chain of causation between the base forces and observed extinctions. That is, the same fundamental 
forces that generate the general incentives for underinvestment flow relative returns) cause 
underinvestment in management institutions. Therefore, open access is an "effect" rather than a 
"cause" of the fundamental forces driving the extinction process.
3.5 Implications of the Revised Model of Extinctions
There are two sets of implications to be derived from this revised model of the extinction process. 
The first concerns the multiple routes to extinction engendered by diverse resource 
noncompetitiveness. The second concerns the different policy implications of the revised model for 
distinct resources.
In particular, the policy implications of the revised model are, for most species, diametrically opposed 
to those derived from the previous model. This model implies that the objectives of diverse resource 
conservation policy should be the creation of basic incentives for investment in diverse species and 
diverse habitats. This would imply that in many instances the object is to maximise the difference 
between price and harvest cost, not to minimise it. It would also indicate that most of the current 
policies concerning the criminalisation of the wildlife trade are probably misconceived.
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3.5.1 Alternative Routes to Extinction
In sum, there are three alternative routes to extinction for terrestrial species (as opposed to the single 
route for marine species). These three routes are:
stock disinvestment
As in the bio-economic model applied to marine species, these are resources with high 
price/cost ratios but low growth. In that case, there are incentives to harvest the entirety of 
the resource (for its high value) and invest the funds in other assets (for their greater growth 
rates). (Clark [1973]).
An example of this force in action is the deforestation of the tropical hardwood forests. 
These trees represent substantial amounts of standing value, but they have very low growth 
potential. It is economically rational to "cash in" the hardwoods and invest the returns in 
other, more productive assets.
management resources diversion
These are resources of "medium" value but relatively low growth. Since they are slow 
growing resources, they make little sense as assets; society has no incentive to invest in their 
growth capacity. In addition, on account of their relatively low value, they do not justify a 
commitment of substantial amounts of national resources for the management of the 
exploitation process. Then, the nation will allow these resources to be depleted through 
unmanaged exploitation.
Examples of this process include the depletion of many of the large land mammals, such as 
the African elephant. During the decade of the 1980s, sub-Saharan Africa lost half of its 
elephant population (from 1.3 to 0.6 million). However, on closer inspection of the national 
population statistics, it appears that four countries alone (Sudan, CAR, Tanzania and Zambia) 
lost 600,000 thousand elephants between them. It is also clear how these elephants were lost. 
These four countries fell at the bottom of the tables of African park and protection spending 
(averaging about $ 15 per square kilometre). The decline of the African elephant in the 1980s 
was the result of these tacit "open access" regimes.
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base resource conversion
These are resources that are of little or no known individual value to humans. These 
biological resources are not overexploited but undercut. They are lost because humans find 
alternative uses for the lands on which they rely.
An example of this process is the depletion of many types of virtually unknown life forms 
(e.g. plants and insects) when land is deforested and converted to other forms of use, such 
as cattle ranching. This branch of the force for extinction is generally termed the 
"biodiversity problem".
Although there are these three, alternative routes to extinction, they are all consequential forces, not 
fundamental. As was shown in section 3.4, each of these forces is the consequence of the more 
fundamental determination that the biological asset is unworthy of investment. It is the particular 
form in which this decision regarding noninvestment first impacts a given resource that determines 
the applicable route to extinction. However, always at the base is the decision that this particular 
biological resource is unworthy of human investments.
3.5.2 Rent Appropriation and Investment Incentives
The crucial difference between these models for policy purposes is the impact of an increased 
price/cost ratio. In the Clark model, as set out previously, the impact of an increased price/cost ratio 
on wildlife was unambiguous. The effect of increased price/cost ratios was to generate enhanced 
incentives for harvesting, without a concomitant increase in the resource (as the growth function was 
exogenous to the model). This resulted in an unambiguous increase in the threat to the viability of 
the species.
In this model, the implications of an increased price/cost ratio could not be more different. In 
essence, an increase in this ratio implies an increase in rent appropriation by producers. This will 
enhance the perceived investment-worthiness of the resource.
For example, in the context of equation (3.12), the effect is unambiguous. An increase in rent capture
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(e.g. resulting in an increase in the equilibrium level of X in equation 3.12) increases the relative rate 
of return for this species (i.e. the right-hand side of equation 12). More lands may be made available 
to the species because this species is now better able to "pay its way".
This analysis applies equally to the allocation of management services to the diverse resource. So 
long as social benefits are perceived to be equal to at least the sum of all individual harvests of the 
species, then an increase in the per unit appropriable value will increase the incentives to invest in 
this factor as well. In general, enhanced rent appropriation will enhance the incentives to invest in 
this species.
RENT APPROPRIATION
AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES:
Equation (3.15) states that an increase in the per unit appropriated rent increases the level of optimal 
investment in base resources for the species. This means that, all other things being equal, an 
increase in rents will increase investment in the species. This would occur by reason of a "shifting 
out" of the rate of return curves in Figures 3.2,3.4 and 3.5. In essence, the increase in rent value has 
increased the investment-worthiness of the diverse resource.
Of course, this result does depend upon the initial conditions in which the diverse resource is found. 
If the resource is initially subject to disinvestment by reason of the diversion of management services 
and it is perceived to be unworthy of investment, then it will already be subject to an "open access" 
regime. Under the circumstances of an open access regime, a marginally increased rental value will 
only increase the rate of species decline, while maintaining the inefficient management regime in 
place.
However, this does not mean that the policy implications of this model are context dependent, only 
that the reforms required may be more drastic in some circumstances than in others. A species that 
is subject to an open access regime cannot be saved through a policy of "rent destruction", it can only 
be shifted between the various avenues to extinction. That is, if a species is perceived as unworthy
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of investment, then a reduction in its marketed value will render it more likely to be lost by reason 
of base resource conversions and less likely to be lost by reason of management services diversion. 
This policy cannot save any terrestrial species, only change the proximate cause of its decline and 
possibly defer its date of reckoning.
The only policies that can alter the ultimate fate accorded by human society to any particular species 
is one that addresses the fundamental cause of decline: perceived investment-unworthiness. This 
implies that diverse resources must be accorded very substantial values, including market values, if 
they are to receive the investments that they require for their survival. This is the only means by 
which the fundamental forces driving extinctions and diversity losses might be faced.
3.6 The Decline of the African Elephant - A Case Study
During the decade of the 1980s, the populations of African elephants declined precipitously according 
to most estimates. In aggregate, the number of elephants on that continent declined from about 1.3 
million to approximately half that, approximately six hundred thousand, in about ten years’ time. 
What have been the causes of this decline, and what are the policies needed to arrest it? This section 
outlines the nature of the African elephant’s decline from the perspective of each of the competing 
theories above.
Table 3.1 Estimates of African Elephant Populations.
1979 1989
Cameroon 16,200 22,000
CAR 63,000 23,000
Chad 15,000 2,100
Congo 10,800 42,000
Guinea 1,300 500
Gabon 13,400 74,000
Zaire 377,000 112,000
Central 497,400 277,000
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Ethiopia
Kenya
Rwanda
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
Eastern
Angola
Botswana
Malawi
Mozambique
Namibia
South Africa
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Southern
Benin
Burkina Faso
Ghana
Guinea
Ivory Coast
Liberia
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo
Western
Totals
900
65,000
150
24.300
134.000 
316,300
6,000
546,855
12,400
20.000
4.500 
54,800
2.700 
7,800
150,000
30,000
282,200
900
1.700
3.500 
300
4.000 
900
1.000 
160
1.500
2.300 
450 
300
80
17,090
1,343,340
8,000
16,000
50
2,000
22,000
61,000
1,600
110,000
18,000
68,000
2,800
17.000 
5,700
7.800
32.000
52.000
204.000
2,100
4,500
2.800 
560
3,600
1.300 
840 
100 
440
1.300 
140 
380 
380
19.000
609.000
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Source: ITRG, 1989. The Ivory Trade and the Future of the African Elephant. Report to the 
Conference of the Parties to CITES, Lausanne.
3.6.1 An Application of the Clark Model?
At first glance, the recent decline of the African elephant appears to be a good example of the 
workings of the Clark model of extinction. There is no doubt that the proximate cause of most 
elephant deaths during this decade was a high-powered weapon, no^t^at the motivation for the 
slaughter was the procurement of ivory. During the decade the trade in ivory reached a peak of over
1,000 tonnes per annum, after averaging nearer 600 tonnes in the previous decade. (ITRG, 1989.)
It is also clear that the incentives for open access overexploitation were in place over this period. 
During the 1980s, the price of elephant ivory soared, reaching prices of more than $140/kg in Japan, 
while the cost of harvesting (indicated by the prices paid to poachers) was more in the order of $5- 
10/kg. [Swanson (1989a)].
Finally, the growth rate of the African elephant is relatively slow. [RRAG (1989)]. It has a life span 
of 60 years and reaches fecundity at the age of 13 with 5 year inter-birth intervals. Studies indicate 
that a maximum population growth rate of 6% is all that is feasible.
The congruence of these characteristics spells extinction in the context of the simple Clark model. 
The high price/cost ratio of harvesting combined with the low growth rate of the species makes 
extermination the likely economic outcome. In essence, this model would explain the 
commencement of the downward spiral in elephant populations as the result of a technology shift, 
i.e. the widespread availability of high-powered weaponry, causing the cost of harvesting to fall 
precipitously. With this one-time shift in the harvest cost function, it is possible that the new 
bioeconomic equilibrium would not be established prior to the extinction of the species. In essence, 
the harvesting function (on account of the technology shift) has shifted up - in Figure 3.1 - resulting 
in a lower population in the steady state (and possibly extinction).
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3.6.2 A More Fundamental Explanation of Species’ Decline
An alternative theory would place a species’ decline within the context of the broader forces 
operating across its range. Although the immediate cause of death of each elephant was some 
hunter’s pursuit of its ivory, the more fundamental causes concern the reasons why these hunters were 
allowed unmanaged access to the elephant herds, and why the ivory harvest was not being managed 
better for the benefit of the elephants’ "owners".
This framework provides an alternative explanation for the decline of the Afican elephant. In short, 
the African elephant makes little economic sense as a biological asset for investment purposes. Each 
elephant requires about one-half kilometre of good grazing land for its sustenance. (Caughley,G. & 
Goddard J., 1975.) Average life expectancy is about fifty five years. (Hanks, 1972). Therefore, it 
represents a substantial commitment of resources to provide for a single elephant’s livelihood.
The resources required for the sustenance of the millions of these creatures that recently roamed 
Africa would represent a substantial portion of that continent’s land area. In addition, few elephants 
are stationary within an area of a few hectares; they travel widely in search of food, and crops are 
at particular risk. For these reasons there are substantial negative externalities experienced by those 
living in the rural areas of a country that has a significant elephant population. Also, the management 
of access to the population would not be as inexpensive as with a more sedentary animal.
Combined with its slow growth rate and the absence of significant international markets for its 
products, the pressures for the removal of a substantial portion of the African elephant population 
from the lands of Africa must be intense. The species will very likely be replaced by a more 
specialised biological asset, such as cattle or goats or even grain.
In short, elephants do not demonstrate the sorts of characteristics that make an asset worthy of the 
substantial investments (of natural and governmental resources) that this species requires for its 
sustenance. This is the fundamental force underlying its decline. The absence of incentives for 
investment made the species a candidate for nonmanagement.
It is the case that the prevailing management regime in most African range states has been de facto 
"open access". Open access, in the context of terrestrial resources, is largely a function of the efforts 
and expenditures of the putative owners. That is, open access occurs when the de jure owners fail
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to allocate sufficient resources to create barriers to accessing the species, or its habitat. In the case 
of the African elephant, the de jure owners are the governments of the African range states, who 
without exception claim exclusive title to the elephant as "wildlife". However, governmental 
spending on park and habitat protection has been insufficient to regulate access in all but a couple of 
states, resulting in de facto open access regimes.
This fact has been demonstrated empirically. Poaching pressure and species decline has been shown 
to be closely related to the governmental spending levels on park protection. In the case of the 
heavily poached rhinoceros populations of sub-Saharan Africa, spending on management was shown 
to be inversely related to the decline of the species’ population in those localities. [Albon and 
Leader-Williams (1989)]. The equation fitted by these authors indicated a zero population change 
level at spending of about $215 per square kilometre. The information that is available indicates that 
the spending on park monitoring is in fact much lower than this in most African states.
Table 3.2 Park Management Spending by Selected African States (Spending levels in $/sq. km.)
Botswana 1984 10
Burkina Faso 1986 132
Cameroon 1986 5
CAR 1984 8
CAR 1986 5
Ethiopia 1984 57
Ghana 1984 237
Kenya 1984 188
Malawi 1984 45
Malawi 1986 49
Mozambique 1984 19
Mozambique 1986 7
Niger 1984 5
Somalia 1984 50
South Africa 1986 4350
Sudan 1986 12
Tanzania 1984 20
Tanzania 1986 18
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Uganda
Zaire
Zambia
1984 357
1986 2
1984 11
Zimbabwe 1984 277
Zimbabwe 1986 194
Sources: Bell,R. and McShane-Caluzi,E., (eds.) 1984. Funding and Financial Control, in 
Conservation and Wildlife Management in Africa. Peace Corps:Washington,D.C.; 
Cumming,D., DuToit,R. and Stuart,S., 1986. African Elephants and Rhinos. IUCN:Gland.
Open access regimes are better thought of as implicit determinations to not invest in the particular 
resources, with the object of converting to others that are perceived to be more productive. That is, 
it is likely to be the decision to deplete a natural resource that generates the open access regime, not 
the other way around. Obviously, in the 1980s, few of the range states perceived the elephant as an 
asset worthy of the investments necessary to maintain existing stock levels.
Unofficial open access policies have been a good method for mining the vast numbers of surplus 
elephants, from the perspective of an aid-sensitised African government. The criminalisation of the 
offtake of ivory preserves international appearances, while the absence of resources applied to 
elephant protection allows the mining to continue apace. There is, in addition, the side benefit of the 
revenues derived from sales of seized ivory. Virtually the entirety of the trade in ivory during the 
past decade (ranging between 500 and 1000 tonnes per annum) has derived from poached ivory sales 
that were "licensed" after seizure. This arms-length approach to the industry preserves appearances 
while fostering the removal of the species from the land.
In short, the elephant’s decline has been largely the result of an implicit decision to undertake mining 
on the part of some of the range states. For example, in the 1980s, four countries alone -Tanzania, 
Zambia, Zaire and Sudan - are estimated to have lost 750 thousand elephants between them, equal 
to the overall continental losses. [ITRG (1989)]. The above table indicates that these states spent $2, 
$11, $12, and $18 per square kilometre, respectively, on park monitoring in the year surveyed. The 
decline of the African elephant during the 1980s, and the ivory trade it spawned, was a direct result 
of these official non-investment decisions.
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Other African states, on the other hand, chose to invest in their elephant populations, and with quite 
different results. In fact, populations increased by almost one hundred percent in one southern 
African state that invested heavily in its elephants, Zimbabwe. The relationship is not exact, but it 
is apparent that most instances of elephant population declines were predetermined by government 
refusals to investment meaningfully in the species.
This is also consistent with the nature of the observed threats of large-scale losses to less well- 
documented biodiversity. Throughout Latin America, for example, much of the force for conversions 
derives from governmental policies that encourage deforestation, and the substitution of specialised 
agriculture. In Brazil, and many other Latin American states, property right regimes are only 
substituted for open access regimes on the condition that the land is cleared and used for specialised 
agriculture. [Repetto and Gillis (1988)]. Throughout many parts of Latin America, it is '’illegal" to 
trade in all wildlife products, and yet large-scale trade flows from the continent [Swanson (1991)]. 
The impact of such unenforced laws is simply to enshrine open access with respect to these resources, 
so that it is impossible for the local populations to foster them as economic resources.
In summary, even in the case of a species, such as the elephant, that is apparently well-suited to the 
overexploitation framework for extinction, the underlying rationale is actually one of 
underinvestment. This has resulted in the mining of the species from arms’ length over the past 
decade. The absence of investment incentives has generated this open access institutional framework, 
and it has therefore been the fundamental cause of the decline of this species. The adopted 
international policy, of criminalising the trade and destroying demand, can only bolster the already- 
existing incentives for the elimination of significant numbers of African elephants from their lands. 
The fate of the African elephant will be the same, under this policy, only now it will result from 
"undercutting" rather than "overexploitation".
3.7 Conclusion
Even biological resources are now economic resources, in the sense that human societies have control 
over the terrestrial biosphere and human decisions on resource allocations determine (directly or 
indirectly) which life forms will continue to exist.
Within this context biological resources are best viewed as a naturally existing form of productive
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asset, on account of their innate capacity for growth. The human decision within this framework is 
determine the set of productive assets that make up the asset portfolio that human society relies upon. 
If it is possible for these resources to be included within that portfolio, then it is also possible for them 
to be left out Conversion is best viewed as the decision to alter the make-up of the asset portfolio, 
by means of disinvesting in some assets and acquiring others Hie disinvestment decision is the 
fundamental force that is determining which species are and are not threatened with extinction today.
Although the fundamental force resulting in extinctions is disinvestment, this may occur via a number 
of different routes: "mining" for receipts, conversions of base resources, or overexploitation. To date, 
policies addressing endangerment have been focused upon these, proximate causes of extinction, 
rather than the more fundamental one. When this is the case, a policy of this nature can only shift 
the threatened species between the various routes to extinctions, not alter its ultimate fate. This is 
precisely the case for many of the species regulated under laws of the nature of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species, and species such as the African elephant.
All extinctions are the result of underinvestment. Even overexploitation is the result of 
underinvestment. Currently, existing policies of demand destruction and supply criminalization are 
misconstructed and misguided. They hinge upon crucially incorrect assumptions regarding causation. 
All extinction policies - those dealing with endangered species, biodiversity policies or land 
conversions - must deal with the fundamental rather than the proximate causes of the decline of 
diverse resources. In order to regulate the extinction process effectively, policies must be based on 
the idea of fostering incentives to invest in these diverse resources.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE GLOBAL CONVERSION PROCESS:
FUNDAMENTAL FORCES UNDERLYING LOSSES OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
4.1 Introduction
Many leading natural scientists are predicting an imminent "mass extinction" of species. Some 
project losses of twenty-five to fifty per cent of all life forms over the next one hundred years. This 
concern has been labelled the problem of "biodiversity losses". Although these scientists indicate that 
there are a variety of proximate causal factors regarding extinctions (overexploitation, habitat losses, 
exotic species), there has been little, if any, work on the nature of the root forces currently threatening 
extinctions.
The reason for this is that natural scientists view extinction as a natural process, occurring over 4.5 
billion years of evolution, whereas the biodiversity problem is better conceptualised as the result of 
a social process, occurring for very different fundamental reasons over the past ten thousand years. 
At the time of the climatic upheavals of the late Pleistocene, there was a real discontinuity in the 
process. Extinctions since that time must be considered the result of a social, rather than a natural, 
process.
There has been some consideration of extinction within a social framework. Economists have 
identified two possible, fundamental forces for human-induced extinctions; however, to a large 
extent, these two forces are in logical conflict with one another. One category of forces might be 
broadly labelled depletion due to the "mismanagement" of biological resources, the other might be 
termed the forces for extinction resulting from the human "management" of biological resources.
Attracting the most attention recently is the problem of mismanagement, and the resulting 
overexploitation of biological resources. This analysis is the result of the Clark model developed in 
the context of the fisheries literature. [Clark (1976)]. It has been applied more recently in the context 
of tropical forests and many other land-based habitats. [Repetto,R. and Gillis,M. (1988)].
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Clark also initiated the other line of reasoning regarding human-induced forces for extinction. [Clark 
(1973)]. For certain types of species, optimal "management” policies might themselves lead to 
complete depletion. In essence, this force for extinction derives from the fact that certain species are 
uncompetitive as assets, because their natural growth rates are not competitive with the returns 
available from other assets in the economy. From this perspective, optimal management of the entire 
portfolio of productive assets implies that some may be relatively poor investments. In those cases 
it may be rational to "mine” the whole of a species, and invest the proceeds in another asset. This is 
possibly the case for slow growing species, such as the Blue Whale or the African elephant. These 
species have annual growth rates of five per cent or less, which may not be competitive with the 
returns available from other investments, and so optimal management points to absolute depletion. 
[Spence (1975); Dasgupta and Heal (1979)].
However, even these two forces acting together fail to explain the fundamental nature of the 
extinction process as it is currently occurring across the face of this planet. At present, natural 
scientists report that endangerment and extinction is not afflicting a handful of relatively slow- 
growing species, it is a threat to virtually all but the few. The extinction process, as it is presently 
occurring, approximates much more closely to one of convergence upon a slate of a few dozens of 
heavily utilised species, with all of the remaining species being relegated to increasingly reduced 
patches of unconverted habitat.
In order to explain this "biodiversity problem", it is necessary to derive the conditions under which 
human choice would generate a mass extinction of species, rather than the selective endangerment. 
That is, an understanding of the biodiversity problem requires an explanation of the human actions 
that homogenise the biosphere, not an explanation of human actions that degrade the biosphere.
This chapter attempts to provide an answer to the question concerning the fundamental nature of the 
forces that might generate such uniformity. Specifically, it explains the particular form that the 
biodiversity problem takes as the result of a dynamic externality incorporated within the idea of 
"agriculture", as it diffuses across the globe. This term describes a process that commenced 
approximately ten thousand years ago when humans first developed the ideas of agricultural 
technology somewhere in the Near East. These ideas, and the tools that they spawned, were used in 
the cultivation of the various species selected for that purpose in that region (sheep, goats, cattle, 
barley, wheat, etc.). Over the years, agricultural technology has become imbedded in these first- 
chosen species, so that adoption of these ideas implies adoption of the same species and the same
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tools used in their production. When the decision to convert to agriculture has been made, it has 
implied the adoption of the set of ideas, tools and species around which agriculture was originally 
developed; "agriculture" is simply the adoption of these specialised methods and species for 
harnessing the biosphere.
As these technologies have diffused across the globe, it is the universal adoption of these specific 
methods of production (as embodied within the domesticated and cultivated species) that has 
produced the homogeneity we now see. It is the inertia flowing from the initial choice of these 
species, and the many subsequent years of investments, that determines that these are the "species of 
choice" in many other environments for which they are not so well-adapted. As the last lands on 
earth are confronted with the human conversion decision, there is the threat that the last great refuges 
for diversity might succumb to this process. Human adoption of uniform methods of biological 
production across the globe has produced the potential for a mass extinction that we are now 
witnessing.
Section 2 of this chapter discusses how the extinction process is now the result of social choice, 
distinguishing this process from that of "natural extinction" and demonstrating that the extinction 
process is now more the result of human management practices, rather than mismanagement. That 
is, it shows that the true nature of the biodiversity problem is the homogenisation of the biosphere, 
not its degradation. Section 3 presents three simple models of species exploitation, developing the 
nature of the conversion process. It first reviews the basic nature of the conversion decision, but then 
demonstrates that it is the "specialised" nature of conversion that threatens diversity. Finally, it 
demonstrates that sunk investments in a given technology can create an inertia for the continuing 
adoption of that same technology; thus, it is the specialised nature of conversion combined with its 
in-built inertia that threatens a mass extinction.
Section 4 then discusses the implications of this new theory of extinction, and relates it to the existing 
evidence on human niche appropriation; in short, the idea of agriculture was an idea on how to 
advance human wealth and fitness, and to date many of the gains realised have been allocated to the 
expansion of the human niche. This final section demonstrates that humans have expanded their own 
niche at the expense of other species, through a "partnership" with the specialised species. Human 
niche expansion has occurred, under agriculture, through the selection of a small set of prey species 
and massive expansions of their ranges. This has created the homogenisation of the biosphere that 
we are witnessing, and the threat to all diversity that is so imminent. The development and
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proliferation of the specialised species is the basic force depleting biological diversity. It is itself 
driven by the human adoption of the strategy of conversion for the advancement of the fundamental 
pursuit of resources and fitness. These are the fundamental forces driving the depletion of diversity.
4.2 The Nature of the Process of Extinction
There are three distinct phases in the history of the extinction process. The first commenced about 
four and a half billion years ago, and continued up until approximately ten or twenty thousand years 
ago. This was the era in which the natural process of extinction functioned as a fundamental 
component of the evolutionary process, with little interference from human choice. Evolution 
operated by allocating "base resources" (those required for sustenance) to those life forms that were 
best adapted to the existing niche; those that were less well-adapted were outcompeted, and rendered 
extinct. The second phase commenced with a technological shift occurring sometime in the climatic 
upheavals of the late Pleistocene, when humans adopted much more sophisticated technologies for 
the appropriation of biological product. From this point onwards, human choice usurped the 
"evolutionary role", by determining which life forms were to be allocated base resources. Extinction 
was becoming a distinctly social, rather than a natural, process. Finally, there is now in process a 
third phase to the extinction process. This is the phase in which human allocations of resources will 
result in mass extinctions, rather than isolated events of endangerment and extinction. Many 
scientists predict that the near future holds the potential for a mass extinction of a scale that has 
occurred only five or six times in the evolutionary history of the planet.
This section describes the fundamental nature of each of these three phases of extinction. Its purpose 
is to demonstrate that the projected problem of mass extinctions may be conceptualised as the direct 
result of the management practices adopted by human societies for the purpose of human 
advancement. In short, many of the gains by the human species over the past ten thousand years (in 
terms of resources and fitness) have come at the expense of other species. Development and diversity 
decline have been, to a large extent, two sides of the same coin.
4.2.1 The Natural Process of Extinction
Extinction is itself a natural process and the ultimate fate of every species. [Futuyma,D. (1986);
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Cox,C. and Moore J*. (1985)]. Studies of the fossil record show that the average longevity of a given 
species lies in the range of 1 to 10 million years. [Raup,D. (1988)]. Over the four and a half billion 
years of evolutionary history, the mosaic of life forms on earth has been completely overhauled many 
times over.
This process is necessary in order to preserve life on earth. The continuous and contemporaneous 
processes of speciation and extinction form the two necessary prongs of the evolutionary process. 
It is this constant re-shaping of the biological diversity on earth that allows life to continue in the 
context of a changing physical environment. (Marshall,L. [1988]).
Ecologists conceptualise life on earth as a single body. "Life" is the conduit through which the 
energy of the sun flows on this planet It is constantly shifting and reshaping itself, via the 
evolutionary process, in order to better adapt to prevailing conditions. The various parts (life forms) 
come and go in order to maintain the integrity of the whole. Any given life form maintains its place 
within the system solely by virtue of its current capacity to capture some part of the flow of solar 
energy.
Some life forms are able to capture solar energy directly, simply by virtue of being alloted a "place 
in the sun" on earth. These are known as the "plants", and the fundamental constraint that they face 
in their competition for existence is territorial. If a plant life form receives an allocation of land, then 
this is often the only base resource that it requires for survival.
Plants capture the energy of the sun through the process of photosynthesis, and in so doing generate 
the "Net Primary Product" (NPP), i.e. the product generated from energy captured directly by life 
forms on earth. [Leith,H. and Whittaker,R. (1975).] It is estimated that the NPP on earth is about 
225 billion metric tons of organic matter per annum. [Ehrlich,P. (1988).] All non-plant life forms 
must be sustained from this base resource. It is the most fundamental constraint on all other life 
forms; in order to exist, all non-plant forms of life must receive an allocation of NPP.
This "allocation" process was a wholly natural one for billions of years. The competition between 
plant forms for "land" allocations and the competition between other life forms for NPP allocations 
lies at the core of the natural process of evolution. These competitions drove the process of evolution, 
and the evolutionary process gave us the particular set of allocations that human societies "received" 
twenty thousand years ago.
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Within the evolutionary process, the particular shapes that life takes derive from the relative 
advantages of these life forms in appropriating some part of the base resource. A "species" is the 
name given to a particular form that life takes for this purpose. [Barton,N. (1988)]. Ecologists 
conceptualise energy flows to earth as diffusing over uneven gradients, e.g. uneven latitudes and 
uneven topographies. Given this uneven distribution, base resources will be similarly concentrated; 
that is, there will be various peaks and troughs across this gradient. A species is defined as the form 
of life that has established itself as the appropriator of the energy flow across one of these "resource 
peaks", or niches. Therefore, the species and its "niche" are coincident concepts; a species is the 
particular form that life takes to fit a particular pattern of the energy throughput on earth (the niche).
There is an in-built rate of turnover for each niche. First, niches are in a state of constant competition 
through the process of genetic recombination, mutation, and dispersion. At any point in time a new 
form of life may arise that is better "adapted" to the existing niche, i.e. there is a better fit to the 
distribution of the base resource. Then the existing life form may be supplanted.
There is another sense in which this process of adaptation must always remain a dynamic one. This 
is the result of a continuously changing physical environment For example, the geography of the 
planet is dynamic. The tectonic plates of the continents have always moved at an average pace of 
approximately five to ten centimetres per year. These changes create gradual shifts in continental 
climates. In addition, the earth’s overall climate is also in a perpetual state of change. The mean 
summer temperature in "Europe" has cycled about 12 times over a range of 10-15 degrees centigrade 
during the past million years. [West (1977)]. The Yugoslav physicist Milutin Milankovich 
hypothesised that this cycle resulted from the superimposition of three periodic cycles: a 100,000 year 
cycle resulting from the eliptical shape of the earth’s orbit; a 40,000 year cycle resulting from the 
earth’s tilt on its axis; and, a 21,000 year cycle resulting from the earth’s wobble of the axis of 
rotation. [Hays, Imbrie and Shackleton (1976)].
These in-built mechanisms for environmental variability have generated a system in which the shape 
and location of any given niche is dynamic. In essence, a niche may be thought of as a peak in the 
uneven distribution of the base resource, and a species as an outgrowth from the base resource. 
However, as the topography of the basic resource is not itself a static concept, the process of species 
definition must also be dynamic.
It is the static result of this dynamic process that can be seen in the distribution of species prevailing
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at any given point in time, and "extinction" is the term applied to the changes which occur between 
static states. The existence of genetic mutation maintains a pool of potential competitors 
omnipresent. With the shifting of the underlying base resource, these invaders may be provided with 
an opportunity at any time. If the invader is successful, and so genetically dissimilar as to not 
interbreed, then the previous occupant of the niche is superceded, and its range is restricted. If this 
same result occurs across the entirety of its range, then the totality of its niche is appropriated, i.e. it 
becomes "extinct".
The prevailing distribution of populations is a snapshot of this dynamic competition. For example, 
the family of Magnoliaceae, genus Magnolia, have at present an extremely disjoint distribution. 
About 80 species exist, with 26 of these in North (and northern South) America and the remainder 
in southeast Asia. However, the fossil record indicates that this family was extremely dispersed 
during the Mesozoic (100 - 200 m. years ago), also including within their range all of Laurasia 
(Europe, Asia) through to Greenland. [Dandy, J. (1981)].
It appears that the Magnolias have gradually succumbed to interspecific competition, i.e. the pressure 
of faster growing, more well-adapted species capable of better exploiting their former niches. As the 
environment altered, these competitors appropriated the Magnolias’ niche throughout Europe, leaving 
only the disjoint distribution that we currently see. If the process of displacement had continued, the 
Magnolias may have lost the entirety of their niche.
This is the nature of the natural extinction process, as demonstrated by four billion years of 
evolutionary history. It is not so much a process resulting in the removal of a species, in the sense 
of niche abandonment, as a process of species resolution, in the sense of niche refinement. It is a 
natural process for life forms to change, over time and over space. With changing environments, 
former inhabitants have lost their "best-adapted status" to invaders, and been replaced. This is 
recognised as extinction if it occurs across the entire geographic range of the life form. However, in 
the natural process, it is more accurately conceptualised as necessary turnover deriving from the 
better adaptation of "life" to the current state of the niche.
Obviously, this description of the natural extinction process does not accord well with the prospect 
of losing half of all life forms in the coming one hundred years, i.e. the problem of biodiversity 
losses. Adaptation is more of a gradualist process in the aggregate sense, even though it represents 
millions of starts and stops for individual species. Species resolution is a process that occurs over
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periods of hundreds of millions of years.
This is not intended to imply that all mass extinctions must necessarily be human-induced; they result 
from any large-scale shock to the life system. There have been several occasions when the rate of 
extinction of species far exceeded the rate of speciation. There are at least five occasions indicated 
in the fossil record during which over 50% of the then-existing animal species were rendered extinct. 
[Raup (1988)]. These mass extinctions have always been the result of a sudden and dramatic change 
in the physical nature of the system, e.g. hypothesised sunspots, asteroids, geothermal activity etc. 
The dramatic shift of the physical system places a stress on the life system for immediate adaptations. 
The result of this stress is the loss of many species without their immediate replacement. In essence, 
this manner of extinction occurs when the niche has been so severely dislocated by a physical event 
that the species find themselves without the capability to make a claim on the base resource. The 
"peaks" in the base resource have shifted out from underneath them.
The current mass extinction is not being initiated by one of these exogenous physical phenomena 
creating a shock to the system. There is indeed a tremendous stress being placed upon the life system 
on earth, but it is arising from within the system. This is unique in evolutionary history, and it is not 
a part of the natural process of extinction. It is a part of the human societal choice process.
4.2.2 The Human-Induced Extinction Process: The Result of Mismanagement or
Misappropriation?
The natural process of extinction bears little resemblance to the processes occurring over the past few 
millenia. To a large extent, there is a discontinuity which exists in evolutionary history, arising 
sometime in the past ten to twenty thousand years. Since that time, there appears to be another layer 
to the extinction process. There is a record of an increasing number of extinctions, especially of the 
large land mammals, associated with human arrival or intensive settlement. The change appears to 
derive from a technological shift, regarding hunting and cultivation, that occurred sometime during 
the climatic upheavals of the late Pleistocene. From this point onwards, extinction has been more a 
process of human choice than a process of gradual adaptation.
There is no evidence of human-induced extinctions prior to the evolution of Homo Sapiens and the 
introduction of this species to new continents, about 50,000 years ago. Since that time, the
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coincidence of human migration with species extinctions has been marked. This occurred in 
Australia (about 50,000 years ago), in the Americas (about 11,000 years ago), in Madagascar (about 
1500 years ago), in New Zealand (about 1200 years ago), and on numerous oceanic islands over the 
past thousand years. [Diamond, J. (1984)].
The causes of the more recent extinctions (i.e. over the past two thousand years) have been 
categorised under three human-induced causal factors: overexploitation; habitat destruction; and 
species introduction. [Diamond,J. (1989)]. However, for the purpose of human choice analysis, it 
is best to think of all extinctions as arising from one of two fundamental factors: mismanagement or 
management
Both potential explanations of the human-induced extinction process are sourced in technological 
shifts. Extinctions resulting from "management" derive from technologies (or strategies) that allow 
one species (or group of species) to appropriate the niches of others. The essence of a management- 
based extinction is that it occurs by reason of the human species’ appropriation of another species’ 
niche.
" Mismanagement"-based extinctions result from a poor fit between human institutions and biological 
resources. This issue has been the subject of a significant economics literature, primarily in the area 
of fisheries economics. Recently this theory has also been applied to the mismanagement of 
terrestrial resources, such as forests and wildlife. [Repetto and Gillis (1988)]. For example, 
overexploitation is often theorised to occur when new technology abruptly reduces the cost of 
harvesting the resource, if social institutions for managing resource access are unable to evolve 
rapidly enough to forestall the aggregate impact of the new technology. The inability to adapt in time 
might then result in the complete removal of a given prey species - a jointly irrational step that 
equates with human niche contraction.
As mentioned, it is also possible to extinguish another species through the process of niche 
appropriation. This occurs under conditions of "mutual competition", i.e. where two or more species 
share a common food supply or breeding ground. The principle of competitive exclusion states that, 
where two species depend on a common resource, niche expansion by one implies contraction by the 
other. It is possible for a mixed equilibrium to evolve under these conditions, but if the only basis 
for the relationship is competitive, then extinction is the likely outcome for one species or the other. 
[Hardin, G. (I960).]
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Niche exclusion and appropriation, by humans, occurs mainly through indirect and surrogate 
competition. Of course, niche exclusion can occur directly, through the appropriation of another 
species’ resource base for own use (as with the displacement of many American songbirds with the 
introduction of the European starling). In the case of humans, however, our niche appropriation 
occurs more indirectly, through surrogates, by the introduction of one human-preferred species in the 
place of another (as with the displacement of the large African land mammals with selected crops and 
domesticated livestock).
Niche appropriation, as practiced by humans, has consisted of the selection of a few prey species, and 
the expansion of their niches. The discovery of this strategy (domestication and cultivation) and its 
implementation constituted a very important part of the technological shift that occurred in the late 
Pleistocene.
Niche appropriation may be used as a strategy to advance either wealth or fitness. In many cases, 
humans have used the benefits from the expansion of their surrogates’ niches for the purpose of their 
own niche expansion, but this has not always been the case. It is also possible to capture these gains 
in terms of the reduced allocation of labour to the production of subsistence (and increased allocations 
of the released labour to other wealth-generating activities), and thus to capture these gains in terms 
of wealth rather than fitness.
Therefore, there are two competing explanations hypothesised to be at the base of human-induced 
extinctions: the efficient use of technology for niche appropriation to advance the objects of wealth 
and fitness accumulation ("management") or the inefficient management of technology with 
consequent degradation ("mismanagement"). It is clear that a technological shift occurred ten 
thousand years ago resulting in a new phase of human-induced extinctions; however, whether these 
extinctions are sourced in the effective or ineffective management of this technological change is 
more unclear. The remainder of this section examines the evidence.
There is no doubt that human mismanagement has resulted in the overexploitation and extinction of 
many oceanic species, where there is little human competition for the species’ niche. Many of the 
sea mammals (whales, seals, otters) have been hunted to the point of virtual extinction. [Bell.R. 
(1978)]. Stellar’s Sea Cow, a slow and easy target, was indeed hunted to complete extinction. These 
examples most definitely do provide some evidence for the mismanagement hypothesis. However,
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there is a very important difference between terrestrial and marine resources; the cost of institutional 
adaptations are much greater in the context of the latter, because no single governance structure 
applies. In this context, it is predictable that human institutions would adapt slowly to technological 
changes, to the detriment of the resources.
For terrestrial species, on the other hand, the available evidence (primarily the archaelogical record) 
cannot separate out between the two competing explanations. This is because both potential 
explanations, management and mismanagement, have the identical objective consequences. Since 
species and niche are one and the same, the removal of either has the same consequence, i.e. the 
extinction of the species. Whether humans are pursuing the species or the niche, the observable 
consequences are identical. In either case, the species will be depleted, and its products may be used 
in the process; however, in one case the depletion is itself the human choice, in the other the depletion 
is a by-product of human niche expansion.
The oft-cited "best evidence" for human mismanagement of terrestrial resources is the coincidence 
between the introduction of the human species to the American landmass 11,000 years ago and the 
loss of many of its large mammals; approximately seventy-three per cent of North American and 
eighty per cent of South American land mammals disappeared at about the same time as the arrival 
of Govis hunters. It has always been assumed that this coincidence implied mismanagement by 
reason of overhunting, especially as many of the large mammals’ remains were evidently slaughtered 
by humans.
However, it was also at this time that substantial climate changes were occurring. [Lewin,R. (1983).] 
These climatic shifts generated a technological shift among human cultures. In particular, it was 
during such periods of climatic upheaval that the resource management practices known as modem 
agriculture were developed. The oldest known fossils of domesticated animals are dated to about 
12,000 to 15,000 years ago. Widespread changes of diet have been documented for human 
populations between eight and ten thousand years ago. [Davis,S. (1982).] [Diamond,J. (1989)]. 
Cultivated grains have been identified back to 6000 years ago. [Wright,H. (1970).] Cultivation and 
domestication at that time implied large scale land use changes, especially the widespread use of fire 
for clearing forests and brush to create agricultural and pasture lands.
It is apparent that a substantial number of human-sourced extinctions occurred throughout the 
Northern hemisphere ten thousand years ago; e.g., much of the large mammalian fauna was depleted
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during this period. Despite much previous speculation, it is not possible for the archaelogical record, 
by itself, to segregate between cause and effect in terms of these extinctions. Archaeological 
evidence cannot say whether these extinctions were the direct result of human mismanagement of the 
species, or a side-effect of human appropriation of its niche.
However, when the impact of that technological shift on the human species is considered, there is no 
longer any doubt as to its character. It was at this time (about ten thousand years ago) that the human 
species’ population began to record unprecedented growth. The development of human technologies 
(cultivation and domestication) in the neolithic enormously expanded the human niche, from the 
capacity to support perhaps ten million individuals to a capacity of hundreds of millions in a 
relatively short time period. [Boulding (1978)]. This population expansion commencing at this time 
is a clear indicator that the technological shift of the late Pleistocene was being capably managed and 
the benefits used for the expansion of the human niche, and the appropriation of many others’.
The fact that this population level has been sustained over these ten millenia indicates that this 
technological shift has constituted a long-term appropriation of other species’ niches. The continuing 
growth of the human population (expected to stabilise only sometime in the next century) is 
indicative of the diffusion of these ideas of niche appropriation across all of the human societies on 
earth. In short, human population growth is the best indicator of niche appropriation by this species, 
and the history of the past ten thousand years indicates that this era has been one of massive niche 
appropriation by the human species.
In more recent times, when the historical record is more complete, the source of causation is less 
difficult to discern. Over the past few centuries, the introduction of alien species has become one of 
the most significant causal factors in species extinctions. For example, over the past four hundred 
years, there have been approximately 30 species of frog and lizard extinctions, 22 of which (i.e. 73%) 
that have been attributed to the introduction of alien species. [Honnegger (1981)]. This is a pattern 
of extinction that is common across many species over much of the last few hundred years; the 
introduction of aliens is listed as the single highest proximate cause of documented extinctions. The 
relationship between human management, i.e. methods of production, and recent species extinctions 
is indicated by the fact that most documented plant and animal extinctions are related to the 
introduction of only seven alien species: goats, rabbits, pigs, cats, and three species of rat. [Atkinson, 
I. (1989)]. It has been the human-chosen domesticated species that have been the source of the 
majority of modem documented extinction cases.
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This effect may also be demonstrated by reference to the study of island habitats. Studies of 
extinctions on islands are particularly important because they represent a microcosm of the forces 
occurring globally. Just as most species will have nowhere else to go when human technology 
diffuses to the final comers of the earth, island species have few options when humans arrive and 
develop their habitats. The importance of a refuge from human development for species survival is 
indicated by the fact that fully 75% of all documented extinctions have occurred in island habitats. 
[WCMC (1992)].
There are two results from island studies that are of particular importance. First, from the fossil 
record it is apparent that the species diversity of birds on virtually all oceanic islands was reduced by 
thirty to fifty per cent within the period of human initial occupancy. Since about one-third of all bird 
species are endemic to islands, this represents a loss of about one-quarter of the world’s bird species 
over the past few thousand years. [01son,S. (1989)]. Therefore, the impact of humans over the past 
thousand years has already worked one mass extinction. This confirms the plausibility of large scale 
extinctions as the same forces diffuse as completely on a global basis.
Secondly, it is important to understand the nature of the base forces that have been working this mass 
extinction. How does the diffusion of human technology impact on a species when abruptly 
introduced, and how do they react within their threatened habitat? The best evidence shows that 
species become increasingly concentrated within the least-threatened final refuges.
Previously it was thought that high islands had greater species diversity because of 
their montane rain forests. An important observation to emerge from recent studies, 
however, is that drier, more level lowland habitats, the ones most susceptible to 
burning and clearing for agriculture, had greater species diversity than steep areas 
of high, wet forests. On islands, most species that persist in wet montane forests 
today do so not because this is their preferred habitat, but because it is the only 
habitat left that has not been too severely modified by man. [Quoted from Olson,S.
(1989)].
The diffusion of the technological change associated with human societies might operate globally as 
it does on these islands. That is, as human technology diffuses to these island systems in the form 
of land conversions and species introductions, these alterations in turn result in the restriction of the
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ranges of resident species. If the base resources are all suitable to human appropriation, then the 
resident species may find themselves without a niche, i.e extinct. If some part of the base is less 
suitable for human modification, e.g. the montane rain forests, then the island species become 
increasingly concentrated in these unaltered habitats, as "refuges". [Lynch,J. (1988)].
It is probably the case that this same process has been occurring on a global level, over a period of 
ten thousand years. The global distribution of species is now as much the result of human as natural 
processes. Human modification of the environment has restricted the range of many species, forcing 
the majority into a small number of refugia.
The nature of the fundamental force working during this period is clear, i.e. the transfer of niches to 
human-selected species in order to expand the claim of the human species on the base resource. 
Beliefs that mismanagement or human population growth cause extinctions confuse cause with effect 
The population of a species is only a measure of its niche; the expansion of the human population 
from ten million to ten billion is the clearest possible evidence of human niche appropriation. 
Similarly, overexploitation is often an effect of human niche appropriation; the mining of a species 
whose niche is gone. Both of these phenomena occur as a consequence of niche appropriation.
Over the past ten thousand years, the course of evolutionary history has taken an abrupt turn. 
Extinction is no longer a force for better adaptation of all life forms, it is a result of human choices. 
The choice derives from the technological ability of humans to now appropriate wide ranges of other 
species’niches. This is the evolutionary nature of cultivation and domestication. Humans discovered 
how to choose particular prey species on which to build the human niche. Once this was 
accomplished, the route to human advancement (i.e. human niche expansion) was the expansion of 
the range of the selected species. It is human cooperation with these species, for the expansion of 
their ranges, that has resulted in the restriction and extinction of so many others.
In essence, within the natural evolutionary process, the allocation of a portion of "base resource" 
(land or NPP) was determined in a natural competition between various life forms. In the past ten 
thousand years, this allocation decision has been usurped by the human species. Recognising that 
it was possible to select a species to which to allocate the base resource, and then use that species, the 
human species had realised a new form of niche appropriation. From that point on, the competition 
for base resource allocations was a social process.
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4.23  The Nature of the Current Threat to Biological Diversity
The early, human-induced extinctions have often been those species which are most closely 
competing with humans, e.g. the large, land mammals. The ranges of many of these species are 
usually restricted by the introduction of humans, and extinction sometimes results. Large land 
mammals are the most threatened initially precisely because they compete most closely with humans 
in terms of range and resource requirements. Other species, with less demanding requirements, have 
had their ranges vastly circumscribed, or even shifted. As on the oceanic islands, many species have 
taken refuge in some of the last remaining unaltered habitats. The third phase of the extinction 
process, i.e. the "biodiversity problem", is the result of the workings of the human niche appropriation 
process toward these refugia. As this technological change diffuses to the final comers of the earth, 
there must necessarily be an increasing rate of extinction.
There is an empirically derived relationship, used by biogeographers, which relates the area of the 
available unmodified habitat to the number of species which it contains. (Williamson,M. [1988]). 
Studies of "islands" of natural habitat, whether situated in oceans or civilisation, indicate that the 
number of species doubles with a tenfold increase in the area of the island. Conversely, a reduction 
in the size of the natural habitat by 90% is likely to result in a halving of the number of species which 
it will contain. [MacArthur and Wilson (1967)].
Again, the study of islands is instructive for looking at the global impact of conversions. This study, 
known as biogeography, has discerned a geometric relationship between conversions and extinctions. 
That is, the rate of species loss is geometrically increasing with the actual amount of the total base 
resource appropriated by the human species. As the technology for conversions reaches the final 
refugia, there will be much greater losses of species per square hectare converted than occurred with 
the first, earlier conversions. This is what has been occurring on the global level, paralleling the 
island extinctions from which this relationship was derived.
Land use alterations have been working across the globe for the past few millenia. Humans have 
been modifying lands for ten thousand years; however, the pace and diffusion of these alterations 
have been quickening in the past few hundred years. Estimates of aggregate natural habitat losses 
over the past two centuries range from 25 to 50 per cent. [Myers (1980); HED (1989)]. Since the 
commencement of the documentation of land-use changes (in the past thirty years), the pattern of 
current land conversions is clear. Two hundred million hectares of forest and 11 million hectares of
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grasslands were converted to specialised agriculture between 1960 and 1980 alone, all of it in the 
developing countries. [Table 4.1] [Holdgate e t al. (1982)].
Table 4.1: Rates of Conversion of Natural Habitat to Agriculture
Developing 1960
ha.
Sub-S. Africa 161m.
Latin America 104m.
South Asia 153m.
S.E. Asia 40m.
1980 Percent. Change
ha.
222m. 37.8
142m. 36.5
210m. 37.2
55m. 37.5
Developed
North America 205m. 203m. 0.1
Europe 151m. 137m. -10.0
U.S.S.R. 225m. 233m. 2.0
Source: Repetto,R. and Gillis^M., (eds.), 1988. Public Policies and the Misuse of Forest 
Resources. Cambridge University Press:Cambridge.
In the developed countries of Europe and the U.S., there is virtually no human niche appropriation 
still taking place. This is because the process of conversion has been completed. The proportion of 
Europe which is "unmodified habitat" (of at least 4000 sq. km. in area) is now certifiably zero. In the 
U.S., a mere 500 years after the introduction of the first Europeans, the proportion of natural habitat 
of this dimension is down to 5%. [World Resources Institute (1990)]. The conversion process has 
worked its way through most of the northern hemisphere, and it is now proceeding in the same 
manner across the south. At the "frontier" of this technological diffusion, the rate of conversions 
remains high.
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Table 4.2: Recent Rates of Conversion To Specialised Agriculture (Ten Year Rate - To 1987) 
Conversions to Cropland Conversions to Pastureland
1. Paraguay 71.2% 1. Ecuador 61.5%
2. Niger 32.0% 2. C. Rica 34.1%
3. Mongolia 31.9% 3. Thailand 32.1%
4. Brazil 22.7% 4. Phillip. 26.2%
5. Ivory 22.4% 5. Paraguay 26.0%
6. Uganda 21.4% 6. Vietnam 14.0%
7. Guyana 21.3% 7. Nicaragua 11.8%
8. Burkina 19.4%
9. Rwanda 18.6%
lO.Thailand 17.1%
Source: World Resources Institute and International Institute for Environment and 
Development (1990].
As the theory of island biogeography, and the studies cited regarding oceanic islands, would predict, 
this steady contraction of the available unaltered habitat has had the effect of concentrating the 
remaining species in the remaining unconverted habitat It has been estimated that about half of the 
world’s species are now contained in the remaining tropical forests. This is in part the result of the 
workings of four billion years of the natural process of extinction, but it is also the result of the 
impact of ten thousand years of human-induced extinctions.
Much of the world’s remaining diverse life forms exist in one of these last remaining patches of 
substantially unaltered habitat. The so-called "megadiversity states", as identified by the World Wide 
Fund for Nature, are: Mexico, Columbia, Brazil, Zaire, Madagascar and Indonesia; for example, four 
of these states alone contain approximately 75% of all primate species. In sum, it is estimated that 
50 to 80% of the world’s biological diversity is to be found in 6 to 12 tropical countries, including 
those mentioned above. [Mittermeier (1988)].
All of the projections of mass extinctions are based on extrapolations of human land conversion 
trends into the final refugia of species diversity, i.e. the tropical rainforests. A fairly conservative 
estimate would seem to be that the diffusion of these technologies into these final refugia are causing 
current rates of extinction to be about 1,000 to 10,000 times the historical rate of extinction. [Wilson
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(1988)]. A range of estimates by some of the world’s leading scientists projects a possible species 
loss of between 20 and 50% of the world’s total over the next century. [Table 4.3].
Table 43  Estimated Rates and Projections of Extinctions
Rate Projection 
8% 33-50%
5% 50%
33%
9% 25%
5% 15%
Basis
forest area loss 
forest area loss 
forest area loss 
forest area loss 
forest area loss
Source
Lovejoy (1980) 
Ehrlich & Ehrlich 
Simberloff (1986) 
Raven (1988)
Reid & Miller (1989)
Note: The rates are given as percentage losses of total number of global species per decade. The 
projections are based upon the extrapolation of this trend at then-current rates through to the 
total conversion of the examined forested area.
There is no ambiguity with regard to the source of these projected mass extinctions. The basis for 
these estimates is invariably the rates of conversion of the tropical forest habitats upon which many 
of the world’s species now depend. The problem of biodiversity, as defined by the world’s leading 
natural scientists, is precisely the problem of the continuing diffusion of human technology to the last 
refugia on earth. Humans continue to modify the environment in order to replace the preexisting life 
forms with those which they have selected. It is this process that commenced ten thousand years ago, 
and it is its completion that threatens a final human-induced mass extinction. The first acts of niche 
appropriation had grave effects on those species with wide range requirements; other species, 
however, merely had their ranges reduced or relocated. Each successive act of appropriation has a 
greater cost in terms of niche appropriation, and thus increasingly grave impacts on individual 
species. However, the current problem of biodiversity, as a human-induced mass extinction, is one 
of the appropriation of the last refuges of the unchosen species. As the diffusion of technology 
converges upon these sites, the number of species on earth will similarly converge upon the number 
selected for use by the human species.
4 3  The Sources of Human-Induced Extinction: Conversion, Agriculture & Specialised Species
This section addresses the nature of the social forces that now drive extinctions. This process (of 
human-induced extinction) is best modelled as an "asset choice problem". That is, a species is best
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conceptualised as a specific type of natural capital, with the capacity to generate its own menu of 
outputs (goods and services) that is valued by humans. However, the species itself is not the 
fundamental input; it is merely the conduit through which the fundamental inputs flow. The 
fundamental inputs for biological production are the base resources that sustain life: land (a place in 
the sun) for plant life forms, and net primary product for other life forms.
It is the failure to include the competitive nature of the contest for the "base resources" (land and 
primary product) within the economic model that has confused the previous analysis of extinction. 
Of course, solar energy as it arrives here on earth is a "free good", a natural endowment However, 
the specific form that this product assumes depends critically on the array of species that are present 
to channel i t
The allocation of base resources to particular species is now a societal rather than a natural decision. 
Since humans do not have the capacity to capture solar energy directly, they must choose which 
species to use in their consumption of photosynthetic product. And, since humans now have the 
capacity (through surrogates) to control the allocation of the entirety of the base resource, 
nonselection equates with extinction. Therefore, it is now this human choice, between species for 
allocations of base resources, that drives the process of extinction. It is the modelling of this 
competition, and the forces that drive it, that is the subject of this section.
4.3.1 The Force for Conversion
The process of extinction of species, when conceptualised as specific forms of capital assets, is 
straightforward. As with all capital assets, there can be no output without inputs. It is the human 
decision to not supply these inputs that induces extinction. There are three necessary inputs into a 
biological production system for the capture of photosynthetic product by human societies: stocks, 
base resource flows, and human management.
The first input upon which all species depend for continued existence and production is their own 
stock levels. There can be no flow from a species without a prior investment in a positive stock level. 
Humans must make the decision to invest in supplying these stocks by determining, in each period, 
whether to disinvest in that stock or not.
Although the stock levels of all naturally existing species have commenced at positive levels by
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definition, the decision to continue to invest in this array of species is now a human decision, simply 
because humans have been empowered (technologically) to make the choice. That is, once humans 
have the power to remove a species, (as we do now with regard to all but the smallest), then this 
option becomes a part of the human choice set and it must be analysed within this framework. 
Optimal choice theory will then explain how human societies are making these decisions, not 
necessarily how they should make them.
The outcome of this decision with regard to any species depends upon the relative return between 
assets. Stocks of any one species may be disinvested in order to supply funds for investment in 
another asset This is the "force for conversion" between assets, and Solow (1974) was the first to 
note its applicability to natural resources.
The force for conversion applies equally to the renewable and the nonrenewable forms of natural 
capital. It was first applied in the context of the optimal depletion of a mine. [Hotelling (1931)]. Its 
applicability to marine species was later developed by Clark and then Spence in the context of the 
great whales. [Clark (1973); Spence (1975)]. The determinative factor, in the biological context, is 
the capacity of the natural asset (the species) to compete in terms of productivity with the other assets; 
therefore, the key to species viability is a rate of growth in excess of the applicable interest rate.
There is another necessary input for all biological assets (in addition to initial stocks). This is solar 
energy, which is captured either directly (in the case of plants) or indirectly in the form of 
photosynthetic product (by animals). Solar energy is, as described above, a free good. However, the 
presence of solar energy outside of the earth’s system is of little use; there is little usefulness to 
receiving it on the surface of the moon, for example. The base resource through which solar energy 
is channelled to all terrestrial species is the land itself. The land provides the surface area on which 
the vegetation resides and accepts solar energy. The land surface area thus provides the channel 
through which all herbivores accept their solar energy, and similarly for all other life forms.
Each parcel of land constitutes the "base resource" in the earth’s system by virtue of its place in the 
sun. Organisms which have evolved the capacity to use solar energy require this base resource in 
order to "accept" the energy. Organisms, including the human species, that have evolved the capacity 
to use photosynthetic product must have an allocation of base resource upon which to build their 
subsistence.
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The forces determining extinctions in the modem era are those which determine how humans choose 
between the various instruments for solar energy acquisition. That is, the earth’s surface may be 
considered the base resource simply because it stands in the path of the sun’s energy flow, with an 
in-built capacity to use energy. Each of the ten million or so species may be viewed as a different 
"solar panel" from the human perspective, i.e. each species generates an individualised group of 
goods and services derived from this same input
This competition between biological species for an allocation of the base resource, land, is another 
facet of the "force of conversion". The more productive species, in terms of the flow of human­
valued goods and services, will be substituted for the less productive species. It is the force for 
conversion between biological assets, rather than between natural and manmade.
These two facets of the force for conversion may be demonstrated in a very simple model, as follows. 
Consider a human society’s decision concerning the allocation of an amount of base resource (R) to 
a given species (with stock x, and flows y). Assume that it is a developing country whose concern 
is the maximisation of tradeable product from the flow, and hence the objective is profit 
maximisation. This choice problem may be considered as follows:
Social Choice Regarding Investment in a Species: (4.1)
k is the value of the flow of goods and services (y) from a stock of a given species(x)
R is the amount of the "base resource" (land) allocated to this species
r is the marginal rate of return on investment, i.e. interest rate
p(y) is the inverse (worldwide) demand curve for the flow of goods and services (y)
w is the labour cost per unit of output
pR is the unit opportunity cost of the base resource (land)
H(x,R) is the natural growth function of the species
o
(P(y)y -  wy -  rpRR ) dt
Subject to x -  H(xJR) -y
where:
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This model of the decision making process is chosen for its manner in combining the biological and 
economic worlds. The foundation of the model is the stock constraint, which represents the character 
of the biological world. This constraint captures the essence of the biological characteristics of 
biological production systems. It says that the growth function (H) is a "free good" derived from the 
flow of solar energy; but that a flow of the individual species (x) requires prior investments of both 
stocks (x) and base resources (R). Therefore, biological product flows "naturally", but the specific 
constituency of that product is a matter of human choice.
Equation (4.1) gives the criterion by which human societies make their choices regarding relative 
investments in species. This equation states that, in the case of a developing country (where almost 
all diverse resources reside), the decision making criterion will be the rate of return received on 
investments in that species. In short, in parts of the world where investment deficiencies are obvious 
and abundant, there will be a need for assets to generate a clear and competitive return.
The society chooses to invest in a given species by its choices of the amount of base resource (R) 
allocated to the species, and by the amount of offtake (y) of the species. High levels of R and low 
levels of y represent societal decisions to invest in the necessary inputs for this species (here, stocks 
and base resources). Then, the state’s biological production portfolio will include this species within 
its array of assets. Any particular species will have to compete to be included within this portfolio, 
and the nature of this competition can be demonstrated in the first order conditions of the above 
model.
The decision on whether to invest in the resource or not lies with the forces determining investments 
in the two necessary inputs: the prior stock and the base resources.
The General Force for Conversion (stock disinvestment)
"Stock Investment Criterion" (4.2)
This condition is that derived by Clark and Spence in prior work on the economics of extinction. It 
states that, in the steady state, the growth rate of the biological resource must be competitive with the 
general rate of return on assets (i.e. H* > r at some stock level), else the society would prefer to 
disinvest the entire stock of the species and invest the return in other assets.
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Another requisite input for inclusion of a given species within the biological production system is the 
base resource, land (R). Again, the species must compete for allocations of this resource. If no base 
resource is allocated, disinvestment in stocks occurs more indirectly but just as certainly.
Base Resource Allocation Decision: (4.3)
. *R : — __  = r
P it
The optimal investment condition in equation (4.3) provides that this particular species will receive 
an allocation of land (R) in accordance with its capacity to earn a competitive return on that 
allocation. If the species is unable to generate an adequate return, then the base resource will be 
allocated to another biological asset (or possibly converted to an entirely nonproductive activity, 
biologically).
In effect, it is as if the species had to pay a "rent" each period for the use of the land allocated to it 
in the amount of the amortised full value of the land (r pR). Since the price of any particular parcel 
of land will be bid up in accord with the potential flow of revenues from its use in production (since 
it is itself a capital asset), this condition places the species in competition with all other uses of the 
land for its allocation. The species must be seen as capable of producing a stream of revenues (HR 
X) whose present value is sufficient to warrant an investment in the base resource. Otherwise, the 
land will be allocated to another activity.
This is a fundamental force for extinction. Even if the species is able to compete with manmade 
capital in terms of productivity, it still must compete with all other biological assets for an allocation 
of the physical resource. It provides an explanation why the majority of species are often found only 
in a few "refuges" of unaltered habitat These few sites are situated on what were once considered 
to be "wastelands", such as mountains or rainforests, where there has been little human competition 
for their use. For this reason the price of the lands had remained low, virtually zero, and the majority 
of species have been confined to these sites in pursuit of a "low-rent district", where the competitive 
forces have been relatively slight
The recent studies cited in section 4.2, concerning the montane forests on oceanic islands, provide 
an illustration of this. Although biologists initially believed that these forests were naturally more 
diverse habitats, it is now believed that these lands contain more species because they have been less
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susceptible to human modification (burning and agriculture) than are the lowlands. Many of the 
forest species have migrated to these relatively less-competitive habitats from the lowlands.
The pattern of diversity discovered by modern-day biologists is therefore itself a result of the 
economic forces for substitution. Species have been confined to "low-rent" habitats, where human 
competitive pressures have been lowest.
The same pattern has emerged on a global basis. With the reconstruction of the human asset 
portfolio, and consequential human alteration of much of the land surface over the past ten thousand 
years, the unchosen species (unable to compete for investment) have had their ranges restricted to the 
few remaining refuges of unaltered, undeveloped habitat The current geographical dispersion of 
species diversity, as charted by modern day biologists, must have its source as much in economic 
forces as in natural ones.
The threat of mass extinctions arises as even these last refuges are coming under pressure for 
development. It is not the mere fact of a state’s "natural" endowment of diversity, but equally where 
that state stands in the global development process, which determines the potential magnitude of the 
impact of these final conversions.
43 2  The Nature of ’’Agriculture”
The force for conversion is not in itself sufficient to explain the forecasts of mass extinctions. 
Conversion merely implies that each parcel of land will have its array of biological capital altered in 
order to maximise its rate of productivity. This means that it is likely that many land parcels will 
generate a different bundle of biological goods and services, after human modification, but it does 
not provide an explanation for the reason why many species would not be able to compete for even 
a single parcel. That is, conversion might imply a redistribution of the earth’s species, but not 
necessarily a narrowing in the total diversity (e.g. the total number of species).
In fact, conversion alone would probably not even redistribute species. By definition, species are 
best-adapted to their natural environments, and most productive in their own niche. [Eltringham.K. 
(1986)]. Therefore, natural productivities (in terms of both growth and human value functions) 
probably work in favour of maintaining the original distribution of species within the biological 
production system.
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The nature of the additional force working for extinction is made clear by the fact that the entire 
roster of species is not being considered for use on any given parcel of land. It is more likely that the 
choice is from amongst only a handful of "commercialised" species: domesticated crops and 
livestock. The roster of species used to appropriate photosynthetic product for humans has converged 
to this very small, select group of plants and animals.
This convergence cannot be explained entirely by reason of consumer tastes. There is clear evidence 
that local tastes favour the local products. Again, this is the expected result of the natural process of 
co-evolution. That is, it would be expected that the community of predators and prey would co- 
evolve, so that a given population of the human species would evolve preferences built around their 
local prey species. [Swanson,T. (1990)].
It is more likely that this convergence is technologically driven. It is the purpose of this section to 
discuss the nature of the idea of "agriculture", as it has developed and diffused across the world, and 
to demonstrate how this idea could generate the sort of global homogenisation of the biosphere that 
has occurred and that we are witnessing.
The basic idea underlying "agriculture" is the introduction of capital goods (i.e. tools) into biological 
production. This allows for the substitution of manmade capital for labour in the capture of 
biological product. This can be seen both across countries and across time. For example, over the 
past one hundred years in the developed world, the proportion of the labour force working in 
biological production has fallen from half to about three to ten per cent with the introduction of 
modern capital goods (large machinery, chemicals). A contemporary example: At the existing 
frontiers of agriculture, e.g. Latin America and Africa, the number of tractors has increased by a 
factor of ten over the past decade, while remaining constant in the developed world. [World 
Resources Institute (1990)]. The technological shift which occurred about ten years ago was, in 
essence, the human appreciation of the fundamental importance of capital goods in biological 
production. The arrival of this idea opened up a new set of production possibilities for human 
societies.
It was at this point in time that individual prey species were transformed into distinct "methods of 
production" for human appropriation of NPP. Unlike the human inputs for which they were 
substituting, capital goods were less flexible and adaptible. On account of this, most tools of 
agriculture were not all-purpose generalists, they were instead "species-specific".
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This observation is equally true today. The reliance upon capital goods requires homogeneity in 
inputs and implies the same in regard to outputs. For example, converting a piece of land to the 
production of a single crop allows the use of machinery for planting and harvesting, and the use of 
chemicals which are capable of targeting all competitors ("pests") of the chosen crop. All of these 
inputs are finely-tuned to a single species, which is the resultant (and only) form of output over the 
entire area of the production unit.
Therefore, agriculture (the idea of using capital goods in biological production) was focused upon 
the choice between distinct "species-specific methods of production": consisting of a species and the 
ancillary resources required Qand) and available (capital goods) for its production. The societal 
choice with regard to biological production possibilities now reduced to a choice between distinct 
"bundles" of joint inputs (i.e. methods of production).
The impact of the introduction of species-specific capital goods within biological production may be 
illustrated in the context of the simple model outlined above. In this version of the model, the role 
of capital equipment is for the reduction of the average (unit labour) cost of production. That is, the 
natural production system remains uneffected, but the addition of capital makes the system more 
efficient in economic terms, by reducing the need for human labour inputs.
Societal Choice regarding Investment in a Species (with Species-Specific Capital Goods):
(4.4)
y X K  n  O ^ ,)  3 JV "  [p(y)> - c(RJC,)y -  rpsR -  rpKK) ] dt
y 0
Subject to x -  H(x\R) - y
where:
Ky is the number of units of species-specific capital goods 
pKy is the price of a unit of such capital services
Equation (4.4) captures the idea that the role of agriculture has been the transformation of the societal 
choice problem to one that incorporates the options that "species-specific" capital goods (Ky)
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introduce into biological production. Societies now invest in different species in accordance with 
how well the overall "package" of joint inputs performs.
Note that the impact of capital goods in agriculture, in this model, is only to substitute for labour in 
order to reduce the costs of production [c(Ky)j. The fundamental nature of biological production, as 
depicted in the stock constraint, remains uneffected by the inclusion of manmade capital. This is 
because agricultural capital goods are not able to affect the rate of flow of solar energy, or the 
capacity of a given species to produce photosynthetic product from that energy. These capital goods 
act only to decrease the (units of labour) costliness of planting, removing competitors and harvesting 
the desired products.
With the introduction of capital goods into the biological production system, the societal choice 
regarding investment in a species (as a method of production) will now require consideration of two 
further factors, in addition to the force for conversion established in equations (4.2) and (4.3).
Agriculture - Species-Specific Methods of Production:
•’Scale" (4.5)
Hj. •X cK y
R*: - A , , -  _  = r
P* P*
"Compatibility" (4.6)
Equations (4.5) and (4.6) are best conceptualised in reverse order. The "compatibility" condition 
states that specialised capital goods will be used in the production of a particular species to the extent 
that its unit cost function responds to this manner of investment. The "scale" criterion determines the 
land area over which the new capital/species production method must operate in order to reach the 
optimal scale of production for this particular method.
115
When combined with equation (4.2) above (the "stock" criterion), these three equations determine 
the system of incentives for investment in any given species-specific method of production. That is, 
this system of incentives will determine the optimal method of production to be allocated to any given 
species, and simultaneously determine the levels of investment in species stocks and in its ancillary 
resources (capital goods, base resources). The impact of agriculture is that the decision making 
concerning the allocation of resources to individual species (and hence the forces effecting 
extinctions) will be determined within the more general decision making framework concerning the 
optimal methods of production to be applied in human appropriation of NPP.
The nature of this decision problem clearly implies societal preferences for some species over others - 
for the purpose of capital intensive biological production. First, there is clear differential 
compatibility of species with capital-intensive methods of production; this indicates why the more 
sedentary ungulates (such as cattle) will be the species of choice over the more migratory ones (such 
as wildebeest). A small capital investment in a fence is sufficient to maintain a stable production 
system in the former case, while it is disastrous in the latter. The "open range" system is a much more 
labour intensive method of production than a fenced system, but some species are simply not 
compatible (i.e. productive) with capital good inputs.
However, the compatibility criterion cannot initself generate extinctions, because no species requires 
capital goods for biological survival. It is the combination of the compatibility criterion with the 
scale criterion in the context o f a strict terrestrial constraint that generates the outcome of extinction 
for species.
That is, it is the compatibility of certain species with capital goods, together with the increased 
allocations of land that these methods of production warrant (relative to other species capabilities) 
and require (in order to achieve a cost-efficient scale of production) that generates the expansion of 
these species’ ranges. The expansion of the ranges of the the capital-compatible (or specialised) 
species necessarily implies the constriction of the ranges of the less compatible (or diverse) species. 
It is the diversion to the specialised species of the required resources for survival that endangers the 
diverse.
For example, a large-scale tractor/combine operation may be compatible with a wheat-based 
production system; however, it might only be cost-effective once a large enough scale of application 
is achieved (implying large, simultaneous investments in capital, land and stocks). The cost-efficient
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scale of production, when the costs of the capital goods become great, implies large simultaneous 
investments in capital, land and stocks for the selected species. As a result, the consequential 
expansion of the range of this one species, in a world with a fundamental constraint (i.e. the base 
resource constaint), implies the exclusion of many other species.
Therefore the nature of agriculture implies that the the evolutionary prererogative usurped by human 
society (i.e. the responsibility for allocating base resources to competing life forms) will be made 
implicitly within the societal decision making framework concerning the optimal methods of 
production for use in human appropriation of NPP.
Thus, at the base of the problem of extinction is the human choice between distinct methods of 
production for niche appropriation. The technological shift implicit within agriculture was the idea 
that biological production was most cost effectively undertaken under methods that "bundled 
together" the requisite inputs: species-capital goods-base resources. These joint inputs were 
specialised one to the other, and the choice of a method of production then involved a choice across 
such bundles. All of the various species on earth have been rendered potential "methods of 
production" for the human race, competing for allocations of the ancillary resources that they require 
for their survival.
With the introduction of the idea of agriculture, the extinction process has since been driven by 
decision making concerning the optimal levels of investment in a species and its ancillary resources. 
An absence of investment in the resources required by a species, in the context of a strict terrestrial 
constraint, in itself implies ultimate extinction.
4.33 Dynamic Externalities: Specialised Species and Learning by Doing
Agriculture cannot in itself explain the phenomenon of convergence within the biosphere. It indicates 
the reasons why some species will attract human investments, and thereby outcompete other species 
in the contest for base resources, but it does not explain the number of species that would result from 
such a competition. Specifically, it does not provide an explanation for why the biosphere would 
converge upon only a small subset of a few dozen of the available species.
For convergence to occur, it is necessary to include one further factor of production within our model 
of biological production. This is the factor known as "knowledge" or "learning" within the literature
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(T). (Arrow, 1962). Knowledge in this context is the factor that accumulates with experience or 
research with regard to the production of a particular species. It is the information that derives from 
this experience, and that is useful in guiding the production of the species or any of its ancillary 
specialised factors of production.
For example, it would be possible to re-trace the learning curve with regard to many of the specialised 
species. The first species-specific tools would probably have been hand tools well-suited to the 
planting and harvesting of the species, e.g. the hoe and scythe for wheat With experience would 
come the realisation that further, better tools were possible; for example, the introduction of animal 
power and the plough in wheat production. On the innovation of the internal cumbustion engine, the 
experience with wheat would indicate how best to apply this invention, in the form of tractors, 
cultivators and combine harvesters. More recently, with the advent of the synthetic chemical 
industry, the experience with wheat indicatedits most virulent competitors (insect, plant, and fungus), 
and dictated the nature of the capital goods (pesticides) to flow from that industry. In sum, the 
accumulated experience with a particular species would determine, at a minimum, the direction in 
which new ideas were developed, and very likely determined the direction in which much 
fundamental research was undertaken.
Thus, this factor is also species-specific in that the knowledge derives from previous work with a 
particular species and its particular capital goods. It is a factor "specialised" to a particular species, 
in the sense that it is costly to transfer the knowledge gained in working with one species across the 
boundary into other species. It is also specialised in the sense that the work with a particular species 
determines, in part, the direction in which research is undertaken; the information most suited to the 
production of diverse species has not even been pursued.
With this final factor introduced, it is now possible to describe precisely the nature of the methods 
of production available for human appropriation of NPP. These represent the various instruments 
available for human consideration as means for sustenance.
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Species-Specific Methods of Production: (4.7)
y  =  F(x, Ky,Ty,R)
where: y * the appropriation of NPP in form of species y
x -  stocks of species y 
Ky =  species-specific capital goods 
Ty »  species-specific knowledge or experience 
R -  base resources allocated to species y
Equation (4.7) captures the idea of the nature of the contest between species for survival. They are 
competing as one of four joint inputs within a method of production available for human use in NPP 
appropriation. Three of these inputs (x,Ky,Ty) are specialised one to another, and together form a 
distinct "method of production". These methods of production then compete for allocations of the 
fourth, fungible factor (R): the base resources required for biological survival. It is this competition 
that has replaced the evolutionary competition in determining the survival and extinction of species.
It is the nature of this final factor that generates the forces for the convergence of the biosphere upon 
a small set of specialised species. It is the dynamic externality inherent within accumulated 
knowledge and learning that generates the nonconvexity within the system, so that human choice falls 
again and again upon the same small set of life forms. Specifically, accumulated knowledge in this 
context is a nonrival good in the sense of Romer (1987; 1990a; 1990b). That is, it is of the nature 
of a "design or list of instructions" that is distinct from the medium on which it is stored, and thus (as 
pure information) it may be used simultaneously by arbitrarily many agents without added cost. The 
accumulated experience in regard to the specialised species is inherent within the capital goods and 
species as they stand, and is available at no added costliness to the marginal user. (Romer, 1990b).
This dynamic externality creates the nonconvexity within the system. Specifically, it is attributable 
to two different "spillover" effects regarding accumulated agricultural knowledge, one that does and 
one that does not exist First, it is costly to transfer accumulated knowledge and experience across 
biological boundaries (spillover between species does not exist). Second, it is not costly to transfer 
accumulated knowledge and experience across geographical boundaries (spillover between users does 
exist).
The combination of these two effects would create a clear nonconvexity within the global system of
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choice regarding distinct methods of production for appropriating NPP. Essentially, there would 
evolve through cumulative causation an inertia around the initial conditions of agricultural technology 
by virtue of the accumulation of experience around these initial conditions, and the noncostly transfer 
of this experience to subsequent users. The result would be an example of "path dependence", or a 
situation in which history "matters" (i.e. the initial conditions determine the subsequent path). 
(David, 1985; 1987).
This nonconvexity is of two types. First, the idea of agriculture would arise in a given location, by 
the choice of particular species for development in combination with the newly introduced capital 
goods. With cumulated experience with these particular species and their associated tools, a stock i 
of species-specific knowledge is generated. This stock of knowledge is productive in two ways: it j 
contributes to the cost-effective production of the chosen species (given existing technologies) and ■ 
it also contributes to the cost-effective production of new species-specific capital goods. The ! 
cumulation of this stock of capital thus represents the increasing returns to scale that derive from 
learning by doing. (Arrow, 1962). It creates the incentive for systems that have adopted a particular 
set of production methods to continue down the same path.
Secondly, as the idea of agriculture (i.e. the use of species-specific capital goods) diffuses across the 
globe, there is a nonconvexity in the choice set afforded to states on the agricultural frontier. This 
results from the nonrival nature of the existing stock of knowledge associated with the specialised 
species. (Romer, 1990b). In essence, the state on the frontier has a choice between adopting 
agriculture in its species-embedded form (and thus receiving the stock of knowledge inherent in these 
species and their capital goods at no extra charge), or in adapting agriculture to its resident species i 
(and thus facing the requirement of generating its own stock of knowledge at its own expense).
Therefore, it is the combination of these two types of dynamic externalities that creates the force for 
global convergence upon a particular set of species for human appropriation of NPP. The increasing 
returns to scale derived from learning by doing keeps the early converting states on the path initially 
selected. The nonrival nature of this knowledge provides the incentives for later converting states 
to follow the same path. Together, these forces provide the incentives for the human-constructed 
biosphere to converge upon that set of species within which agriculture was first initiated.
The initial "chosen” species were selected from a small subset of the global number, dependent upon 
the locations in which this technological shift occurred. Investment was then "sunk" into these
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species, as the capital developed has been finely-tuned to their specific characteristics. Finally, as 
the idea of agriculture diffused, it did so in embedded form, i.e. the idea of capital-intensive 
production of species diffused in the form of already-selected plants, animals and equipment. 
Therefore, the acceptance of the idea involved the conversion of the habitat (and resident species) to 
the already-specialised ones.
The dynamic externality implicit within the idea of agriculture may be demonstrated within the 
context of this simple model. The relevant question concerns the choices made by those individuals 
and societies on the agricultural frontier; that is, what forces will determine the nature of conversion 
at the global frontier. Consider a single state (s) attempting to decide in which species to invest, 
financial and base resources, in its transition to agricultural production. The only change to the 
previous model is the inclusion of the additional factor input, knowledge (Ty), within the decision 
making framework of the frontier state.
Once the importance of this factor is recognised within the framework of the marginal state, there is 
an additional investment criterion to be included with those previously derived (4.2,4.5 and 4.6) in 
determining the optimal methods of production to be applied. That is, the newly converting state 
must consider not only the capital-compatibility of various species in choosing the methods of 
production to apply, it must also consider the availability of knowledge and experience in the use of 
the species (or the costliness of developing the same) and the cost-effectiveness of this knowledge.
State’s Choice of Methods of Production in Agricultural Transition:
subject to: x = H(xjR) -  y
where:
Ty — stockofspecies-specific knowledge or experience 
pr = price perm it of species-specific knowledge or experience
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This will be referred to as the condition determining the "optimal stock of learning" with regard to 
a species-specific method of production.
Optimal Stock of Learning: (4.9)
T * *  fT, : cT y  =  rp^
Equation (4.9) states that the optimal level of learning with respect to any species-specific method 
of production will equate the marginal benefits from additions to the stock with the marginal 
costliness of these additions. The benefits to learning supplements are straightforward. In this model 
they act to reduce the (unit labour) cost of production of the appropriable biomass (y), by substituting 
for the other factors of production.
The nonconvexity of the state’s choice set derives from the relative costliness of additions to the 
state’s stock of learning. This derives from the alternative methods for producing this knowledge. 
One means of producing learning is by pre-production research or on-line experience. Each of these 
alternatives is costly. The former implies postponing the choice into the future while learning is 
acquired through research; both research and postponement are costly. The latter implies the 
accumulation of experience after the choice of method has been made; this implies commencement 
with a zero stock level of learning and the incurrence of sunk costs for the selected species.
The alternative for the state is selection from the slate of the already-specialised species, which 
incorporate the accumulated learning from their usage within their specialised capital goods and 
within themselves. For these species, the existing stocks of learning are nonrival goods, available at 
no additional cost to the marginal users of these species. That is, the long history of usage for these 
species has resulted in informed choices that have been incorporated within the method of production 
of which these species are part. Selecting these species brings with them this accumulated 
knowledge. Selecting other than these species implies the necessity of incurring the costliness of 
producing these stocks, or foregoing their benefits.
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Costliness of Alternative Methods for Acquiring Stocks of Learning:
(4.10)
Acquisition ofLeamingby: 1)  Imitation -  p- =  0 for 0 <  Tf s. T*
2) Research -  pT > 0 for T* -  0
jj
where: T*t 3  the stock of species-specific learning acquiredby states
Tyt 3  the existing {global) stock ofleamingfor speciesyt 
pT 3  the cost per unit of species -specific learning
Equation (4.10) states the reason for the nonconvexity in the converting state’s production 
possibilities set. It arises from the nonrival nature of the stock of global experience with the 
specialised species. This represents an implicit subsidy to those producers adoping these species- 
based methods of production.
Since the diffusion of agriculture has taken time (approximately ten thousand years), the accumulated 
learning regarding the previously selected species has generated a virtually irresistable force for the 
currently converting states. The stocks of the specialised species (cattle, sheep, pigs, buffaloes) have 
risen to such levels (1.3 billion, 1.6 billion, 800 million, 150 million, respectively) (World Resources 
Institute, 1990) over such a long period (ten thousand years) that it would require virtually limitless 
amounts of resources to replicate these levels of cumulated experience for other species in a shorter 
amount of time.
The capacity for "learning-by-doing" forms of dynamic externalities to generate natural monopolies 
has already been demonstrated in the context of the "experience-advantaged firm". (Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz, 1988). In short, if there are sunk costs involved in accumulating learning (i.e. the benefits 
of learning do not spillover between production units), then the most cost-efficient form for the 
industry to take is a single production unit. In the private sector, the industry would probably assume 
an oligopolistic structure. (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, p. 247).
In the context of our model, the "industry" concerned is the human quest for cost-efficient biological 
production, and the "production unit" is a species-specific method of production. The selection of 
an initial slate of species at the onset of agriculture vested these species with the advantage of
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experience, and this advantage has acted as a barrier to entry for other species-based methods of 
production. This is how this initially chosen slate of species became "natural monopolies" as 
methods for producing the biological product that human societies rely upon.
Therefore, the idea of agriculture has become embedded in these few species, and it has diffused as 
a package of specialised species and species-specific capital goods. That is, as the idea underlying 
this technology has globalised, so have these species. Rather than applying the idea of specialised 
production to the naturally resident species, the nonconvexity within the system has dictated that the 
lands be "converted" to the previously selected package of species and capital.
The result has been a two-sector biological world: one homogeneous in its roster of species and 
methods of biological production, and the other diverse in the same. As the idea of agriculture has 
moved across the face of the globe, it has shifted the boundary between the homogeneous and the 
diverse sectors, continually restricting the diverse sphere to an ever smaller area. Until, at this point 
in time, we are faced with two closely linked outcomes.
First, the biological production "menu" has converged to a relative handful of species. Of the 
thousands of species of plants which are deemed edible and adequate substitutes for human 
consumption, there are now only 20 species which produce the vast majority of the world’s food. 
[Vietmeyer (1986)]. In fact, the4 big carbohydrate crops (wheat, rice, maize and potatoes) feed more 
people than the next 26 crops combined. [Witt (1985)]. There are now less than two dozen species 
which figure prominently in international trade. [FAO (1988)]. In short, humans have come to rely 
upon a minute proportion of the world’s species for their sustenance.
Secondly, a substantial number of the other, unchosen species are endangered by reason of relative 
underinvestment. The continuing diffusion of this technology to the final corners of the earth 
threatens to place the entirety of the globe into a single, homogenous sector in the coming century; 
the area of unconverted habitat dwindles each day. The ongoing conversion to a very small number 
of species leaves the vast number of species without a resource base, as they are undercut by the 
expansion of the niches of the previously-selected plants and animals.
This is the nature of the human-induced extinction process, as it is presently occurring. This is a by­
product of the technological shift that occurred ten thousand years ago, when humans first selected 
species for niche expansion. The current threat to biodiversity is logical result of the diffusion of this 
technology to the ends of the earth.
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4.4 The Impact of Specialised Species - An Empirical Example
The ideas of agriculture have been applied by the human species for almost ten thousand years. On 
account of the dynamic externalities within this process, the gains in productivity have come at the 
expense of losses in variety. As this technological change works its way to the ends of the earth, the 
aggregate impact on the remaining diversity is steadily increasing.
The driving force behind the use of this strategy is the human drive for increased wealth and fitness. 
The cumulative impact of this process is reflected in the expansion of the human niche as well as in 
human resource accumulation. However, there are other strategies that are able to contribute to 
human wealth accumulation, while only niche appropriation can contribute to human niche 
expansion. The evidence on human niche expansion is the clearest we have for the measurement of 
the nature and scale of this technological shift.
This impact is demonstrable in two ways. First, as previously mentioned, a species’ population is a 
measure of niche, and under this definition the human niche has increased by three orders of 
magnitude since onset of this technological change. Although we have become accustomed to living 
in a state of disequilibrium, it is necessarily the case that the continuing increase in the human 
population comes by means of the appropriation of other species’ niches.
The relative success of species in the competition for base resources is the other evidence we have 
on the impact of human niche appropriation. This is reflected in the distribution of Net Primary 
Product between different life forms. Current estimates indicate that the human species, one of about 
ten million species, sequesters about 40% of terrestrial NPP to itself. Of course, this level of niche 
appropriation in and of itself excludes many other life forms. The magnitude of human NPP 
appropriation is an important threat to global biodiversity.
Table 4.4: Human Appropriation of the Earth’s Biological Product 
Form of Human Use Share of NPP
Direct Use 4%
Indirect Use 26%
Losses 10%
Total 40%
Source: Vitousek,P., Ehrlich,P., Ehrlich,A., and Matson,P. [1986].
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It is nonetheless important to separate out between the effect of "pure scale" and other causes active 
in the depletion of diversity. The human species cannot live without prey species, so human 
population expansion (pure scale) does not necessarily equate with the depletion of diversity, of the 
nature currently witnessed. That is, it would be possible for the human species to vastly expand its 
niche by means of excluding only those species in closest competition (i.e. those at or near the same 
trophic level). If the nature of the diversity problem were pure scale, then it would be expected that 
humans would be removing the species at or near their own trophic level (the large land mammals) 
and concentrating on the more efficient methods of capturing NPP (i.e. the substitution of plants for 
animal prey). Appropriation methods of this nature might deplete all of the land mammals, and most 
other predators, but they would not threaten a mass extinction of all forms of diversity (since the vast 
majority of life forms would be potential prey rather than competing predators).
It is not human population expansion by itself, but the particular form that this expansion has taken 
(i.e. the homogenisation of human prey) that has been most destructive of diversity. That is, human 
population expansion is more a consequence than a cause of diversity depletion. The more 
fundamental factor is the human-sourced homogenisation of the biosphere for the cost-efficient 
appropriation of biological product. This homogenisation directly depletes diversity and indirectly 
enables further expansion of the human population.
In order to make clear the distinction, consider the consequences flowing from the discontinuance 
of either process: the homogenisation of the biosphere or the expansion of the human population. 
To date, the two processes have gone hand-in-hand, i.e. biosphere homogenisation has equated with 
niche appropriation, but this need not necessarily be the case. It is possible to unlink the two process, 
and thus it is possible to continue one without the other.
First, consider the potential halt of biosphere homogenisation. It remains possible for human 
populations to continue to expand without the depletion of remaining diversity. All this requires is 
that agriculture be adapted rather than adopted, i.e. the stock of learning for the use of diverse species 
must be developed rather than adopted in the form of the specialised species. It is more costly, but 
still feasible, to expand the human niche without necessarily substituting specialised for diverse 
species.
Second, consider the possible halt of the process of human population expansion. It remains likely 
in this event that diversity will continue to be depleted despite the halt in population growth. This
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is because biosphere homogenisation is a generally cost-effective measure for biological production; 
it generates wealth for the human community through cost-effective factor substitution, irrespective 
of its scale. To date, much of this increase in human wealth has been absorbed in terms of population 
expansion (to the dismay of many human communities), but this does not imply that halting 
population growth will equate with halting diversity depletion. To achieve this result it is necessary 
to assume that human societies will halt processes aimed at wealth expansion as well, an unlikely 
prospect.
The relative importance of the various contributing factors to diversity depletion is indicated by the 
various cateogories of current human use of NPP. The impact of the scale of the human population 
is indicated by the amount of direct use, which is 4% of NPP. While this is in itself is substantial, 
it is not out of line with the complexity and trophic level of the species. [Wilson,E. (1988)]. 
Therefore, the "scale" of the human niche (and hence its population) is not, as indicated by direct NPP 
consumption, sufficient to be a threat to global biodiversity at present.
A more significant force placing pressure on other species is human "wastage" of NPP. This results 
most dramatically when good soil is paved for a road, but it occurs more commonly when a forest 
or pasture is converted to a common commodity such as com. The homogenisation of the system of 
outputs to a single species has the ancillary effect of reducing the total biomass of the system. 
Species are expert at finding an available niche in which to prosper, but they require variety in the 
environment in order to distinguish themselves. For example, a tree by itself creates a vertical 
dimension to an otherwise horizontal environment and can thereby generate innumerable niches. 
Clearing the natural environment removes a large number of such niches, thus resulting in a net loss 
in ecosystem product Therefore, an even greater force for human-induced extinction than human 
consumption arises from human reliance upon homogeneous outputs in biological production.
However, the most significant force for extinction derives from the amount of ecosystem services 
which humans use "indirectly"; this constitutes fully 26% of total NPP. These uses include the parts 
of the plants that we grow which are not consumed by us, and thus return to the earth unused by a 
higher organism. It also includes the amount of biological matter which is cleared and burned in the 
agricultural process. These are uses that derive from the fact that humans require homogeneous 
inputs in a system that produces homogeneous outputs. Lands are cleared and levelled. Other species 
are denied access as potential pests and predators. The inputs into the system are restricted as far as 
possible to those entirely within human control.
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Of the forty per cent of NPP appropriated by the human species, four per cent of this is attributable 
to consumption and thirty-six per cent is attributable to methods of production. The idea of 
agriculture has had its impact by virtue of replacing heterogeneous production systems with 
homogeneous production systems, and this constitutes ninety per cent of the "niche" currently 
sequestered to human use. This is the core of the problem of biodiversity endangerment.
4.5 Conclusion
There have been three different phases to the process of extinction. The first phase extended across 
nearly four and a half billion years, and was a fundamental component of the evolutionary process 
on earth. The two other phases commenced only ten thousand years ago, and are processes of human- 
induced extinctions for the expansion of the human niche.
Ten thousand years ago, the idea of domestication occurred to human communities. The kernel of 
this idea is for the human species to select certain plant and animal, and specialise in the consumption 
of their products. To a large extent this idea set the human species free from its previous niche, and 
made them reliant instead on the niches inhabited by the selected species. For the first time in 
evolutionary history, the fates of different species became voluntarily interconnected.
Rather than choosing different species to partner in different habitats, humans have instead chosen 
to spread a handful of select species across the globe. This is because investments in species-specific 
capital goods are sunk, and the productivity gains of "agriculture" derive from combining capital 
goods with species in biological production. With specialised "leaming-by-doing", subsequent 
adoptions of this technology are biased towards the originally selected species. The original 
developers of the technology continue to invest in it on account of the dynamic returns to scale. The 
newly converting states adopt it on account of the nonrival nature of the knowledge. For these 
reasons, the technology has come to be embedded in a handful of plants and animals.
The primary results of this new strategy of inter-species cooperation have been two. First, the human 
species and its specialised prey have had their niches expanded beyond recognition. The population 
of the human species has expanded from ten million to ten billion in ten thousand years time.
The past ten thousand years has also seen the human species work hard for the expansion of the 
niches of these specialised species. There are now more than one and a third billion cattle on the
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earth, inhabiting every continent on the earth. The human species has selected just four species of 
plants (potatoes, rice, wheat and maize) upon which it relies for the majority of its daily diet. These 
species have also seen their niches expanded to the comers of the earth.
Secondly, as all species rely upon the same base resources (land and NPP) for their sustenance, the 
marked expansion of some niches implies the contraction of others. Humans have usurped the 
evolutionary role as the allocation mechanism of base resources, and they have chosen to exercise 
this power on behalf of their "chosen" species. The escalation of human-induced extinctions over the 
past ten thousand years is an indicator of this impact. This was the first phase of human extinctions, 
having little relation to the previous natural process. It made its first impact in the extinction of the 
large land mammals, whose requirements and ranges most closely matched those of humans.
To a large extent, the full impact of this new technology on biological diversity has been deferred by 
the dynamics of the process itself. The study of islands on earth indicates that species will react to 
human land alteration by concentrating in the remaining unconverted habitat. As the last refuges of 
unaltered habitat are converted, a geometrically increasing rate of extinctions is encountered.
This same process is now occurring at the global level, as it has previously occurred in cases of 
isolated habitats. Much of the productive parts of the northern hemisphere has been converted. At 
present the same process is working its way across the southern hemisphere, and into the vast tropical 
rain forest Consequently, the next phase of the human-induced extinction process is commencing 
with the diffusion of human technology into these final refugia. The final spasm of extinctions at the 
completion of a ten thousand year old process of technological diffusion is what we term the problem 
of "biodiversity losses".
Therefore, extinction is now a human choice process, deriving from this technological shift of ten 
thousand years ago. It bears little resemblance as a process to the constructive character of the natural 
force of extinction. In fact, it represents the human usurpation of the evolutionary role. Humans have 
exercised this power in most dramatic fashion by re-shaping the earth in a very specific and 
specialised manner. This re-fashioning has afforded previously unavailable base resources to the 
human species (through its chosen surrogates), thus expanding its niche (and theirs); however, it has 
simultaneously deprived many other species of their own. The global problem of biological diversity 
losses has been generated by this new-found human power, but especially by the special way in which 
it has been exercised.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE COMMONS AND THE STATE: REGULATING OVEREXPLOITATION
5.1 Introduction
The overexploitation of renewable resources has been explained as the result of "open access" 
conditions applied to a common resource. This analysis was initially developed by Gordon (1954), 
but then generally adopted by most other analysts of the overexploitation problem, [see, e.g., Clark 
(1976)]. Open access has been accepted as a fundamental explanation of the problem of 
overexploitation.
This overlooks the necessity of explaining why open access conditions inhere in regard to certain 
resources, and not in regard to others. For marine resources, the source of this distinction may be 
obvious, as some of resources fall within domestic jurisdictions while others fall outside of the same. 
The latter are available for all to access, while the former are not. However, in the case of terrestrial 
resources, this distinction does not apply, since all terrestrial resources fall within some state’s 
jurisdiction. That is, for every terrestrial resource, there is an "owner" - the state within whose 
borders the resource lies.
In addition, it is not apparent why open access is a useful concept when the same "owner-state" 
capably regulates some resources (e.g. tin mines and tea plantations) while failing in regard to others 
(e.g. wildlife and forests). Under such circumstances it is probably better to view an open access 
regime as the consequence of a societal choice, rather than the cause of collective failures. More 
fundamental forces are determining the owner-state’s decision concerning which management regime 
to apply to a given resource or region.
For this reason, the open access model of overexploitation cannot be a fundamental explanation of 
resource decline. Open access regimes are as much an effect of the social processes causing resource 
decline as is the decline itself. They constitute one of several available routes for implementing a 
society’s decision to disinvest in a particular resource.
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Specifically, terrestrial open access regimes are used to implement disinvestment decisions with 
regard to resources that are valuable enough to warrant harvesting, but not sufficiently worthy (as 
assets) to warrant the funds required for management of the harvest. In that case, the "optimal" 
management for the particular resource might be practically none at all. Then the desired 
disinvestment in the resource occurs, without the necessity of incurring the costliness of managing 
the process.
The declines of many of the large land mammals in sub-Saharan Africa are illustrative of this manner 
of disinvestment. For example, four African range states (Sudan, Central African Republic, Tanzania 
and Zambia) accounted for the bulk of the decline in the populations of the African elephant that 
occurred over the past decade. These four states alone lost over half a million elephants (nearly half 
of the continental population) during the 1980s. [ITRG (1989)]. None of these elephant declines 
derived from management programmes, as it was illegal to take elephants in each of these states 
during this period. [IUCN (1985)]. Rather, it was a classic example of "arms length" exploitation, 
as elephant populations were drawn down through largely unregulated access and subsequent 
government sales of confiscated tusks. [Swanson (1989)]. These states could have better regulated 
the exploitation of this species, if it had been a high priority object to do so. Leaving the populations 
unmanaged indicated that other priorities were being ranked more highly by these overstretched 
governments, and equated with a tacit endorsement of the overexploitation that inevitably resulted.
The institution of the open access regime is applied to a wide variety of resources in a large number 
of countries. The same sort of institutional arrangement that applied to the African elephant applies, 
in certain countries, to most wildlife (Swanson, 1992), tropical forests (Repetto and Gillis, 1988) and 
various other diverse resources.
It is unsatisfactory to source this form of overexploitation in the existence of open access regimes. 
Under these circumstances open access regimes are as much an effect of the base causes as is the 
overexploitation. It is singularly unhelpful to stop the analysis at this stage because, first, it fails to 
identify the true fundamental causes of overexploitation and, secondly, it fails to identify the general 
nature of the institutions required for regulating overexploitation (by focusing on the nature of the 
property regime rather than the general nature of the solution).
This chapter attempts to formulate the more fundamental nature of the open access problem, and the 
general nature of the reforms required to resolve it. It demonstrates that a natural resource commons
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problem may be conceived of as the coincidence of three joint asset investment problems, involving 
the base resource, the biomass flowing from that base, and the requisite management for those 
resources. The most fundamental of the three is the last. Investment in management must occur 
before incentives will exist for investment in either of the other two natural assets.
However, management investments result only when there are incentives for them to occur, and the 
absence of such incentives is the essence of the open access problem. This requires institution- 
building, i.e. investment in the creation of incentives for management The irony is that, when these 
incentives are most needed, the incentives to develop them are least extant. Individuals in a common 
have no more incentive to invest in institution-building than they do in management. Then, this is 
a function that only government is able to fulfill.
One of the primary roles of government is to create such optimal incentive mechanisms. However, 
it is important to note that institutional reform of this nature will in general attract only economically 
"optimal” levels of investment, i.e. investment funds in an amount equal to the returns that the 
reforms generate. This means that "first best" institutions (from the perspective of natural resource 
management) may not exist, or even be targeted. Inferior natural resource regimes, such as open 
access institutions, can result from the perceived inadequacy of the returns from investments in 
natural resource-related institutions.
Therefore, this chapter develops a model of the bio-institutionalframework within which individuals 
operate in the context of natural resource exploitation. It is this framework which determines the 
incentives for individuals to invest in these natural resources, and thus determines their particular 
fates. It is the sovereign "owner-state" that determines this framework for all of the terrestrial 
resources within its jurisdiction. Therefore, the overexploitation of natural resources must be the 
result of a choice (implicit or explicit) made by that owner-state. However, even nations operate 
under constraints, and it is this fact that ultimately generates the "open access" regime and the 
overexploitation that it implies; overexploitation is the result of the relative incentives for investment 
in various resources.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, the differential impacts of different management regimes are 
illustrated in section 2, in the context of two very different regimes: open access and pure private 
property. Section 3 then demonstrates that the selection of the management regime is itself a 
construct of human choice. The state decides the nature of the management regime applicable to
132
various resources, depending upon the ability of that resource to "pay" for the costs of the institution- 
building. Section 4 generalises the points of the preceding two sections in the formulation of a 
general model of bio-institutional regulation.
The overarching objective for this chapter is to demonstrate that there is only one fundamental force 
for resource depletion; that is the incentives to invest (or not to invest) in that particular biological 
resource. In order to avoid depletion, biological resources require investment in their stocks (i.e. they 
must not be entirely disinvested). However, there are other, ancillary requirements equally necessary 
for their sustenance, e.g. base resources and management. When any of these required investments 
are withheld, depletion is the result
Resource depletion occurs when there are no incentives to make these investments. One source of 
depletion is the lack of incentives to maintain stocks of the resource; another source of depletion is 
the lack of incentives to supply the required base resources (land). A prominent source of depletion 
is the lack of incentives to supply the third necessary investment, in resource management. This 
results in the depletion of the resource by virtue of overexploitation.
However, the fundamental cause of this form of depletion is not the overexploitation but the lack of 
incentives to control i t  These in turn derive from the general characteristics of the biological 
resource. When there are no incentives to invest in the biological resource, then there are no 
incentives to invest in its management either. When this is the case, the result is an "open access" 
regime and overexploitation. Even overexploitation is the consequence of the more fundamental 
problem: the absence of incentives for investment in the resource.
5.2 The Nature of the Commons Problem: Instituting Incentives for Investment
The commons problem in the natural resources literature has been conceptualised as a natural resource 
that is subject to mismanagement by reason of insufficient incentives to control individual 
exploitation. However, this conceptualisation confuses two distinct assets: the natural resource and 
its management. The solution to the commons problem requires incentive systems that generate 
optimal individual investments in both of these assets.
In fact, investment in management is a precondition to the creation of incentives for investment in 
the natural assets. It is the lack of incentives for investment in management which lie nearer the base
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of the commons problem. However, if incentives do not exist for investment in the natural resource, 
then it is unlikely that they will exist for investment in management, as the return to management 
flows through the same commons.
Therefore, the fundamental nature of the commons problem lies two stages removed, with the 
necessity of investments in the creation of incentive mechanisms to encourage investments in 
management. This is the need for institution-building, and it is at the core of the commons problem. 
It is the failure to invest in this underlying asset, institutions, that ultimately generates inadequate 
incentives for investment in the natural assets. It is the purpose of this section to demonstrate how 
and why this is the case.
The section first commences with an examination of the contrasting equilibria resulting under two 
very different management regimes: open access and basic property rights. It is demonstrated here 
that the fundamental differences between the two different regimes are the incentives for individual 
investments in management services, and the consequential impact which the resulting aggregate 
levels of management have on the incentives to invest in natural resources. This point is then 
generalised, when it is shown that the essence of an open access regime is the societal determination 
not to invest in the management of a particular resource.
5.2.1 The Open Access Regime: Institutionalised Incentives for Underinvestment
This section investigates the nature of the incentive scheme instituted by an open access (O A) regime, 
in the context of an asset-based model of resource utilisation. In short, it demonstrates that the 
institution of an open access regime implements a system of incentives that generates 
underinvestment by individuals in the natural resource.
These results may be derived in a simple model of renewable resource utilisation within the context 
of an OA regime. Consider a terrestrial species, with stock (x) and flow (y). This species resides 
within the jurisdiction of a given state (s), on lands to which a large number of uncoordinated 
individuals (i) have access, or potential access. This last provision constitutes the core criterion of 
an OA regime. "Open access" means precisely what it says: access is open to any individual with the 
incentives to use the resource.
What is the effect of this regime on the particular resource (e.g. a species) to which it is applied? This
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regime alone will determine the incentives for investment in the species and its habitat. In short, the 
application of an OA regime will create disincentives for investment in the resource, which are 
equivalent to forces for the depletion of the resource.
This is so because human investment is now the crucial factor determining the viability of a species. 
That is, the human species now holds the "evolutionary prerogative": the power to determine the 
allocation of life-sustaining resources between the various life forms on earth. If society chooses not 
to invest in a particular species, this is now equivalent to a decision to disinvest in the species, 
although the particular route to disinvestment may be one of several. It all depends on which of the 
required resources (that are withheld) is the first "to bite".
The essence of the decision model is that human societies will make decisions concerning allocations 
of required resources to particular species, in the course of choosing a portfolio of productive assets. 
If the resource is to be included within this portfolio, then this requires a decision not to disinvest in 
the resource stock, and also a decision to invest in the ancillary resources required for its sustenance. 
That is, in order to avoid depletion, a given stock of the species must be left at the end of each period 
(jO in order to allow the species to regenerate itself, and in addition sufficient lands (R,) must be left 
in a form which the species finds conducive for its survival (e.g. the trees must remain intact if it is 
a forest species). If either of these conditions does not inhere, then the species will experience 
disinvestment and ultimately extinction (through either stock disinvestment or land use conversion).
In equation (5.1), the incentives for a human society to provide these resources to a given species are 
examined within the context of an open access regime. The essence of an OA regime is that the 
individuals concerned consider only the benefits to be realised from the utilisation of only two joint 
assets - the species stock (x) and the land (R). The other investment decision is made for them; there 
is no management in this commons. Access to the resource is available to all (n) individuals with the 
capacity to harvest there.
These two jointly held assets then yield individual benefits through their impact on both resource 
growth (H(x,R)) and the cost of harvesting (c(R)). The decision problem concerns the determination 
of the individual’s optimal rate of harvesting (y^ and the individual’s optimal rate of land allocation 
to this species (Rj) (by, for example, not harvesting the timber within the forest). These are, in effect, 
the equilibrium levels of individual investments in the natural assets resulting under the prevailing 
management regime.
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Incentives for Individual Investments Under an Open Access Regime: (5.1)
(Individual Choice Problem regarding investment in joint assets x & R)
^  r r  (yi>Ri’x’R) 53 ]*e [ p(y)yt -  c{R)yi -  r p ^  ] dt 
subject to x -  H(XyR) -y
where:
i r
= individual benefit from use of joint assets x, R
p(y) = demand for goods of species y
C(R) = unit cost of harvesting y
= harvest of species y by individual i
Ri = lands unmodified by individual i suitable for use by species
PR = price (opportunity cost) of unit of unconverted land
H(xJR) = growth function of species
r = cost of capital applicable to individuals in community
n S the number of individuals with access to the common
In order to solve this decision problem, it is necessary to specify the nature of the interaction between 
the various agents with access to the assets. The sort of conjectures which best describe interaction 
in the context of an open access regime are known as Open Loop Nash Equilibrium (OLNE) 
assumptions. Open loop conjectures imply that the only information available or relevant is that 
arising in the current period. This applies well to an open access situation because there is little 
opportunity for a feedback-based equilibrium when there is free entry. Enhanced cooperation within 
the environment will generate additional profits and so more entry, thus returning the group to its 
original, noncooperative state. In addition, Nash assumptions (that individuals do not respond to other 
individuals’ strategies) apply well in any situation where there are large numbers of players, because 
it is difficult to develop more sophisticated strategies in this context.
Given this manner of interaction, it is possible to derive the following equilibrium "investment 
conditions" for the individuals accessing the common. These investment levels that arise under an 
open access regime are termed (x°\ R°‘).
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Individual Investment in Diverse Resources under Open Access (OA) Regime (OLNE):
(5.2)
OA X / xyt : — = p(y)
n
1+. -  c
where: X s  the value o f marginal relaxation o f the stock constraint 
( the rental value o f the resource stock)
Stock Investments (53)
*°* : - - H ,  * -  » ri. 
n n
Base Resource Investments (5.4)
Consider the conditions determining resulting individual investments in stocks (5.3) and in base 
resources (5.4). In each, the equilibrium condition may be interpreted as balancing the returns from 
investments in in this diverse resource against the returns available on the marginal investments 
within the economy. In these two equations, the left-hand side of each may be interpreted as 
representing the anticipated return from investing in this diverse resource; the RHS of each equation 
represents the anticipated return from investing in other assets within the economy. In each case, 
there are various discount factors applied to the natural resource investment, on account of the nature 
of the management regime to which it is subject (i.e. open access).
Equation (5.2) establishes the definition of resource "rent" under an open access regime. If there are 
large numbers of suppliers in the product market (i.e. n -> °°), this implies that A, -> (p - c). Resource 
rent is then equal to the residual from price over input costs.
The first disincentive to investment under open access derives from the "averaged return" received 
from such investments. This is reflected in the term on the left-hand side of equation (5.4) which 
contains the expression (y/n). Here, the "individual return" is equal to the joint yield divided by the
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number of harvesters. Individual investments flow into the natural environment, but returns flow 
uniformly back out of the same. Open access regimes provide the ability, and hence the incentive, 
to free ride.
The second disincentive to investment inhering under an open access regime derives from the failure 
to manage entry into the commons. For this reason, the value of X is divided by the number of 
harvesters, on the left-hand side of these equations. This represents the expected value of an 
investment in the diverse resource, given that the probability of future appropriation of the return 
from that investment is the same for all harvesters (the one investing and all others).
Of course, it is also possible to predict the number of entrants and the expected average returns from 
investments. The expected returns from investments will be eroded via entry to that point where the 
average return is equal to the cost of access. Given low costs of access (ready transport between 
habitat and population centre), the expected returns on investments in the common must be 
approximately zero. In that case, the incentives to invest in these joint assets will also be nonexistent.
Therefore, the institution of an open access regime clearly creates a system of incentives for 
disinvestment in the assets subject to its management All biological resources, irrespective of their 
relative capacities for growth (H* and H r), are rendered nonviable investments by the institution of 
an open access regime.
5.22 The Introduction of Property Rights Institutions - An Example
This section is intended to demonstrate the nature of the incentives inhering under a very different 
form of management regime: individualised property rights. In this system there are no joint assets 
whatsoever; each individual deals only with assets that are wholly "individualised". This of course 
creates a very different system of incentives for investment; the asset managed under such a regime 
receives investments that are determined much more by its own characteristics rather than the 
regime’s. This is the rationale underlying the familiar prescription of "property rights regimes" for 
the resolution of commons problems. [Demsetz, 1968.]
However, this section is also intended to demonstrate that the answer to commons problems is more 
complicated than the simple prescription of "well-defined property rights", because the institution 
itself is not a unitary concept. Moving away from the regime of open access implies the movement
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across a spectrum of possibilities (not a movement to a single point). These possibilities are defined 
by the amounts of funding that the state is willing to invest in the construction (and maintenance) of 
an institution other than open access for the resource, and the resulting amounts that individuals are 
willing to invest (under this institution and investment) in the management of the resource. It is the 
sum of all of these investments (state and individual) that determines the nature of the management 
regime governing a resource, not its name.
For example, a "parks and protected areas" movement initiated by the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) about thirty years ago has resulted in the designation of vast tracts 
of land as "national parks" throughout the developing world. These were the results of a previous 
international attempt at institution-building for natural resource conservatioa However, these 
designations have had little or no impact on natural resource exploitation in the areas they concern; 
they are little more than "paper parks". This is because the adoption of legislation denominating land 
a national park, and the creation of maps listing these newly designated parks, without more, has no 
impact on state and individual incentives to. invest in the management of these lands. For the most 
part, the new designation did little or nothing to alter the exploitation situation away from the 
previously prevailing conditions, often open access.
True institution-building acts to modify the framework within which individuals operate, and hence 
alters the existing incentive structure regarding individual investments in management, and 
consequently natural resources. The chain of causation in the process of institution-building is as 
follows. First, the state acts to alter the incentive framework within which individuals make decisions 
regarding investments in management Then, individual levels of investments in natural resources 
react to their own investments in management. This section demonstrates the process by which the 
system of incentives under OA might be revised with an initial act of institution-building.
Assume that the institution-building commences when a state decides, for some reason, that it would 
be useful to regulate more efficiently some natural resources currently under an open access regime. 
At this juncture, however, the state is assumed to be unwilling to make a commitment to substantial 
and ongoing investments in management The baseline approach to the commons problem might be 
the institution of a very basic property rights regime. In this situation the state invests only to the 
extent necessary to undertake an "authoritative" allocation of the base resource to individuals (with 
an assurance of sanctions for apprehended interlopers), while leaving the ongoing implementation 
of the system to those same individuals.
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In this instance the sole investments in the day-to-day monitoring of the property allocation (i.e. its 
"management") will be those made by the individuals in the course of defending the rights they have 
received. It is very unlikely that this will always be the most efficient form of institution-building, 
but it is used here in order to segregate between state and individual involvement in monitoring in 
order to present the simplest possible case of institution-building. Here, the cost-effectiveness of the 
state’s intervention will not be considered (as this is the subject of section 5.3); the relevant issue here 
is how this smallest-possible state intervention impacts individual incentives for investment in 
management
The introduction of such a basic property rights institution may be conceptualised as the creation of 
a new strategy for value appropriation. It has the effect of giving some individuals the idea of 
investing in the exclusion of others from some individual segment of the base resource (this will now 
be termed Rj). The biomass associated with that base resource will be similarly individualised (and 
thus termed Xj) to the extent that others are excluded by individual investments.
Investments in management will be assumed to be of the nature of fence-building. The more that is 
invested in exclusion, the higher is the fence, and the more potential entrants will be disqualified. 
However, such investments can never be effective with certainty. The distribution of potential 
entrants will be assumed to cover a wide range of fence-climbing abilities and motivations, and thus 
exclusionary investment would need to go to infinity for all potential entrants to be excluded. 
Increasing investment will keep an increasing proportion of the entrants out of the area, but at a 
decreasing rate.
Under these assumptions, the institution of property rights has a very specific sort of impact, by 
creating incentives for individual investments in management (Mj) which thereby create incentives 
for individual investments in the other joint assets: the base resource and the biomass. The individual 
resource management problem, (5.1) above, can now be reformulated as follows, under the 
assumptions of this very basic property rights regime. The important point to recall is that under this 
regime there are no longer any joint assets.
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Incentives for Individual Investments under a Property Rights Regime (PR) - Individual 
Optimisation Problem regarding investment with no joint assets
(5.6)
IT 2 f « "  [ P(y)y,mi(Mi) -  -  rp„S, -  rpMMi 1 dt
0
subject to: xi = H(xPR) -  yi
= the benefits to individual i from investment in allocated assets 
= the proportion of the flow appropriated by the investor 
= the total flow of species y from base resource unit i 
= the amount of base resource unit i devoted to production of species y 
s  the stock of species y associated with base resource unit i 
= the amount of investment in the management of base resource unit i
This formulation of the problem states that the construction of such a basic property rights regime 
involves the allocation of "islands" of the base resource to individuals, on which the stock and flow 
of biomass is then perceived to be segregable from surrounding lands. The impact of this allocation 
is to create the impression that there are no longer any joint assets. That is, other individuals’ 
investments no longer have any perceived effect upon the individual's return. It is this belief that 
creates incentives for individual investments in the management of these individualised natural 
resources.
Equation (5.7) states that individuals within this very basic property rights regime will now invest 
in management services corresponding to the allocated base resource unit (i). That is, individuals will 
invest in "building fences" around their allocated assets to the extent that these investments generate 
competitive returns. The state’s limited effort at institution-building has thus introduced management 
into the habitat for the first time.
Max
y^ -M,
where:
II'
m
y
R
PR
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Management Services Investments under Basic Property Rights Regime (PR)
(5.7)
../>* * /* y ,M, : _ _ _  = rpu
m.
Xwhere —  -» p -  c, if the market in which y is sold is competitive 
m.
Management is the key to providing the possibility for natural resource investments. The individual 
investments in management that result under this basic property rights regime provide the framework 
within which individual investments will then be made in the natural resources. There is now in 
effect an incentive system which gears individual returns to individual investments in the natural 
resources. Therefore, there is now a new higher optimal level of individual investments in the natural 
resources given the higher level of investment in management.
Natural Resource Investments - Base Resource and Stock (PR)
(5.8)
: Xh r, -  V i mi = r P*
x RR : XHx * X ■ rX 
where X = m{(p -  c) in a competitive industry
The individual investments in management have the effect of overhauling the investment incentives 
regarding the natural resources. Comparing equations (5.3) and (5.4) with the equations in (5.8) 
indicates that the "free rider" effect is now reduced by reason of investments in determining the level 
of flow appropriation (m). That is, investments in the base resource no longer yield an average return 
(y/n) but an individualised return (y; m), dependent upon the individual ’ s investment in management. 
The same is true with regard to investments in the stock of the species; forebearance in harvesting 
results in an impact on base resource unit i alone, channeling the returns from investment to the 
investor.
The "free access" effect under an open access regime is also removed through management. The 
expected rents from the resource (A.) under open access had been minimal; there is pressure on rents
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to go to zero under open access if access is readily available. However, under a basic property rights 
regime, X is now determined by the individual’s management spending. That is, the unit rental value 
will be in equilibrium between the force of potential entrants and the force of the investor’s 
exclusionary investments.
Therefore, under the property rights regime, there is the prospect for investments in the biological 
resources. The level of these investments will now be determined, at least in part, by the individual 
characteristics of those resources (H , and Hr).
Underlying all of the differences in these two equilibria (OA and PR) is the government’s choice of 
institutional framework. That is, all of these investments, in management and consequently in the 
subject natural assets, are the consequence of the state’s initial investment in altering the bio- 
institutional framework, i.e. in altering the individual’s perception of the incentive system applying 
to management Prior to moving to the analysis of the state’s choice of the institution to apply to 
different resources, it is important to generalise this analysis, so that the entire range of institutions 
can be considered.
5.23  The Fundamental Nature of the Commons Problem: Underinvestment in Management
The commons problem falls generally within that group of problems which concern the optimal 
management of "joint assets". This is the general nature of many different types of relationships: 
firms, contracts, distribution agreements. [Grossman and Hart (1986); Hart and Moore (1990); 
Williamson (1986)]. The classic commons problem is simply the instance where one of the joint 
assets concerned is a natural resource.
It is fundamentally important to separate out between the tangible assets that are the context of the 
relationship and their management, which is another distinct dimension. That is, in regard to the 
commons problem, it is important to distinguish between natural resource utilisation and natural 
resource management, as they are both "joint assets" in this context.
In many relations, it is easy to distinguish between the context and the incentive system. In 
particular, where the relationships are purely "vertical" (such as the passage of goods through a chain 
of distribution), there is no point in time when the tangible asset is actually held in common. Then, 
the only joint asset is the incentive system applying to the various parties in the relationship.
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For example, consider an insurance company that develops an insurance contract and then distributes 
it through a network of independent sales and service agents. The joint asset between company and 
distributor is not the insurance policy (which is the sole property of one party in the chain of 
distribution at each point in time), but the system of incentives to generate optimal investments by 
both. An institution must be developed within this purely vertical system that will create incentives 
for agents at both levels to invest optimally in the maximisation of the value of the policy. This 
system must generate incentives for the insuror to invest in the creation of the value-maximising 
terms in the policy and must also generate incentives for the retailer to invest in the value-maximising 
sales and service scheme. It is this system of incentives to individual investments ("management") 
that the two parties hold jointly, not the contract itself.
This indicates why the natural resource commons problem involves more joint assets than have 
usually been considered. In this case there are both horizontal (the natural resources) and vertical 
(their management) joint assets. That is, unlike the case of the purely vertical relationship, the 
commons involves joint production in the context of common tangible assets. However, just as in 
the case of the purely vertical relationship, there remains another joint asset that is distinct from the 
tangible assets.
Management is an entirely distinct asset which itself requires investment, not another name for 
investment in natural assets. This means that the commons problem may be conceptualised as 
production in the context of three distinct joint assets: the base resource, its flow o f biomass, and 
their "management".
The examples of the previous sections demonstrated how the most fundamental joint asset in the 
context of the commons is the provision of the optimal incentive structure for investments in the 
natural assets ("management"). Investments in management were a precondition, in sections 1 and 
2, to the development of incentives for investments in the natural resources.
This is depicted in equation (5.9). In the generalised commons problem there are now three joint 
assets (x,R,M), and it is the third (M) that drives the resolution of the commons problem. Aggregate 
investment (M) determines all individual incentives for investment in management (Mj), in base 
resources (RJ and in the resource stock level (x(y)).
144
Generalised Commons Problem - Individual Optimisation Problem (Regarding investment in 
joint assets x, R & M) (5.9)
Max
subject to: x  = H(x,R) -  y
y t =  y fM )
=  R f M )R
M = M.(M)
The generalised commons problem derives from the existence of these three joint assets; however, 
the fundamental nature of the commons problem is indicated by the underlying importance of 
aggregate investment in management institutions for the creation of individual incentives for 
investment in the other assets. Investment in management, M, underpins individual decisionmaking 
with regard to investment in the base resource, R,(M), and with regard to investment in the stock of 
the individual species, y^M).
At the core, then, the commons problem concerns the incentives which exist for investing in 
developing a management regime. This is a tertiary layer of incentives: the incentives to develop an 
incentive system for the natural assets. The two management regimes considered at the outset of this 
paper (OA and PR) are discrete examples of the forms of incentive systems which may exist; 
however, there is a continuum of possible systems. The range of possibilities concerning this most 
fundamental layer of incentives are termed institutions, and this core problem of the commons will 
be termed institution-building.
The fundamental problem of the commons is that, in the absence of already-existing investments in 
institution-building, there are insufficient individual incentives for the commencement of such 
investments. This is because the same incentive system applies to the investment in the underlying 
joint assets (of management services and institution-building) as applies to the other joint (natural) 
assets. In order to demonstrate this, consider these underlying incentive systems as a single combined 
asset, termed management. From the perspective of the interacting individual harvesters, this is in 
fact the case; management investments will either be direct (expenditures on monitoring and 
appropriation) or indirect (expenditures on the creation of an incentive system for such investments). 
The allocation of management spending will depend on the relative return to direct versus indirect
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spending.
In either case, management is an intangible asset that yields its return when combined with other, 
tangible assets. In the case of the commons problem, management is combined with natural assets, 
and its return is channelled back through them. Therefore, starting from the initial position of little 
or no aggregate investment in management, there is little individual incentive to commence investing 
optimally.
This may be demonstrated by the introduction of the fundamental joint asset of management into the 
individual’s decision problem set out in (5.1) above; this is done below in equation (5.10). Now the 
individual must decide how much to invest in initial "fence-building" (management), under 
conditions of open access. Under these initial conditions of little or no aggregate investment in 
management, individuals will only invest in this core asset in order to equate marginal private 
benefits with marginal private costs; that is, the societal benefits from individual investments in these 
base incentive mechanisms will be ignored in making the investment decision.
Management Services Investments by Individual under Commons Regime (CP) (OLNE)
(5.10)
Since n**" s IT W ~ r Pmm ,
where:
pM = is the price o f a unit o f management services
= is the individual investment in management services
Equation (5.10) implies underinvestment in management services, precisely because management is 
a joint asset. Ironically, when the underlying incentive systems are weakest (and institution-building 
would potentially yield its greatest aggregate return), the individual incentives to invest in institution- 
building are also at their weakest.
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This discussion may be used to illuminate the special nature of the case of the OA regime. In 
particular, it will be used to demonstrate the polar nature of an open access regime along the general 
range of possible institutions. OA is the system of incentives that prevails with regard to natural 
resources when there is little or no aggregate investment in the management of these assets. That is, 
the^ OA regime is a special case of the three-asset model discussed here, but with aggregate 
investment in the base assets (management and institution-building) very near zero. Then, the 
observed result will be aggregate investments in natural resources going to zero, and consequent 
overexploitation.
The Nature of an Open Access Regime - Noninvestment in Management (5.11)
I f  M  = 0,
— ► If *" ■ IT'
 > x(M=0) =
S(MO) = R M
This discussion also indicates why open access regimes are very stable institutions - in the absence 
of governmental intervention. If the initial position is one of low aggregate investment in 
management institutions, there is virtually no individual incentive to commence such investments. 
This is because the returns from investments in management services will then be channeled through 
a joint asset regulated under an open access regime, which means that the returns will be very poorly 
directed. Under these conditions, the incentives for individual investments in management will be 
virtually nonexistent This means that an open access regime, once prevailing (and without 
intervention), will remain a stable equilibrium.
This section has depicted the nature of the commons problem as one of underinvestment in joint 
assets. The joint assets implied by the commons problem are three: the base resource (land), the 
resident biomass (species) and the management of these natural assets. The most fundamental of the 
three is the last. Investments in management determine the incentives for investment in the other 
joint resoruces. However, as the returns from management are channelled through the commons, the 
same undeveloped individual incentives inhere for management as for the other (natural) assets. 
Furthermore, since the reform of this incentive system is also a management function, it also requires 
resource commitments for its resolution. The core problem of the commons is that, once institutions 
are in existence which generate low levels of individual investment in management, it is improbable 
that new institutions will be forthcoming from those investments alone.
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5.2.4 The General Nature of the Solution to the Commons Problem: Investments in Institution- 
Building
To this point this section has demonstrated the fundamental nature of the commons problem, which 
is the inadequacy of investment in the base joint asset: management. When some amount of 
investment in management occurs, there are incentives for investment in the other joint assets of the 
commons (i.e. the natural resources). With inadequate investments in management, regimes akin to 
open access are instituted, and there are few incentives for investment in natural resources. This is 
how overexploitation occurs in the context of the commons problem.
This basic example has also indicated the general nature of the solution to the commons problem. 
The general solution is the modification of the incentive structure so that investments in management 
will occur, a type of management spending termed institution-building in this section.
An example of institution-building was provided in section 5.2.2 in the context of a basic property 
rights institution. It is important to note that, although the property rights form of institution is one 
possible means for addressing the core problem, it is not the sole means of doing so. That is, the 
movement along the spectrum of possible institutions away from OA regimes implies movements 
toward generally increased aggregate levels of investment in management, and not necessarily 
movements toward property right institutions. Therefore, the simplest statement of the general nature 
of the solution to the commons problem is: increased aggregate levels o f investment in management.
The importance of the distinction lies in the fact that there is no a priori basis for believing that 
property right institutions are the first-best approach to the solution of the commons problem. The 
determinative characteristic possessed by property rights institutions is that they minimise state 
investment (Ms) in management relative to institution-building. That is, property right institutions 
involve a strict division of labour between private and public sectors with regard to direct and indirect 
investments in management. Again, there is no a priori basis upon which this division of 
responsibility might be deemed optimal.
Property rights institutions are an attempt to institute a "vertical" system of incentives through 
operation solely on a "horizontal" plane. That is, they are providing management through the simple
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expedient of the subdivision of the resource requiring management As mentioned above, this 
unnecessarily confuses the two distinct assets, management and natural resources. It is very possible 
that optimal joint management will not require interference with the manner in which the other joint 
asset is held.
It is also based on the assumption that these joint assets may be beneficially segregated. That is, 
property rights systems create the artifice of individualised "islands" in an actual continuum of base 
resource and biomass. However, externalities will necessarily persist on account of the existence 
joint assets, resulting in inefficiencies in investment across the system (as there is leakage of the 
impact of investments across boundaries).
Also, this manner of institution-building will not be compatible with all forms of biomass. Some 
forms will not persist under conditions of individualised exclusionary investments, e.g. migratory 
species. Some forms will not be easily appropriated by individualised exclusionary investments, e.g. 
the avian species. There will be a necessary loss of a significant portion of life form diversity, and 
some particularly individually valuable species, by the exclusive reliance of property rights 
institutions.
These two broad reasons, the persistence o f externalities and the exclusion o f options, indicate why 
property rights institutions would not always and everywhere be the optimal direction for institutional 
development in the commons. The fundamental nature of the commons problem is the need for the 
development of incentives for investments in management. The general nature of the solution is the 
investment in institution-building and management in order to move upwards along the spectrum of 
available incentive systems.
5.3 Optimal Investments in Institution Building in the Commons
The models of the previous section suggest the nature of the solution to the commons problem: this 
is the movement toward an institution that generates optimal investment in the management of joint 
(natural) assets. This section concerns the nature of this institution-building process, i.e. the 
incentives for investment in institution-building. In particular, it addresses the question concerning 
why one form of institution is applied to some natural resources, and very different forms of 
institutions applied to others.
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This enquiry requires the identification of the agency making decisions regarding institution-building 
with regard to any particular commons. This is not difficult to do. Since there exists an "owner- 
state" that claims sovereignty for every parcel of land, there then exists a regulator de jure of the 
incentive systems extant in every commons. Yet, in practice, it appears that in many cases the 
regulator abdicates this authority, leaving individuals and resources to reach ostensibly unregulated 
equilibria. This result is then denoted the inefficient overexploitation of natural resources.
However, this assumes that institution-building is a costless activity. In fact, the development of 
institutions requires the investment of resources which are thereby disallowed to other sectors of the 
economy. Institutional development regarding natural resources must compete for capital just as does 
any other form of development (health, education, housing etc.) It is this constraint on investment 
capital that is the fundamental cause of inadequate management institutions, and hence 
overexploitation. That is, the absence of investments regarding certain natural resources usually 
corresponds to an official decision that these resources are incapable of generating a return warranting 
that investment. This section investigates this hypothesis, and demonstrates how states make 
decisions regarding optimal investments in natural resource institution-building.
5.3.1 The Role of the State in Institution Building
Institutions may be developed through either horizontal or vertical methods. Horizontal methods 
constitute attempts to recognise and internalise interdependence amongst those individuals facing the 
same bio-institutional framework. In this situation, institutions may evolve because individuals 
include within their choice problems not only environmental variables but also the choices of other 
individuals. Choices are then made, in part, in order to influence the choices of others, through 
various reward and punishment strategies. Vertical methods for institutional creation instead involve 
attempts by a third party (i.e. some individual or organisation facing a distinct optimisation problem) 
to re-shape the bio-institutional framework (and hence the decisionmaking process) of the 
interdependent group. In this situation, the third party includes within its decision problem the 
choices made by the group in reaction to its choices. Vertical institution-building is similar to a 
Stackelberg-type of decision problem.
This section focuses upon the latter, vertical form of institution building. There is a substantial 
literature developing around the idea of horizontal institution building. (Seabright, 1992). However, 
it has little practical importance for most terrestrial habitats, for two reasons. First, there is no
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remaining terrestrial habitat (with the possible exception of some segments of Antarctica) which 
remains unclaimed territory. This means that a specific state has exclusive authority for developing 
institutions with regard to every parcel of land on earth. Therefore, the vertical form of the institution 
already exists de jure across the face of the globe; the important question is why there is so little 
investment in this institution in so many places in the world, resulting in its virtual 
nonimplementation de facto.
The other reason why horizontal institution building is of little practical importance for terrestrial 
resources is technological. A technological shift in transport and communications has occurred 
across the globe over the past few hundred years. This has rendered every piece of terrestrial habitat 
vulnerable to the forces of open access. There is no place on earth now that is unapproachable over 
land. Vast urban populations may reach the frontiers in a matter of hours. With this omnipresent 
pool of potential entrants, there is no capacity for interdependence and recognition to evolve 
institutions over time. If the number of interacting, and potentially interacting individuals, is very 
large, then the transactions costs of such collective management is usually too great for such 
"horizontal" contracts to evolve. Then it is necessary to rely more on "hierarchy" for the provision 
of management solutions.
This scenario fits most natural resource exploitation situations. The key elements of the problem are 
the free and easy access of most of the nation’s population. As transportation to the frontier improves 
with the development of roads and diffusion of motor transport, the pool of potential entrants into any 
natural habitat becomes as large as the population of the nation. Most natural habitat exploitation 
problems occur on frontiers by reason of new colonists following new roads, not by reason of existing 
populations overexploiting their own lands. [Southgate (1992)]. With such large numbers of foreign 
entrants, there is little prospect for the evolution of common resource management on a horizontal 
basis.
Therefore, it is the role of the state to provide for the optimal solution of these multiple joint asset 
problems. The fact that the state claims jurisdiction to the commons indicates that the vertical form 
of regulation exists de jure, if not de facto. In the large numbers context, there is little choice but to 
look to vertically-instituted incentive mechanisms. The core issue is: Why don’t societies invest in 
the development of these vertical institutions?
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5 3 2  The Nature of State Institution Building in the Commons: Working Through The Bio- 
Institutional Framework
The purpose of state institution-building in the commons is the generation of investments in the 
management of natural resources. It may invest resources in management itself, or invest in the 
creation of incentive mechanisms which generate investments in these assets. In either case, the state 
intervenes by investing in the management of joint assets, Ms. This investment operates both 
directly, through the public provision of management and monitoring, and indirectly, through the 
public creation of private incentives for individual investments in the same Mj(Ms). It is the sum 
result of these two interventions which determines the aggregate societal level of investment in 
management, M. These aggregate levels of investment in management then determine the incentives 
for individual investments in the base natural resources (x, R).
State Investment in Management of the Commons:
E IF" O ',* ," ,;  x,R,M)
(5.12) 
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n
x  = x(M) s  Y ,  ^  w
1
R = R(M) •  £  RjM)
1
n
M  = M(Ay a  £  + M °
The state’s decision problem in (5.12) is of the Stackelberg type. The state is able to choose its social 
optimum regarding natural resource investment only indirectly, by operating through the reaction 
functions of the individuals in the society (the first two constraints). It does this by investments 
which alter the bio-institutional framework (the latter two constraints) within which individuals make 
their choices. The state invests in management both indirectly (M!s) and directly (MDS) in order to 
achieve the beneficial movements in the social/biological equilibrium that result from these 
investments.
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Therefore, the state takes action with regard to the management of natural resources only through the 
alteration of the framework within which individual decisions are made with regard to these 
resources. Equation (5.12) demonstrates the interaction of the government sector, the private sector
regarding these natural resources. This model is further developed in section 5.4. At this juncture, 
the focus is on the nature of the state's objective regarding commons management.
53 3  The State’s Objective in Commons Management
The depiction of the state’s decision problem in equation (5.12) implies that there exists a trade-off 
between natural resource management and alternative investments. The resources allocated to 
institution-building (for this natural resource) might be allocated instead to other investments in the 
economy. Thus, a state with sole jurisdiction over a common resource has two distinct problems to 
solve: the problem of first-best natural resource investments and the problem of optimal social 
investments. To some extent, the two objectives do not coincide on account of the opportunity costs 
implied in the former.
Consider initially the problem of first-best natural resource investments in isolation. First-best natural 
resource investment concerns only the nature of the "first-best" solution to the natural resource 
portion of the commons problem. This is the problem of determinining the first-best aggregate levels 
of investment in the natural resources (xft, R*), assuming that the costliness o f inducing these 
investments is zero. Equation (5.13) defines the level of these first-best investments for the three joint 
assets, given that the cost of management investments (p ^  is zero.
A Subsidiary Problem of the Commons:
First-Best Natural Resource Management (FB) (5.13)
However, the overarching problem of the commons is to determine and to implement the optimal 
aggregate level of investment in all three of these joint assets: base resource, biomass and
and the bio-institutional sector in the determination of the resulting social/biological equilibrium
subject to: x -  H(rjl) -  y
153
management. The optimal social investment problem subsumes the natural resource management 
problem. There is no reason to assume that a state would choose to invest in institution-building to 
an extent that deprives more worthwhile investments of funding.
The state’s objective is to invest optimally in the pursuit of first-best institutions. That is, the state 
acts by moving the system closer to the "first-best targets" provided in equation (5.13), and thereby 
removing the costliness of less than first-best institutions. However, investments in institution- 
building have intrinsic costliness, as they allocate scarce societal investment funds to the management 
of these particular natural resources. The state faces a trade-off between investing in achieving first- 
best institutions regarding these natural resources, and investing in other assets.
Therefore, an alternative way of depicting the state institution-building problem is to focus instead 
on the minimisation of the sum of these two types of costliness: natural resource institutional 
inefficiencies and natural resource institution-building costliness. This is depicted in (5.14) in two 
terms: the first represents the costliness arising from the "distance" between first-best and existing 
institutions, the second represents the costliness of investments to reduce this distance.
Optimal State Investment in Management of the Commons (Cost Minimisation):
First-best incentive structures are a target, but not usually a feasible one. The internalisation of 
externalities requires continuing and ongoing investment in management The price of that 
management is unlikely to be zero in any situation. The society faces a trade-off between investments 
in providing this management, and investments in other assets in that society.
Therefore, the objective of the state in commons management is to move the bio-institutional
(5.14)
subject to: x  = H(xjR) -  y
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framework along the institutional spectrum (via investments) toward a first-best incentive system. 
However, given the intrinsic costliness of institutional investments, it is unlikely that first-best will 
ever be the ultimate target. This investment is constrained, as are all investments, by the opportunity 
cost of foregoing investments in other assets in the society.
53.4 Optimal Institutions Generally: Providing Optimal Incentive Systems
One role of the state is to provide optimal institutions, i.e. optimal incentive mechanisms for 
organising society, because these are public goods that will not otherwise be provided. However, this 
does not imply that it will necessarily be optimal to provide first-best incentive mechanisms with 
respect to each and every resource. This is because the provision of institutions itself entails 
costliness. The "optimal" institution is the one that balances the benefits from enhanced incentives 
with the costliness of institutional modifications.
This constitutes a revision to the assumptions incorporated within the analyses of vertical 
relationships (e.g. the "principal-agent" (P-A) sort of incentive problem), in order to take into account 
the costliness of institutional modifications. Under the P-A problem, the principal’s object has been 
assumed to be the installation of first-best incentive mechanisms at minimum costliness, subject to 
the constraint of maintaining all agents within the principal’s jurisdiction. [Grossman and Hart 
(1988)]. In the context of the commons, the analogous objective would imply that it is the state’s role 
to achieve first-best investment incentives at the minimum possible cost
Such a rendition of the model eliminates the possibility that the societal optimum might lie with 
investing society’s resources in some endeavour other than the refinement of these incentives. The 
"optimal institution" model provides for this possibility. There is an express trade-off between the 
costs and benefits of commons management implicit in this model.
The optimal institution is the one which balances the gains from the aggregate impact on individual 
actions of governmental expenditures on incentive modifications against the costliness of those 
expenditures. Because the institutional change is a collective good, the correct assessment of 
optimality considers the sum of the individual benefits. [Samuelson (1954)]. This condition can be 
derived by differentiation of either equation (5.12) or (5.14).
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Optimal Social Investment in Institution Building: (5.15)
M A 311W
h  ~ S m ~
dt = rp„
Therefore, the role of the state in commons management is to invest optimally in the creation of the 
correct individual incentives to investment, and this requires the consideration of the aggregate 
societal impacts of any investment in management. However, this does not imply that first-best 
incentive systems will necessarily result, or even be targeted. It all depends on the capacity of the 
institution-building process to generate a competitive return.
5.4 Regulating Overexploitation: The General Model of Bio-Institutional Regulation
This section builds upon the arguments of the previous sections in order to develop a generalised 
model of regulation in the commons. The general model of bio-institutional regulation is a theory 
which describes how far along the spectrum of available institutions the state will invest in order to 
manage the exploitation of a given natural resource. It that the optimal institution (from the owner- 
state* s perspective) is the one that balances the gains from investment in these natural resources, 
against the costs of foregone alternatives.
Therefore, the fundamental forces instituting an open access regime, and thus indirectly generating 
overexploitation, are those which determine the incentives for relative investment rates for particular 
forms of natural resources. Relative unattractiveness for investment purposes denies institution- 
building investments to a wide variety of diverse natural resources, resulting in "open access" regimes 
by default, and consequential overexploitation.
This explains why "obviously inefficient" management regimes (from a global perspective) are 
nevertheless implemented by the local regime. An obvious example is the case of the African 
elephant, where a few African owner-states implemented open access regimes, resulting in large-scale 
overexploitation and an international outcry. The environmental problem here is an example of the 
divergence between the local and the global optima, not an example of sub-optimal management. 
From the perspective of these owner-states, the flows of appropriable values from the elephant did
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not warrant large-scale investments in management. From the perspective of the international 
community, the flows of stock-related values (e.g. existence value) made the implemented 
management regimes appear obviously inefficient. It is this asymmetry in perspectives (derived from 
the asymmetry in appropriated values) that lies at the heart of many international conservation 
problems.
5.4.1 The General Model of Bio-Institutional Regulation
There are three distinct layers to the bio-institutional regulation problem. At the base are the 
fundamental state variables; that is, the state of the biological and institutional systems determining 
the bio-institutional nature of a particular commons. Interdependent individuals (i.e. those working 
in the context of joint assets) form the second layer of the problem. They are constrained to make 
their choices within the context of the current state of the bio-institutional system. Finally, in the 
third layer is the regulator (in this context, the owner-state). The regulator is constrained by the 
decision making processes of the interdependent individuals, but at the same time has input into that 
decisionmaking process both directly (through direct subsidies to their choice variables) and 
indirectly (through investments in the shaping of their base institutional environment). This is the 
role of the natural resources regulator: to invest optimally in the institutional environment so as to 
develop incentives for investments in the common’s natural resources.
This can be depicted in the following model, which is the generalised version of bio-institutional 
regulation.
The General Model of Bio-Institutional Regulation: (5.16)
Regulator’s Objective (5.16a)
Max
M(MS)
Subject to:
Interdependent Individual Choices (5.16b)
o
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Subject to:
Bio-Institutional Framework (5.16c)
i = \i(M), ,n  where \ <^ \xiM{Mt)) <, n\ |X; >0, jj.77 <0
x  = H(x,R) -  y
At the base of this model lies institutional investments by the state (Ms), occurring either directly 
(M°s) viainvestments in monitoring and management, or indirectly (Mrs) via investments in incentive 
mechanisms to induce individual investments (Mi). The aggregate of individual and state investments 
(M) is the total amount spent by the society on institution-building.
Institution-building investments have their impact by altering the bio-institutional framework within 
which individuals make their decisions (5.16c). Specifically, it has the impact of reducing the 
number of uncooperative strategies with the commons. This does not necessarily occur by virtue of 
excluding individuals from the environment (i.e. the property rights solution), only by removing 
noncooperative strategies. Full cooperation occurs when a group of interdependent individuals 
internalise their externalities, and thus behave as if they were a single operator in the commons. This 
is accomplished by means of investments in institution-building in this model. Increasing 
investments in institution-building have the effect of increasing the number of interacting individuals 
in the cooperating group (p. = p(M); |T>0).
For example, cooperation within the commons may be conceived of as a group of the first 1... p (of 
n) individuals banding together and delegating all of their rights to one of them. This is assumed to 
fully internalise the externalities between members of that group. The delegate might then distribute 
the results of its management to the group members in accord with previously agreed individual 
shares. Alternatively, the cooperating group might agree a joint management plan for the natural 
assets, and then distribute enforced permits for individual shares corresponding to this aggregate 
quota. Either avenue is capable of generating full cooperation amongst this group.
Increasing investments in institutions will reduce the number of noncooperative strategies within the 
commons (p’>0), but just as in the fence-building analogy of section 5.2, it is increasingly costly to 
procure the cooperation of the remaining noncooperators (i.e. p ” <0) (on account of their relative 
abilities as "noncooperators" and on account of the increasing returns to - and increasing motivation
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for - noncooperation). [Bairett,S. (1990); Hoel,M. (1992)].
Thus, there will probably always remain a residual of noncooperative strategies in the commons (n - 
p). This residual will include all manners of uncooperative behaviour: those who decline to join the 
cooperative group and those who join the group but still attempt noncooperative behaviour. It is this 
residual of noncooperative behaviour that adversely impacts the incentive structure for the 
decisionmaking by the individuals in the commons.
This effect can be seen in the levels of investment in the natural assets that result, after the level of 
investment in management by the owner-state is implemented. This decision will determine the level 
of management spending by the individuals in the commons, and hence determine the aggregate level 
of management spending (M). This management spending then determines the residual amount of 
noncooperation within the commons (i.e. n - p). Individuals harvesters then take their decisions on 
investment in the natural assets: the base resource (R), and its biomass (x). The resulting investment 
levels are shown in equation (5.17).
Consequential Investments in Natural Resources: (5.17)
Stock Investments (5.17a)
x V  : -  X-.JL- = rX
n - p  n - p
Base Resource Investments (5.17b)
R ’ : V - J L  H, -  - ° ' l  = rp„
\L-n * (/I -  n) K*
where X = p 1 + 1
**,(* -  \i)
-  c
The implication of the equations in (5.17) is that investment in the natural assets is wholly dependent 
upon the level of residual noncooperation within the commons, for two reasons. First, each 
individual in the group of cooperators views the returns from its investments as being distributed 
across the number of noncooperative strategies within the commons (i.e. n - p), and there are only
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p (cooperative) individuals considering investment Hence, the returns from investment are 
internalised by only a factor of (p/n-p). Secondly, the benefits from cost reductions are averaged 
over the entire next harvest’s yield, so once again this return from investment is averaged over the 
number of noncooperative strategies. The "residual of noncooperation" remaining in the common 
(by virtue of the owner-state’s investment decision) is an important factor in determining the level 
of investment in the natural assets.
The relationship between the general bio-institutional model and the special models presented earlier 
in this paper lies in the generalisation of the institution-building function (\t(M)). This function 
provides the link between investment spending and management systems. In essence, this function 
states that increased commitments of resources create enhanced management and incentive systems 
for enhanced management, thereby resulting in the removal of noncooperative strategies from the 
common.
For example, with investments in institution-building going to infinity, it is even possible to achieve 
first-best natural resource exploitation through the coordination of all activities in the common. This 
may be checked by the substitution of the term (p = n-1) into equation (5.18); when there is no 
residual noncooperation, the incentives for investment in the natural assets are "first-best".
Achievement of First-Best Natural Resource Management (5.18)
For M  -> °o -------- » p -> n --------> x*,R* —> Xth,
The regulator will not, of course, incur infinite levels of investment in the pursuit of first-best 
incentives. The regulator will instead trade-off the benefits from further coordination with the costs 
of additional institutional investment. This is precisely the same condition derived before, in section
5.3
Optimal State Investment in Institution Building (5.19)
Therefore, the general model of bio-institutional regulation provides that the state will first determine
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the optimal level of investment in institutions, with individuals reacting in a predictable fashion to 
the revised bio-institutional environment. The result of the state’s choice is a determinate institutional 
regime for regulating the base natural resources. The result of the interacting individuals’ choices 
is a determinate level of investment in the natural resources. The ultimate result is a perceived level 
of overexploitation in the commons.
5.4.2 The Fundamental Environmental Problem of Overexploitation
This chapter commenced with a discussion that argued that the existence of an open access regime 
is not a fundamental explanation for overexploitation and resource decline. The purpose of this 
chapter has been to address the resulting question: What are the fundamental forces driving 
overexploitation? The general answer has been the incentives to underinvestment
Open access regimes are not fundamental causes of overexploitation; they are only proximate causes. 
In the context of the general model of bio-institutional regulation, the nature of the regulatory regime 
applied to the commons is determined by the level of investment in management If the level of 
institution-building investment goes to infinity, then a first-best incentive system results. If the level 
of such investment goes to zero, then an "open access" incentive system results.
Investment Determined Incentive Systems (5.20)
I f  M o o  » p -» n  > x*,R* -» x fb,Rfb
If  M ^  0 -------- > p -> 1 --------> x' ,R*  -> x 0 A,R 0A
Of course, these two management systems are polar representations of the range of institutions 
available for the management of the commons. It is not always the case that such comer solutions 
would result from the solution of the state’s investment choice problem. The aggregate level of 
management spending on a given resource will lie somewhere on this spectrum, and will determine 
the investments incentives for that resource.
However, it is nonetheless apparent that in many circumstances it is in fact the case that O A regimes 
(or regimes closely approximating them) are applied to many forms of natural resources. This 
occurred in the context of the four African states which removed a half million elephants in the
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1980s, for example, and it occurs with regard to many of the other diverse resources on earth.
These systematic refusals to invest in management institutions ultimately derive from the general 
forces that determine the perceived investment-worthiness of various natural resources. As was 
mentioned above, the "environmental problem" in this instance is not inefficient local management, 
but an asymmetry of perspectives on the same problem. The international community realises many 
stock-related values from the existence of these resources that are not appropriable by the owner- 
state, and the (globally) "optimal" level of management spending from this vantage point is 
determined by these benefits (and little consideration of the implied costliness). From the perspective 
of the owner-state, however, the level of management spending must accord with the appropriated 
flows from the asset, and this is an entirely distinct set of benefits and costs to be considered.
Therefore, the fundamental problem of overexploitation, in regard to terrestrial resources, lies in this 
asymmetry in perspectives on the same problem. The divergence between local and global optimal 
regarding particular resources causes the locally-applied level of management spending to appear 
"optimal" from one perspective and "sub-optimal" from the other. The regulation of overexploitation 
will require policies that directly address this underlying problem.
5.5 Conclusion
Overexploitation occurs in many different nations, but there is no state in which all forms of natural 
resources are overexploited. This is because resource overexploitation is simply another way of 
saying that the resource is attracting insufficient investment. The failure to invest in a natural 
resource, its base and its stock, determines that it will be the subject of overexploitation.
Similarly, the failure to invest in investment-inducing incentives will determine that the resource 
suffers underinvestment, and hence overexploitation. It is the institution-building process that 
generates these incentives, and it is the investment in resource-specific institutions that determines 
whether particular resources are overexploited or not. The vast majority of diverse biological 
resources currently languish outside of effective management systems for lack of such investments. 
The application of open access and similar regimes for overexploitation simply reflect the owner- 
state’s unwillingness to make those investments a high national priority (given the level of 
appropriable benefits from that resource and the costliness of its management). From the "local
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perspective" (of that owner-state), this is the optimal level of investment for that resource.
Then what is the "environmental problem" concerning these declining diverse resources? The 
environmental problem stems from the asymmetry in perspectives on the declining resources, 
between the local and the global communities. And, this asymmetry is also easily traceable. Local 
communities respond to locally received benefits from the resource (and the opportunity costs of 
increased investments). Global communities perceive the globally received benefits from the 
resource (and probably little of the opportunity costs of increased investments).
Therefore, the sole environmental problem involving diverse resource overexploitation and 
consequent decline is an international one. It concerns the necessity of creating mechanisms for 
registering the preferences and concerns of the global community with the local. This is the 
necessary path for regulating overexploitation.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY PROBLEM:
OPTIMAL POLICY AND THE GLOBAL CONVERSION PROCESS
6.1 Introduction
The problem of global biodiversity losses derives from the failure of states to consider the impacts 
upon global stocks when taking national resource regulation decisions. When stock depletion 
generates substantial externalities, as is the case with diverse biological resources, then decentralised 
(i.e. multi-national) regulation of these global stocks will be necessarily inefficient. The biodiversity 
problem is, in effect, the predictable result of an imperfection in the existing global regulatory system 
with regard to diverse resources; decentralised decisions regarding diverse resources cannot take into 
account the innate value of their diversity.
The statement of the solution to the global biodiversity problem is straightforward: decision making 
in regard to diverse resources must take these stock externalities into consideration. However, this 
solution concept runs into the same difficulties as the underlying biodiversity problem, because it also 
must proceed through the same decentralised regulatory system. As natural resources are national 
resources, the mere recognition of these regulatory imperfections goes little further toward their 
solution. It is instead necessary to construct global incentive mechanisms which induce national 
regulatory actions consistent with the global object.
This chapter outlines the general nature of the global incentive mechanism required to internalise the 
value of biodiversity, but only in section 5. First, it is necessary to provide a clear depiction of the 
nature of the problem to be solved; this description will then suggest the nature of its own solution. 
The first three sections of this chapter undertake the task of formulating the nature of the regulatory 
problem that generates inefficient global biodiversity losses. In section 2, the human-induced 
extinction process is described as the result of human choice in the conversion of the biosphere. In 
section 3, the predictable failures in the decentralised regulation of this conversion process are 
described. In section 4, the costliness of these failures (i.e. the value of biodiversity) is outlined.
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Then, finally, in section 5, the general nature of the international incentive mechanisms necessary to 
redress these regulatory failures is discussed.
The international regulation of extinction may sound like an unlikely or at least impractical project. 
However, the point of this chapter is that the regulation of extinction is occurring right now, only on 
a national basis and with a demonstrably suboptimal outcome. The international community needs 
to intervene, in certain specific ways, in order to redress the imperfections in the existing regulatory 
system.
6.2 Regulating the Global Biodiversity Problem: Past, Present and Future
For regulatory purposes, terrestrial natural resources are first and foremost national resources. This 
is the meaning of the doctrine o f national sovereignty in international law. Each state has the 
unrestricted and exclusive right to determine (through act or omission) the management of the various 
natural resources that it "hosts". There is good reason in economics, as well as in law, for such a 
doctrine; it serves the role at the international level that property right institutions serve at the 
domestic. That is, under the doctrine of national sovereignty, there is a specific state that has the 
designated responsibility for the management of any given area of terrestrial resources. As with 
property rights, this is a useful mechanism for allocating management responsibilities to those agents 
best able to invest optimally in the resources.
However, just as with domestic property rights, problems can arise where environmental systems 
extend beyond institutional boundaries. This is the nature of the problem of global biodiversity 
losses. It is a problem resulting from the decentralised regulation of a process with clear global 
implications. In essence, the problem derives from the fact that the impacts of national resource 
exploitation on global stocks are not considered by individual regulator states. Therefore, the general 
problem of global biodiversity losses concerns the difficulty of adequately regulating global stocks 
of diverse resources in a decentralised (i.e. multi-national) world.
Before moving to the issues of optimal international regulation, it is necessary to understand the 
nature of, and imperfections within, the existing, decentralised regulatory process. This section of 
this paper presents a specification of the existing global conversion process, its decentralised stopping
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point, and the reasons for its divergence from the global optimum. This constitutes a specific 
representation of the global biodiversity problem; it is a problem of a global process that is 
inadequately regulated in a decentralised (i.e. multi-national) world.
6.2.1 The History of Biosphere Conversion: Inefficient Decentralised Regulation of the Global 
Conversion Process
This section tells a very short story about a very long period of time. Its purpose is to develop a 
schematic that is descriptive of the process by which the earth’s biological resources have been 
converted. It encapsulates a "history" of the biosphere since the introduction of domesticated and 
cultivated species, some ten thousand years ago.
The history of the biosphere since that time may be best described as one of sequential conversions: 
the alteration of the world's slate o f natural resources on a state-by- state basis. Conversion within 
a particular state has occurred as and when the idea of employing domesticated and cultivated 
varieties (and the methods of production that they imply) has arrived at that state at a particular point 
in time; then, the natural slate of resources is usually displaced by the domesticated. The sequential 
nature of this process is discernible in the nonuniform progress of the process across the world’s 
states; some states are long-converted, while others have had little resource conversion within their 
borders. The conversion process has therefore diffused in general much more rapidly within 
particular states than it has between them. In order to simplify the exposition in this chapter, it will 
be assumed that the conversion frontier moves between states, rather than within them, and that (on 
arrival of the frontier) the adoption of the ideas of modem agriculture (i.e. conversion to specialised 
varieties) is of the nature of an "all or nothing" proposition; this is the "sequential conversion process" 
analysed here.
Therefore, in this analysis, the time horizon relating to the biosphere is demarcated into two sections, 
representing the succession of states that have already converted their biological resources (the 
"past") and those states which have not (the "future"). The conversion frontier (the "present") resides 
at the marginal state (MS): the state that is currently contemplating the conversion of its natural slate 
of biological resources.
The force that generates the progression through this series of states is the global conversion process.
166
It is the perceived net benefit from the conversion of the state’s naturally evolved slate of resources 
to the human-selected specialised slate (i.e. the slate of domesticated and cultivated varieties and their 
associated methods of production).
Over the course of the history of the biosphere, each state presented with the idea to date has 
undertaken the option of conversion, i.e. the net benefits to conversion have been perceived to be 
positive. With successive conversions, it is likely that the perceived net benefits to conversions will 
be declining, on account of both rising supply costliness as well as falling prices for the goods and 
services flowing from conversion. However, with so few states remaining within the nonconverted 
margin, it is apparent that the perceived net supply costs of conversions are not rising rapidly enough 
to deter conversions by themselves.
This process is depicted in Figure 6.1. Along the horizontal axis is the passage of time, representing 
sequential conversions of the diverse resources managed by individual states. The history of the 
evolved biosphere ends at the point of 100% conversion, when no conversion frontier remains on 
earth. The question addressed in Figure 6.1 is whether the global conversion process will continue 
through to totality (the elimination of the evolved biosphere), or whether there are forces that will halt 
this process.
Figure 6.1 depicts a scenario where there is little likelihood that the conversion frontier will be halted. 
First, it assumes that each state perceives a nonincreasing costliness to the conversion of its natural 
resources; that is, the costs of the specialised inputs (machinery, chemicals, and species) of converted 
production are nonincreasing to each successive state. This is represented by the downward sloping 
perceived supply cost curve in Figure 6.1, which is the perceived marginal cost of conversion at each 
point in time (i.e. by each state).
Another reason why there is little reason that conversion will halt is the lack of a demand-related 
constraint on the process. The analysis within Figure 6.1 assumes that there is no constraint arising 
out of a lack of subsitutibility between specific natural and specialised outputs, although the average 
benefit from additional units of identical outputs is declining. This is represented by a downward 
sloping linear demand curve (representing the perceived average benefit from conversion to 
specialised resources). The average benefit to conversion declines, because of the existence of some 
diverse products for which consumers hesitate to accept specialised substitutes. Then, as global 
conversion approaches totality, the marginal benefit to further conversions becomes very small due 
to consumer hesitancy to substitute, but never small enough (in Figure 6.1) to halt the process.
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It is important to be precise concerning the nature of the "benefits to conversion", as they are only 
in the short run derived from the increased productivity of specialised resources. In the medium run 
(with other factors adjusting), the benefits from conversion are derived from very different sources.
In the medium run, it is almost certain that the demand curve for conversions would be downward 
sloping. The first reason for this is derived from the argument for conservation advanced by John 
Krutilla (1968). He argued that as human development continues, by reason of the conversion of 
natural resources, one of the few remaining scarce resources will be "naturalness" itself. In short, the 
only value of the increased wealth from conversion lies in the increased quantities of goods and 
services that may be consumed, and Krutilla hypothesised that there is a trade-off inherent in 
development between quantity and quality. Therefore, increasing wealth, with increasing conversion, 
itself may imply a decreasing relative value for the products it can generate.
The alternative to increased wealth (from increased conversions) is increased fitness. If the benefits 
from conversion were utilised for this purpose, then the primary effect of the conversion process 
would be to expand the human niche. This means that, in the longer run, the benefits flowing from 
land conversions depend entirely upon the social benefits to be derived from greater population 
densities. Does a society benefit more from higher or lower population densities?
There is, of course, a long debate concerning the benefits to be derived from population growth. One 
side to the debate points to the historical evidence that population growth has been the catalyst of 
economic and social change over the past few centuries, with significant societal benefits. (Simon, J., 
1992). The other side to the debate looks at the present and to future, and finds little prospect for 
societal benefits in further population growth. (Lee,R. 1988).
It seems possible to explain the difference in perspectives that generates both sides to this debate. 
In short, the benefits to higher population densities probably depend on the population densities that 
exist in the other societies on earth. For example, if the average benefit curve to further conversions 
were assumed to be downward sloping in the longer run (with populations adjusting), this implies that 
the strategy of high population density (for a given state) would initially afford substantial average 
benefits (in an otherwise low density world). This would be the case if the benefits were received 
by reason of the relative uniqueness of the capabilities (urbanisation, industrialisation) that high
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density would afford over low density societies.
However, if relative uniqueness is the underlying rationale for population-based benefits, then, as 
additional states convert to the same strategy, the average benefits would be declining. This is 
because the new high density populations would be ready substitutes for one another in the 
population-based services (e.g. low cost labour-based manufacturing) that they can provide. In 
addition, the marginal benefits of a high density strategy would decline even more rapidly than would 
the average, and these are the source of a pecuniary externality operating between the newly 
converted and the formerly converted states.
Therefore, in this framework, there is a germ of truth to both sides to the debate. Looking 
retrospectively, societies operating with high population densities (e.g. Europe and Japan) in a low 
density world have gained substantial advantages from the distinct opportunities that this factor has 
provided. However, with a large part of the world already converted, the average benefits from 
further conversions are now much reduced. Looking solely prospectively (from the vantage point 
of the marginal state forward), there is a much reduced benefit to individual land use conversions and 
the higher population densities they imply, even though in the past the benefits were much greater. 
The position that one takes in the debate simply depends on where within the global conversion 
process one stands when considering the average benefits to conversion (and hence high density).
This might indicate that the "population pessimists" have the upper hand in the debate within this 
model, since they seem to be focusing upon the more relevant notion of "average benefit", i.e. that 
average benefit which exists in the present and future. However, it is more likely that the pessimists 
are looking to the marginal than the average benefit to population growth, and deriving their 
conclusions from this. The marginal benefit to population growth (which is perceived by the 
converted but not the unconverted states) will fall much below the average benefit. This is 
attributable to a pecuniary externality, which drives the value of the uniform specialised outputs 
downwards with each successive entrant A difference in perspective here (in terms of focusing on 
marginal versus average benefits) might explain the ironic nature of the current debate, with the 
pessimists within the relatively high-density states (of Europe and North America) preaching the 
benefits of population control to the relatively low-density states (of Africa and South America). One 
group might be pointing to the marginal benefits to such population expansions, while the other is 
reacting to the average.
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In any event, all of these considerations indicate that the average benefit curve for further conversions 
(and hence population expansions) is downward sloping. However, if the demand for the flows from 
specialised species is not too inelastic (indicating that there is broad substitutibility between species 
for basic needs such as food and clothing) and increasing returns to scale are perceived to apply to 
a handful of species over the entire global land area, it is possible that these conversions might 
continue through to totality, as depicted in Figure 6.1. Then the entirety of the output from the 
natural evolutionary process will be lost to the global conversion process.
6.22  The Future of Biosphere Regulation: International Institution-Building for Internalising 
Externalities
There is another force which should enter into decision making concerning the conversion process. 
This is the geometrically increasing costliness of the final conversions of diverse resource stocks (or, 
alternatively, the marginal value of biologically diverse resources). This is represented by the upward 
sloping actual supply curve in Figure 6.1, which includes the marginal opportunity cost of the loss 
of these diverse stocks of lands and resources.
This is an important externality within the decentralised regulatory process. At each point in time 
(i.e. with each successive conversion), this costliness is increasing but unaccounted for, because the 
opportunity costs of conversions in terms of lost global services are not included within the 
converting state’s decision making framework. The "marginal state" considers only the perceived 
supply cost, not the actual cost of conversioa
The loss of diverse resource stocks necessarily entail social costliness, in terms of irreplaceable 
insurance and information services, and hence these losses should be considered as an opportunity 
cost in the supply of converted lands. The precise nature of these costs is described in section 6.4, 
below. In fact, the marginal costliness of successive state conversions will be rapidly increasing, once 
a substantial part of the terrestrial surface has been converted to specialised resources. This is 
because the relationship between conversions of land area and loss of species stocks is nonlinear. 
Species-area functions are said to follow an Arrhenius Gog-linear) relationship. Studies in island 
biogeography demonstrate just such an empirical relationship, indicating that the conversion of ninety 
per cent of land area results in losses of about fifty per cent of the species diversity. The importance 
of this relationship lies in its implications regarding the final conversions of the residual territory.
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In general, this final ten per cent of conversions will entail as great of losses of diverse resources as 
did the initial ninety per cent. Therefore, to the extent that global costliness is directly related to the 
loss of species diversity (as will be shown to be the case in section 6.4), this costliness will be 
increasing geometrically with the final conversions.
Therefore, with the passage of time (and successive conversions), there are two countervailing forces 
which should determine the globally optimal stock of biodiversity: the benefits from specialisation 
and the benefits from diverse resources. The global conversion process should halt when the 
marginal global value of the next conversion is negative, or alternatively, when the marginal value 
of retaining the resources in an unconverted state is positive.
In the context of Figure 6.1, the global process of conversion should be halted by the force of the 
value of global biodiversity at the intersection of the actual supply curve with the demand curve (at 
time t* and state MS*), but it is not on account of the decentralised nature of the process. An optimal 
international policy for biodiversity would then attempt to target this point through regulation of the 
global conversion process.
Therefore, an optimal international policy for biodiversity must halt the global conversion process 
at the optimal point in time (at the optimal "marginal state"), and it must do so (in a multi-national 
world) through influencing the incentives perceived by those states. International institutions for 
biodiversity conservation should have as their objective the substitution of the "actual" for the current 
"perceived" cost curve within the decision making of marginal states. That is, international 
institution-building must take the form of investments in re-channeling the global values of diverse 
resources to the host states themselves. In this way, it is possible to achieve an optimal amount of 
conversion within a multi-national world.
6.3 Optimal Policy and the Global Biodiversity Problem
This section makes concrete the various concepts developed within section 6.2, in order to define the 
nature of an optimal biodiversity policy. Given the dynamics of the global conversion process (as 
described in section 6.2), the problem may be defined as the choice of an optimal "stopping rule" with 
regard to this process. That is, optimal policy for biodiversity devolves in its simplest form to a 
determination of the marginal state at which the global conversion process is optimally halted. This
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section gives a model for this optimal policy, and describes the nature of the intervention required 
to implement that policy.
6 3 ,1 Optimal Policy for Biological Diversity - A Model
As developed in section 6.2, the global biodiversity problem is best-described as a conflict between 
nationally rational and globally optimal decision making with regard to the global conversion process. 
This process may be conceived of as a sequential bioeconomic process. The passage of time in this 
model captures three important dimensions within this process: the movement of the "conversion 
frontier" to the borders of the next state; the change in the value of the remaining diverse resources 
(as global stocks erode); and the accumulation of information. The conflict arises on account of the 
predictable divergence between the local and global optima. The local "host state" will make a 
decision regarding the conversion of its diverse resources which does not consider the global benefits 
derived from these stocks, and this externality is the source of the global biodiversity problem.
Specifically, imagine that the states of the earth form two groups at any point in time, termed "North" 
and "South", the former being those which have previously converted their lands to specialised 
biological resources and the latter being those which have not The issue (for purposes of optimal 
policy) is whether the marginal state (MS) in the group South should convert its biological resources 
when full global costliness is considered. The globally optimal stopping rule will halt the global 
conversion process at the point in time (i.e. the marginal state) where the marginal benefits are in 
equilibrium, and irrespective of the local optimum.
In order to depict the optimal policy applicable to this process, imagine that, as the idea of biological 
specialisation diffuses across the earth, each individual state (s) determines whether to convert its 
naturally existing vector of biological resources (x j to a specialised slate of resources. Conversion 
consists of eliminating the land area dedicated to nonspecialised biological resources (RJ, and 
coincidentally the state’s stocks (x j of diverse resources are also replaced by specialised stocks. The 
reduction in global stocks of diverse habitats (R) and resources (x) has impacts both on the individual, 
converting state, (primarily in terms of changes in appropriable flows), and also on the welfare of all 
other states (primarily in terms of nonappropriable insurance and informational services).
The driving force behind such stock conversions is the nature of the flow generated by the different 
biological stocks. Specialised biological resources generate flows to their host state (ytsp), a vector
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of flows corresponding to a subset of species taken from a small menu available to all states (Y*5). 
The important point about this vector is that it captures nearly the entirety of the flows emanating 
from that state's specialised stocks The degree of local appropriability of these flows is 
virtually one hundred percent
On the other hand, a diverse stock of resources generates a vector of flows to the host state (ytd) which 
is very different from the specialised vector available through conversion. First, the dimensionality 
(in terms of species) of the individual state’s "diverse resources vector" is several orders of magnitude 
of greater than that of the "specialised resources vector" (millions of species as compared to dozens). 
Second, rate of appropriability is far greater than it is for the diverse resource vector; that is, the 
appropriated flows (y,d) from diverse resource stocks (xf) represent only a small proportion of the 
total flows from these stocks.
In addition, the global stock of diverse resources (x) generates a vector of flows (Y1) which is again 
several orders of magnitude greater than the dimensionality of y,d in any one state; that is, there is 
little intersection between the diverse resource slates in the various unconverted states. In contrast, 
the global dimensionality of the menu of specialised species (Y5^  is only in the dozens, and the 
Northern states have substantial commonality in flows.
The global conversion process can then be conceptualised as the sequential decision making by 
successive "marginal states" on whether to "change menus", from diverse to specialised resources. 
If conversion is elected, this is accomplished by means of noninvestment in diverse resource stocks 
(resulting in their removal by overexploitation and replacement), and contemporaneous investment 
in the specialised species (by selecting some subset from the global menu, Y*9).
Diverse and Specialised Resources - Definitions: (6.1)
R  (5xl) s  the area o f diverse habitat in each o f the S states in group South
x q xD) 3  the stocks o f diverse resources in each o f the S states in group South (/fglol
ffxQ -  ihe aggregate flows from global stocks o f specialised resources
Y* qxD) a the aggregate flaws from global stocks o f diverse resources
y f  (ixc) 3 th* oppropriable flaws from each o f the c specialised species within (convir
is (1x4) 3  appropriable flows from each o f the d  diverse species within (unconveht
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The optimal policy for biodiversity is the determination of the optimal stopping point in the global 
conversion process. The problem is to select the marginal state (MS) at which the conversion process 
should be halted, if the maximisation of aggregate global benefits is the objective.
The Regulation of Global Biodiversity - Optimal Conversions
(6.2)
M Sa: f i l l i p ]  s  E
(M S-1) N+S
E U
/ - I t-M S
where: MS = the marginal state member o f group South
I L  = the present value o f the flow o f benefits to State s
x MSJRMS = the global stocks o f diverse resources A habitats given marginal state (MS)
N+S a  the number o f sovereign states(decentralised management units)
n r  s  the present value o f the global benefits with marginal unconverted state MS
The two terms in equation (6.2) represent the total benefits to the group North and the group South, 
respectively. The act of conversion shifts the marginal state in group South (MS) to the group North 
(implying that the second term then commences summation from S=(MS+1)). This means that the 
marginal state has converted its biological assets to some subset of the specialised roster of resources.
This has the nationally perceived effect of shifting production from diverse to specialised 
appropriable flows (i.e. from y,d to y,*1’). It also has a global impact, in terms of a reduction in the 
global stocks of diverse resources (from xMS, RMS to xMStl, RMS+1). Since global stocks of diverse 
resources contribute to production in both sectors, while only a portion of this flow is locally 
appropriable (in the form of y,d), the globally optimal stopping rule in the conversion process must 
take into account this stock externality to the Northern states.
Therefore, globally optimal regulation of biological diversity takes the form of halting land use 
conversions, even when these are perceived to be in the national interest, if they are contrary to the 
global interest. Because the conversion process has occurred historically on a state-by-state basis
174
(rather than uniformly across all states), the globally optimal stopping rule also has the effect of 
determining the final size and constituencies of the groups "North" and "South". That is, it creates 
a "division of labour" in world biological production, with one group of states specialising in the 
production of diverse resource flows and the other specialising in the production of specialised 
resources.
63J2 The Nature of Optimal Intervention
It is important to be precise about the meaning of the vector y,d -the flow of goods and services which 
come within the value function of the host state - as it is this definition which captures the essence 
of the necessary intervention. The vector y,d is best conceptualised as that part of the flow from 
diverse stocks which is appropriable by the host state under existing institutions.
Some of the benefits of diverse resources are flows, but flows whose appropriation by the host state 
(via unilateral action) is comparatively costly (or impossible). To the extent that these 
nonappropriable flows constitute a significant portion of the benefits from diverse resource stocks, 
there is an inefficient bias against holding these forms of biological assets.
As states continue to change the form of their holdings of biological assets, always choosing from 
the same small slate of specialised resources, the biosphere on earth assumes a very particular form. 
There are greater and greater numbers of a very small subset of species on the earth (as the group 
North grows) and there are fewer and fewer numbers of all other species (as the group South shrinks). 
Given the role of diverse resources (shown in the next section), this implies that the nonappropriable 
values of diversity will be increasing with successive conversions.
This determines the nature of the intervention necessary for the optimal regulation of extinction. The 
objective is to install an optimal stopping rule to the global conversion process, so that this process 
is halted when the marginal values of diverse and specialised resources are in balance. One 
mechanism which will implement such a solution is to bring more of the nonappropriable stock- 
related values within the host state’s decision making process, i.e. to internalise the global 
externalities of diverse resource stocks. In terms of the model outlined above, this is accomplished 
by means of shifting more of the flow from diverse resource stocks (x j  into the appropriable flows 
vector (ygd). The impact of internalisation will be to cause marginal states to perceive the level of
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opportunity costs implicit within the actual supply curve in Figure 6.1, inducing globally optimal 
decision making by individual states. This has the effect of implementing a stopping rule at the 
globally optimal point in the conversion process.
This is the probable nature of the required solution to the global biodiversity problem for two reasons: 
first, since diverse resources all lie within sovereign states, the mode of intervention must operate 
through the decision making frameworks of the host states; secondly, so long as all states have a right 
to development, this solution concept protects that right in a way consistent with the protection of 
global values. In short, focusing upon enhancing the appropriability of global externalities affords 
these states an alternative path to development, rather than denying "Southern" states development 
in order to maintain the global optimum.
Therefore, the general nature of the global biodiversity problem is the presence of significant levels 
of nonappropriable benefits from the maintenance of diverse resource stocks. The general nature of 
the solution is the internalisation of these same benefits within the decision making process of the 
marginal states.
Clearly, the existence of such stock-related (i.e. nonappropriable) flows is a necessary condition for 
the existence of either a problem of biodiversity, or a solution. The existence of these benefits, and 
their nature, is the subject of the next section. In section 6.5, the chapter returns to the subject of the 
optimal form of international intervention.
6.4 The Values of Global Biological Diversity
The value of diverse biological resources is, in terms of the model of the previous section, equal to 
the total flows from all of the diverse resource stocks that exist on earth (x). This is the value that 
should be given effect within the context of an optimal regulatory policy, in order to halt the global 
conversion process at the globally optimal point. This value is defined in the next section as the 
"marginal value of biological diversity (MVBD)". It is a functional notion of value alone, devised 
because it is required for the purpose of defining the regulatory objective. This concept is the subject 
of the first part of this section.
Before proceeding to a discussion of this concept, it is important to note the distinction between the
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values of biodiversity and diverse biological resources, as the two are not synonymous. The latter 
is an all-inclusive category, encompassing the tangible and intangible flows from all biological 
resources that exist in areas that have not been subject to human conversion. In contrast, the latter 
term corresponds only to the value of "diversity" (as opposed to "uniformity" or "homogeneity"); it 
is the value that flows from the mere fact of nonconversion.
In this sense biodiversity represents two distinct components: first, it is the value of the goods and 
services generated by the evolutionary process (as they encapsulate a 4.5 billion year history of 
adaptation and coevolution); and second, it is the value of retaining a production strategy on earth 
distinct from the "specialised" one. These values, i.e. the values of global biodiversity, are the 
subjects of the latter three subsections of section 6.4.
6.4.1 The Marginal Value of Biodiversity (MVBD)
A very concrete meaning that may be given to the concept of the total value o f global biological 
diversity. This is the opportunity cost of the conversion of diverse resources to specialised ones. 
There are both "total" and "marginal" concepts to be distinguished. The total value of global 
biological diversity would correspond to the area under the actual supply cost curve in Figure 6.1. 
The marginal value o f biological diversity (MVBD) would correspond to a specific point on this 
curve, i.e. the costliness of taking the marginal step in the conversion process.
In both cases the concept corresponds to the opportunity cost of further conversions. However, the 
distinction is important because one is an operational concept and the other is not. It will never be 
possible to give precise meaning to the concept of the total economic value of biological diversity. 
This is because the diversity of life forms on earth is one of the fundamental components for 
maintaining stability in the biological production system sustaining human societies. As diversity 
goes to zero (total global conversion), the level of instability introduced implies that there is little 
prospect for human production systems to sustain themselves over any significant time horizon. 
Therefore, as conversion spreads to the last comers of the earth, its opportunity cost must be 
unbounded, as all human-sourced values must depend upon the maintenance of the biological 
production systems that sustain human societies. This is represented in Figure 6.1 by the area under 
the actual supply cost curve, which is unbounded as conversions approach totality.
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The functional notion of economic value as applied to biological diversity is the marginal one. The 
value of biological diversity cannot be divorced from the sequential decision making process of 
which it is an essential part. MVBD is the global opportunity cost of the marginal state switching 
from group South (the unconverted suppliers of diversity services) to group North (the previously 
converted states). It is also the force which must be effected if the global conversion process is to be 
brought to a conclusion short of total conversion.
The Marginal Value of Biological Diversity (MVBD):
(6.3)
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where: n r  a  the present value o f global benefits with marginal state MS
XMS, R MS = the global stocks o f diverse resources (lands) with marginal state MS
N+S = the number o f states regulating terrestrial production
Equation (6.3) states that the MVBD, at a given point in the global conversion process, is the 
difference between the global present value of all biological production given existing stocks of 
diverse resources and the global present value of all biological production given the reduction in such 
stocks occasioned by the transfer of the marginal state between groups, i.e. the conversion of the 
marginal state's diverse resources.
This concept further demonstrates the nature of the global problem. It is a problem within a process, 
whereby continuing conversions occur not to increase aggregate overall value, but rather to increase 
aggregate appropriable value. There is little interest in domestic investment in supporting global 
values that are not channeled through the supplier state. Therefore, another means of representing 
the MVBD is in regard to its appropriable and nonappropriable components. Equation 6.4 re-states 
6.3, but it now gives the change in the flow of values in two parts: those that are appropriable by the 
host state (6.4A) and those that are flowing generally to the global community (6.4B).
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Appropriable and Nonappropriable Components of MVBD:
(6.4)
(A)
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Equation (6.4) gives another general rendition of the global biodiversity problem; that is, it re-states 
the reason why the local and global optima diverge. This divergence is attributable to the fact that 
the global conversion process is currently regulated by the force encapsulated by the first term in 6.4, 
while the globally optimal regulation would incorporate the sum of the two terms in that equation.
This is because (6.4A) represents the appropriable component of MVBD; it is the part of the change 
in flows of value that is channeled through the host state. This part of MVBD is generally negative, 
as states continue to convert their resources for the greater local productivity gains achievable through 
conversion to specialised resources. The potential force for halting the conversion process derives 
from the values encapsulated within term (6.4B) above: the nonappropriable flows from the diverse 
resource stocks. The value of this term is demonstrably positive, and when it comes to outweigh the 
value of the appropriable elements (6.4A), the process should be halted (from the global perspective). 
However, given nonappropriability of these values and decentralised decision making, there is a 
divergence between the local and global optima.
The remainder of this section discusses the nature of the "stock-related" (i.e. nonappropriable) 
benefits that are encapsulated within (6.4B). These are the true "global values of biological 
diversity", i.e. the values that flow uniformly to the global community from the mere fact of 
nonconversion. In the ensuing discussion, the stock-related values of biological diversity (4B above) 
are broken down into three distinct components corresponding to their static (portfolio) value and also 
to their dynamic value (i.e. the expected value o f information in the context o f retained options). In 
each case the value is developed in the context of the sequential decision making model discussed 
above. That is, it is the nonappropriable element of MVBD (i.e. the global value of the marginal 
state’s decision not to convert its resources) that is being analysed.
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6.4.2 The Portfolio Effect - The Static Value of Biodiversity
Once biological diversity is considered outside of a deterministic framework, there is one obvious 
advantage which diverse resources have over specialised, i.e. their "pooling" capacity. If the global 
community is concerned not only with the mean yield of its biological resources but also with its 
variability, then their capacity to reduce global variability (via the pooling of distinct assets) is a 
desirable trait.
Global conversion upon a small slate of specialised species necessarily increases the variability in 
global yields. This is because the aggregate variability of all biological asset yields is not the simple 
summation of the individual variabilities of these assets. Aggregate variability instead depends 
crucially upon the independence of asset yields, i.e. the absence of a systematic correlation between 
them. Even if each of the different forms of biological assets has the same innate periodic variability 
(o2), the aggregate variability of these assets is equal to that variance divided by the number of 
independent assets (e.g. oVC). This is known as the portfolio effect, and it derives from the fact that 
independent variabilities will have a cancelling out effect within the portfolio.
Consider again the sequential decision making model introduced earlier. In this model the marginal 
state must choose between biological production methods with a diverse roster of outputs (yf) and 
specialised biological production with a small slate of outputs (yg*p). Here it will be assumed for 
simplicity of exposition that all members of the group North produce the same vector of specialised 
resources (of dimensionality c). Members of the group South each produce a much wider range of 
outputs (each of dimensionality d) chosen from a much wider range of possibilities (of aggregate 
dimensionality D). The key difference is the dimensionality of the two vectors. In matter of fact, 
states in group North choose their individual production vector from an aggregate vector Y**, whose 
dimensionality (C) is measured in the dozens. The important difference is that the dimension d is 
probably in the hundreds or thousands^and the dimension D is certainly in the millions, in contrast 
to the dimensions c and C which are only in the dozens at most.
The difference in dimensionality is important for the creation of a "portfolio effect" both locally and 
globally. Any state that retains its diverse resource vector rather than converting to the specialised 
maintains a much broader range of assets upon which to rely (d rather than c). Equally, this state is 
also investing in maintaining the existing dimensionality of the aggregate diverse resource vector (i.e. 
D). This contributes to a portfolio effect at the global level.
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This may be demonstrated in the context of the framework developed above. First, it is important 
to note that each of the components of the production vectors (Y1) and (Y*1*) is, at base, the same 
commodity: the flow of biomass from stocks of base resources fland). This flow might be measured 
in a common unit, (e.g. usable mass, volume or energy), and then these vectors would simply 
represent the usable flows of energy/matter derived from various forms of production. In this 
schematic, a "species" is simply a distinct "method of production" for a common production unit, i.e. 
usable biomass.
In fact, this is a biologically sound description of the various components of these vectors; a species 
does represent a distinct method (or life form) through which the sun’s energy is channeled through 
to human societies. The "portfolio effect" value to retaining a diversity of species thus derives from 
the maintenance of a range of different methods for channeling the sun’s energy to human society; 
alternatively, the cost of successive conversions is the increasing reliance of an ever-larger human 
society (built upon the increased average productivity of specialisation) upon a decreasing number 
of available methods of production.
To demonstrate this effect and the costliness it implies, assume that the annual production of usable 
biomass/energy is achieved by means of the use of the range of existing species. Global product is 
determined by the sum of the global yields for each of the components of Y1 and Y*9. That is, these 
aggregate production vectors may now be considered to represent D and C observations respectively 
on a common unit of production, i.e. the aggregate biomass/energy output from D+C distinct methods 
of production. Given this definition, the annual productivities of all species will be a random variable 
(e.g. defined in terms of energy yield per unit of base resource), which may be described by reference 
to the various moments of its distribution in a given year.
Also, assume that there is some "global welfare function", WCYVY*9), which captures the global 
community’s willingness to trade-off between mean biological productivity and higher moments. 
That is, it will be assumed that W(Y) is a well-defined function over at least the first two moments 
of Y1 and Y*9. Then this function merely expresses the notion that the global community is unwilling 
to pursue higher mean yields blindly, i.e. there must be some consideration of the higher moments 
of the expected flow of benefits. It is then possible to capture the nature of this trade-off, between 
mean production and its variability, in the following expression of the expected marginal value of 
biological diversity (via application of Taylor’s expansion around the mean production levels).
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Marginal Value of Biodiversity - Impact of Conversion on Mean and Variability
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where: d {or c) s  the number o f diverse {or specialised) species in the marginal state
W{ •) & the " global welfare function"
oJ„ s  the variability o f biological production in the marginal state with specialised species
a 2< a  the variability o f biological production in the marginal state with diverse species
The first terms of equation (6.5) (i.e. the portionfnot Within the first square brackets) corresponds to 
the appropriable flows from conversion (as in term 6.4A). This once again captures the nature of the 
force for conversion, i.e. the higher expected mean yields from conversions to specialised biological 
assets. It is because this part of the expected value of diverse resources is negative that marginal 
states continue to undertake conversions.
The second term in equation (6.5) (i.e. the portion within the second square brackets) captures the 
global impact of the marginal conversion in terms of global yield variability; the source of the 
portfolio effect. This impact on MVBD is invariably positive, i.e. marginal conversions increase 
global variability and thus reduce global welfare.
This second part of equation (6.5) may be broken down into three distinct parts. There are three 
distinct forces contributing to reduced variability from the retention of diverse biological resources. 
First, there is a species-specific portfolio effect from the use of a nonspecialised species. A 
specialised species is human-selected for certain traits, and then much of all future generations derive 
from this single selection, eliminating much internal genetic variability. A diverse biological resource 
is itself a wider portfolio for production. Second, there is a nation-wide portfolio effect from 
retaining diverse resource. That is, domestic variability of production is reduced because the state 
retains a larger number of independent methods of production. Thirdly, there is a distinct 
international portfolio effect. The retention of any single state’s diverse resources has the potential 
to reduce the aggregate covariance between national products.
In sum, the marginal value of biological diversity with regards to the value of diverse resources in 
reducing global biological yield variability is necessarily positive. The conditions that determine this
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reducing global biological yield variability is necessarily positive. The conditions that determine this 
are as follows:
MVBD - Portfolio Effect (PE)
(6.6)
E[MVBD]pb = ^ .... + cov (Yd,y *) -  cov(Ytp, y sp)
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Since:
(A) W n < 0 (with risk aversion)
(B) oj* > Cy (species-specific PE)
(O  d > c (intra-national PE)
(D) cov(ytp, Y tp) > cov(yd, Y *) (inter-national PE)
These terms give precise meaning to the various components of the global portfolio effect, as 
described above.
First, term (6.6B) represents the species-specific portfolio effect, in that a diverse species contains 
a wider range of genetic variability than does a specialised. For each diverse species, the inherent 
variability of production is reduced by reason of this innate portfolio of distinct characteristics.
Term (6.6C) captures the idea of greater variability stemming from the use of a smaller slate of 
resources within the marginal state - the intra-national portfolio effect. Assuming that each species 
represents an "independent” method of production, in that the production from each is not correlated 
with that of other distinct species within that state, a wider menu or resources will reduce intra-state 
variability.
Term (6.6D) captures the nature of the interaction between production methods in use in the various 
states. In group North, the aggregate variability of the group must necessarily be greater when 
productive assets are more closely correlated, because there is less opportunity for production effects
183
to "net out". This implies that the covariance between member states in group North will be higher 
than the covariance between member states in group South. Therefore, the marginal state’s decision 
to switch between the two groups will necessarily increase the covariance of global yields - a 
reduction in the international portfolio effect
Therefore, the movement of the marginal state from group South to group North represents an 
unambiguous increase in global yield variability, precisely because this conversion represents the 
movement on a global basis towards universally more specialised production. To the extent that 
global variability matters to human societies, then the increasing first moment of biological yields 
must be set off against the also increasing second moment of these same yields. It is important to 
emphasise that this is not a form of variability that can be resolved through other forms of insurance 
contracting, as this is increasing global variability. Reductions in the portfolio of diverse biological 
assets clearly have this effect on a global basis.
6.43 Dynamics: The Value of Exogenous Information
The use of this sequential decision making model of the global conversion process highlights the 
importance of time and uncertainty. One of the meanings of the passage of time is the accumulation 
of information, in the sense that an uncertain outcome in one period is revealed in a subsequent 
period. This is important for decision making under uncertainty, because a time path must be chosen 
in the first period with only probabilistic beliefs as to the resulting positions in the later periods, while 
the actual decision making framework (or "state of nature") applicable to later periods will only be 
revealed in those periods. That is, in decision theory, information accumulates over time in the sense 
that outcomes of random variables, affecting the decision maker’s framework, are revealed, and 
beliefs as to the future are better defined.
Therefore, placing the problem of global biodiversity into a sequential decision making framework 
also places the role of information accumulation at the core of biodiversity. In a dynamic framework, 
halting the conversion process equates with purchasing time and information. This makes the 
expected value of this information one of the fundamental forces for halting the conversion process.
Sequential decision making regarding resource conversions implies the passage of time, and one 
component of time is the accumulation of information. That is, uncertainties are resolved with the
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passage of time. Since the sequence of events (i.e. passage of time) in this model is linked to decision 
making regarding the conversion of the marginal state’s biological resources, one clear trade-off is 
the postponement of the marginal conversion in order to acquire the period’s information.
MVBD - Exogenous Information (XI)
(6.7)
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where: A I  a  the addition to the information set over time
Equation (6.7) incorporates one definition of time; i.e., the process by which relevant information 
arrives at the decision maker. Then, information may be seen as eliminating relevant uncertainties 
with its arrival.
This value of biological diversity is unambiguously positive if two conditions are met: 1) information 
relevant to decision making does in fact arrive by reason of an exogenous process over time; and 2) 
the conversion of the marginal state’s resources reduce the dimensionality of the gross biodiversity 
vector {Y}. These conditions guarantee nonnegative value because an irreversible narrowing of the 
choice set over time (in terms of reductions in the dimensionality of the gross biodiversity vector) 
renders information useless which would be otherwise valuable in the decision making process. 
Information is valuable, but only if the choices that it implies remain available.
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The Value of Exogenous Information (XI) - The Option Value of Biodiversity
(6.8)
E[MVBD]XI > 0
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where: YMS = the gross set o f global biological diversity with marginal (unconverted) state MS
This makes clear what the concept of option value means in the context of biological diversity. It 
represents the value of retaining the larger choice set until the next period’s information arrives. It 
is, strictly speaking, the value o f flexibility in sequential decision making, or the expected value o f 
information. (Conrad, 1984). Its value in this context is clearly positive.
This result differs from much of the literature on option value, which is inconclusive as to the sign 
of option value. (Johansson, 1988). The unambiguity of the result in (6.8) is derived from two 
differences in the analysis. First, this analysis focuses on a global process represented as a sequence 
of restrictions of the global choice set
That is, this model presents the problem of global biodiversity as a sequential narrowing of the choice 
set with regard to the methods of production ("species") available for capturing biological product 
If two distinct sets have an equal number of different elements (or two production vectors have 
common dimensionality but distinct components), then "option value" (the value of retaining one 
rather than the other) is indeterminate ex ante. However, the problem of global biodiversity is best 
represented as a narrowing of the entire global choice set (of the available methods of production) 
rather than a substitution between elements. Then, the fundamental reason for indeterminancy is 
removed.
The primary reason that option value is clearly positive in this analysis is attributable to the 
specificity with which that term is used here. Here the "option value" of biological diversity refers 
only to the dynamic values flowing from diversity, and this excludes many of the other values of
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diverse biological resources. If these other values were included, then the marginal value of 
nonconversion might very well be negative.
That is, option value is sometimes equated with the marginal value o f biological diversity, as that 
term is defined in equation (6.3) above. However, the MVBD may be sub-divided into two further 
components, the appropriable and nonappropriable flows indicated in (6.4), and option value 
concerns only a part of those nonappropriable flows found in (6.4B). Specifically, "option value" 
concerns only the values within (6.4B) that flow from the existence of a dynamic analysis of the 
problem.
Therefore, the change in global values from marginal conversions may be segregated into three 
distinct categories: 1) the difference in the value of appropriable flows of biological resources; 2) the 
static (portfolio) nonappropriable value of diversity; and, 3) the dynamic (expected value of 
information) nonappropriable value of diversity. Many times, the term "option value" has been 
applied to the aggregation of some combination of these three effects (yielding ambiguous results), 
but here it is used only in regard to the values derived by reason of the use of a dynamic decision 
making framework. That is, option value concerns only the third category of diverse resource values 
listed above.
Option value is thus restricted here to mean only the value to be derived from retaining flexibility in 
a sequential decision making framework. With the arrival of information over time, the value of this 
retained flexibility must be positive. In this sense, the option value of biological diversity must 
always be positive.
It is logical to use this more restrictive definition in regard to the option value of biodiversity. The 
first two categories of value listed above are static values, i.e. they would flow from decision making 
even in the context of a one-period framework. On the other hand, the expected value of information 
(or "option value") applies only if there is a future. The value of such information will ultimately 
flow to the global community in terms of either increased mean yields or reduced variability; 
however, retaining these options has value even in earlier periods, to the extent that it is expected that 
their retention will be important. Diversity is retained in order to provide a dynamic as well as a 
static form of insurance. It is only important to retain options to the extent that it is anticipated that 
"information" will arrive from the environment to make these options important for future decision 
making.
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It remains to explain why it is that information will necessarily arrive in this particular decision 
making process. In sequential decision making, information is the occurrence of nondeterministic 
change in the decision making environment. That is, between periods there must be some relevant 
alteration in the environment that cannot be predicted with certainty; the passage between decision 
periods reveals the "state of nature" which could otherwise only be probabilistically projected.
The very nature of the biological world assures precisely this result It is the very essence of a 
dynamic system, in which the processes of mutation, selection and dispersal continuously alter the 
natural "state of nature". In regard to small organisms, such as bacteria, viruses, and insects, these 
biological processes can occur very rapidly, literally reproducing thousands of generations in a single 
year. The biological process is evolutionary, not deterministic, and to the extent that it can be 
understood, it is too complex to predict.
It is the continuous state of motion within the biological world which guarantees that time produces 
relevant information. The nature of this information in a biological world is the type and extent of 
the shifting of the human niche. The insurance that we have for adapting to such shifts is the 
diversity of the species upon which we rely, or upon which we might rely. Marginal conversions 
represent losses of such options. The expected marginal value of biological diversity includes as a 
component the expected value of receiving information prior to the foreclosure of options. The value 
of this component is clearly positive.
6.4.4 Dynamics: The Value of Endogenous Information
It was noted above that the intra-state variability of a larger vector of resources was likely to be 
smaller, and that states in the group South were the more likely states to rely upon a larger vector of 
resources. In fact, it is also likely that these states will also use biological assets with greater inherent 
variability in yield (and value). This is because, assuming regular concave individual utility 
functions, specialised production probably will be directed toward high mean/low variability 
biological assets. The variability occurs in the aggregate, because so many individuals specialise in 
precisely the same assets. In fact, from many years of use, the individual distributions of the yield 
from specialised biological assets will be very well-known, implying a very small amount of 
information to be gained from their use.
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Unused, and less-used, biological assets are relatively unknown quantities. The expected variability 
of any individual nonspecialised biological asset is quite large, especially relative to its expected 
mean, precisely because so little is known about i t  The expected information acquisition from the 
exploration of these commodities is much higher than it is with the specialised assets, and this 
exploration value is positive.
Therefore, there is a differential informational value to the exploration of the nonspecialised 
biological assets that derives directly from the fact of their relative obscurity. This is termed the 
expected value o f endogenously generated information.
MVBD - Endogenous Information (NI)
Equation (6.9) states that nonconversion not only maintains the choice set at its differentially greater 
size, it also maintains the information flow at its differentially greater rate. The marginal conversion 
reduces the potential information set and the potential choice set in a single act. The reduction of 
either alone is costly in a sequential decision making framework. Therefore, the expected value of 
endogenous information is also invariably positive, being a mere subset (but a very important subset) 
of the entire information flow occurring between decision points.
6.4.5 Conclusion - The Value of Global Biological Diversity
The value of global biological diversity has been given a very specific definition in this section. It 
is the global impact of the conversion of the marginal state to specialised biological resources. This 
global impact has four components, two static and two dynamic (i.e. information-based). The 
information-based values of biodiversity will ultimately feed through the static components; however, 
in any given period there is also the expected value of this future flexibility.
(6.9)
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The Components of the Value of Global Biological Diversity
(610)
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As discussed in this section, the sum of the values of terms (B), (C) and (D) in equation (6.10) is 
strictly positive in the context of the marginal state’s decision whether or not to convert its diverse 
resources. However, it is also clear that the value of term (A) has been pronouncedly negative over 
many years, inducing successive states to undertake resource conversions.
It is not really possible to say anything about the relative magnitudes of these two forces. The force 
for conversion, term (A), flows through a vector of outputs which are clearly appropriable by the host 
state. The values of biological diversity, on the other hand, are clearly nonappropriable values. The 
value of global variability reductions is a pure public good; it is not possible to exclude any individual 
or any state from receiving its benefits. The other values are informational in nature, and these are 
very diffusive and inappropriable well.
Therefore, in comparing these two forces, one for and one against conversion, their most 
distinguishing feature is their degree of appropriability. Under existing institutions, it is clearly not 
possible to guage the relative magnitudes of these two forces at this point in the global conversion 
proces. However, this does not imply that there is no value to biodiversity, only that it is not being 
given effect.
6.5 The International Regulation of Extinction: The General Principles
The nature of the global biodiversity problem is one of imperfections in the decentralised (i.e. multi­
national) regulation of the conversion process, because individual states do not take into consideration 
the consequences of their conversion activities on global stocks of diverse resources. The obvious 
solution to the global biodiversity problem is to halt the global conversion process at its global 
optimum, taking into consideration these stock-related externalities.
This "solution" is also a regulation problem, as it must also be implemented through the decentralised 
process that created the biodiversity problem. The agents with control over the conversion process
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are the individual host states, under the doctrine of national sovereignty, and the global community 
must take action regarding conversions through these agents. Therefore, the nature of international 
regulation regarding conversion is necessarily the construction of international incentive mechanisms, 
devised to induce individual states to regulate conversion in accord with global objectives.
The fundamental purpose of these incentive mechanisms must be to bring the global effects of diverse 
resource conversions within the decision making framework of the marginal states. That is, as 
discussed in section 3, the object is to internalise the externality, causing individual states to recognise 
the true opportunity costs of diverse resource conversions. In essence, the incentive mechanism 
should have the effect of bringing the MVBD (the actual supply cost curve in Figure 6.1) within the 
decision making framework of the marginal states.
The remainder of this section considers the general nature of this intervention, where the assumption 
is that the object of the global community is to implement indirectly the optimal stopping rule that 
cannot be implemented directly. That is, the objective is to halt conversions at the global optimum, 
given the globalised values of biodiversity, in a world in which there is little information on the latter 
and no inherent capacity to do the former.
6.5.1 International Intervention in National Resource Management
Individual states which decide to convert their resources do so through a set of investment decisions. 
In essence, states choose to invest limited national funds in the management and production of some 
species, and not in others. It is the presence or absence of investment that determines the fate of a 
particular species.
The decision regarding conversion to the use of modem agriculture has become embedded in a small 
slate of specialised species. Therefore, most available investment funds will be absorbed by these 
species alone, since the decision to invest in them demonstrates the decision to convert to capital- 
based biological production.
The role of international intervention is to induce the inclusion of diverse habitats and 
diverse/nonspecialised species within the investment portfolios of the marginal unconverted states, 
thereby halting the global conversion process. This is accomplished by means of optimal investments 
by the global community in management institutions that will induce these investments by the host
191
states. That is, the role of the international community is to alter the incentives for states themselves 
to create better incentive systems for the individual management of diverse biological resources. It 
is a new institutional framework overlaying what was previously an exclusively domestic regulation 
problem.
In the global model o f bio-institutional regulation, in equation (6.11) below, the regulatory structure 
existing in the absence of international intervention is captured in terms (6.1 lb), (6.1 lc) and (6.1 Id). 
In 6.11 a, the state regulator simply acts to maximise the joint benefits to the collectivity of harvesters 
of the resource, and does so by investing in the institutional structure regarding the resource (MXMJ 
in (6.1 lb) and 6.1 Id). The bio-institutional structure (6.1 Id) then determines how individuals will 
fare in their interdependent production of this resource, and thereby determines in part how these 
individuals will themselves invest in this resource. Therefore, overall investment in the diverse 
resource, M, is a function of the initial state spending on this management, Ms.
This model then demonstrates how action by the global community has impact at the ground level 
in the Southern states. The intervention takes the form of optimal investments in management (Mq) 
undertaken with the object of inducing state-level investments. When successful, these investments 
then determine the rate at which the host state will invest in that resource (equation 6.11(b)), and the 
aggregate rate of investment determines the bio-institutional structure within which the resource is 
produced (6.11(d)). This structure then determines the management of the resource by individuals 
operating in that state (6.11(c)).
The Global Model of Bio-Institutional Regulation: (6.11)
Global Regulator’s Objective
(dlla)
Mo- M a I L  s  /  e ~* ( I I s  * I L  o-'”;* .* )  -  rPuMe ) a
f o
the global benefits from biological production 
the benefits to nonconverted states 
the benefits to converted states 
the management expenditures by the global community
a  *
where: ^  _
l l o  =
M g =
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Subject to:
State Regulator’s Objective (dllb)
E IX -  rpuMs
I-H
dt V S
Subject to:
Interdependent Individual Choices (6dlc)
f e -" [ p O - V  -  c(K ,M)y‘ -  rps*, -  rp„W( ] dt V i
Subject to:
Bio-Institutional Structure (6Jld)
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In the absence of international intervention, the outcome of this decision making process often will 
be nonmanagement on the part of the state, and overexploitation on the part of the harvesters. With 
optimal international investments there is the possibility that additional diverse resources will be 
included within the investment portfolio of the host states, and thus the global community.
The general nature of the global community’s institution-building is evident. It must invest in
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management institutions that will cause the values of diverse resource stocks to be channelled through 
the hands of the host states. In section 6.2, the problem of global biodiversity losses was described 
in relation to the definition of the vector y*1: the appropriable flows from diverse stocks of biological 
resources under existing institutions. At the core, the economic problem concerns the costliness of 
institution-building for the internalisation of the other benefits from these stocks. As re-channeling 
these otherwise inappropriate benefits will be a costly activity, it will require a commitment of 
resources to bring this about.
The optimal level of international intervention for this purpose will be a trade-off between the 
effectiveness of these investments (in terms of the enhanced benefits from increased retention of 
diverse stocks) against their opportunity costs (in terms of foregone investments). With regard to any 
given diverse resource stock x and base R, the international community will invest in its maintenance 
to the extent that its marginal benefit equates with its marginal costliness (equation 6.11 (a)). The net 
benefits from increased management expenditure will be the sum of the increased appropriable 
benefits flowing through the host state (by reason of enhanced appropriability or increased 
productivity) and the increased nonappropriable benefits flowing to the global community (by reason 
of enhanced stocks).
Optimal Global Investments in Biodiversity
(6.12)
a. 3I L  dy'
s ' dyd dMa
dI1» dx dR
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Therefore, it is the global community’s role to attempt to bring a stopping rule into effect in the 
global conversion process. It will do this by investments in incentive mechanisms that are intended 
to induce a change of investment portfolios by states that would otherwise convert their biological 
resources. The general nature of these systems must be an enhanced channeling of the stock-related 
benefits through the hands of the host state.
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6.6 Conclusion
The global problem of biological diversity losses may be viewed as the problem of halting the global 
conversion process at the globally optimal point in time (and space). Individual state decision making 
cannot achieve this because there is no recognition of the countervailing benefits to the force for 
conversion. The marginal value of biological diversity contains a component of nonappropriable 
benefits that flow to the global community at large.
There is no doubt that there is a value to diversity. The decline of global stocks of diverse resources 
necessarily results in losses of global insurance and informational services. These are services that 
flow to the entire global community, and this is the fundamental reason for their importance and for 
their decline.
It is only international intervention that can halt this conversion process. However, the international 
community can act on this problem only through the instrument of the host state. The nature of 
international action must be the inducement of an otherwise nonexistent pattern of investments by 
the Southern states.
The global solution to the global biodiversity problem is investment in international institutions by 
the global community. These investments must establish mechanisms which provide incentives for 
host states to invest in diverse resources. The nature of these incentives will be the re-channeling of 
the global values of diverse resources back to the host states themselves. Such a system of 
intervention provides the necessary incentives to halt the global conversion process at the optimal 
point, while maintaining the capability of the marginal states to pursue development (albeit down 
diverse pathways).
Therefore, the global diversity problem may be viewed as the externality emanating from the pursuit 
of the same, narrow pathway to development by successive states. As the final states embark on this 
same avenue, the commonality in the methods of production employed jeopardises the biological 
production process itself. The solution must then be the encouragement of the remaining 
uncommitted states toward diverse pathways of development. However, global institutions for 
development have always been constructed around the ubiquitous model, and they have ignored the 
alternatives. The global biodiversity problem requires the construction of international institutions 
focused upon alternative development routes.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN NATIONAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: 
THE INSTRUMENTS FOR REGULATING GLOBAL BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
7.1 Introduction
The global problem of global biological diversity losses is the result of decentralised (state-based) 
decisions concerning land use and conversions. Each state acting independently will take no account 
of the value deriving from the maintenance of a globally diverse portfolio of biological resources. 
Instead, each will attempt to specialise its own portfolio to its own individual benefit. This 
decentralised decision making process will result in the targeting of a globally suboptimal stock of 
diverse resources.
The object of global regulation is to regulate the conversion process so that these global stock effects 
are taken into consideration. In theory, this requires only that each decision on conversion be made 
to balance the marginal benefits against the marginal costliness (including the stock effects) of that 
decision.
This chapter concerns the nature of the instruments required to implement this policy for the global 
regulation of extinctions. Although the policy is easily stated, its implementation is far more 
complex. This is because terrestrial resources are national resources; they are managed exclusively 
by an independent, sovereign state. International intervention must operate through the decision 
making framework adopted by that state.
Therefore, this chapter constitutes an enquiry into the fundamental nature of the international 
environmental agreement required to address the problem of global biodiversity. It takes the multi­
national nature of diverse resource regulation as a given, and then analyses the nature of the 
international agreement that will enable cooperation between these various states to be effected on 
this subject.
It is an important and timely subject precisely because so much effort is presently being undertaken 
on just this task. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development adopted the text
of a Convention on the Conservation of Biological Diversity in June of 1992, and the next few years 
will give concrete meaning to this convention through various resolutions and protocols. In addition, 
the Group of Seven states initiated another institution for the purpose, in part, of conserving global 
biological diversity in 1990: the Global Environmental Facility. This is another example of an 
international institution for biodiversity conservation that is currently taking shape.
The remainder of the discussion within this book provides an analysis of the requisite characteristics 
for an effective international agreement on biodiversity conservation (assuming that the problem is 
of the nature described in the preceding chapters). First, in this chapter, the general nature of such 
an international agreement is discussed. Then, in subsequent chapters, the specific components of 
that agreement are detailed.
The obvious object of an effective international agreement is to alter the choices of the "host states" 
with regard to their diverse resources. So, for example, with regard to the four African states that 
failed to invest in the management of their elephant populations in the 1980s resulting in the loss of 
half of the continent* s total population, the objective is to induce changes in their spending decisions. 
In general, effective global management of diversity will usually be fully translated into effective 
domestic management of diverse resources; the problem is to devise a system that will convert global 
investments into domestic investments in diverse resources.
This is, however, exactly half of the environmental problem of biological diversity. The other half 
of the problem lies in the inducement of optimal transfers from the "Northern" states in compensation 
for the flows from stocks of diverse resources. There can be no solution to the other half of the 
problem without addressing this half as well. The core of the problem lies in the suboptimal flow of 
payments for these intangible services, and increasing that flow away from zero (although moving 
in the right direction) does not assure that the resolution is in the neighbourhood of an efficient 
solution. For that to occur, there must be equal attention paid to the question of inducement 
mechanisms for the North.
International intervention in national management decisions is always a difficult problem, but when 
the values involved are as complex as the informational and insurance services of biological diversity, 
the degree of difficulty rises to a higher order. This chapter considers the fundamental nature of the 
solution to this problem of international intervention for the management of biodiversity.
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7.2 The Nature of the Problem - Optimal Biodiversity Policy
The regulatory problem of global biodiversity losses concerns the optimal means of inducing specific 
forms of investments by sovereign states. The extinction problem results from discrete decisions 
made by independent states concerning their individual investment portfolios. Each state has a 
limited amount of resources to invest, and it must therefore restrict itself to a finite number of 
productive assets to hold within its portfolio. Biological assets, i.e. species, are one form of 
productive asset that the state may choose to hold. Extinctions result when states choose to invest 
in assets other than specific biological ones, because the returns on the biological assets are inferior 
to others.
The specific decision problem faced by the state is developed in equation (5.16). The state’s decision 
concerning a given resource devolves to the determination of how much state funding should be 
dedicated to its management (MJ. The outcome of this decision will determine the quality of 
resource exploitation in that state; large spending on management results in efficient rates of 
exploitation, lesser amounts introduce increasing degrees of overexploitation and waste. In effect, 
the absence of adequate management spending by the state creates an environment that is not 
conducive to individual investment in the resource.
Individuals living in and near the natural habitat of the resource respond with low levels of 
investment in the resource (its stock level), its habitat (e.g. the forest), and its monitoring. Their 
decisions are responsive to the state’s in the sense that they are based on beliefs about the future that 
are determined by the state’s management spending. There is little reason to invest in resources that 
the state leaves unsecured.
The state’s decision taking in regard to specific resources is in turn the consequence of expected 
investment worthiness. Some biological assets are viewed as unworthy of substantial investments 
on account of relative growth rates (H), relative unit rental value (X), and even relative management 
costliness (M). The global extinction problem arises from the fact that, at present and in recent times, 
a small number of biological assets have attracted the vast majority of societal investments in 
biological production, leaving the great majority in an underinvested and overexploited state.
The global community’s objective is to create the optimal investment portfolio, considered from the 
global perspective. In order to accomplish this, it must alter the existing investment portfolios of
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individual states. This is accomplished through investments (by the global community) which induce 
consequential investments by host states in particular biological assets. Therefore, in solving the 
international problem of terrestrial extinctions, the global community must act through individual 
sovereign states, inducing them to alter their investment portfolios in the global interest.
The specific nature of the global community’s decision problem is set forth in equation (6.11). The 
global community decides upon an investment portfolio in biological assets which maximises the 
value of the portfolio to the global community. The global community then acts by means of 
investments in global management mechanisms (Mq) which operate through their impact on state 
management decisions (MJ. State management decisions consequently determine state investment 
portfolios (and the global portfolio in the aggregate).
In short, the problem of extinction is an example of the problem of inefficient decentralised 
management of a global resource. Individual states are taking decisions regarding their individual 
portfolios without adequate consideration of the effects of these decisions on global stocks of diverse 
resources. The global community’s role is to act as an "international regulator", taking actions to 
induce changes in individual state’s portfolios. The capacity of the global community to intervene 
in state decision making is the subject of this chapter.
7.3 Optimal Biodiversity Policy with Instruments
The above discussion makes clear that the primary objective of international intervention is to induce 
state expenditures on the management of particular diverse resources. Changed management 
expenditures will then be reflected in alterred investment portfolios. This means that the overarching 
object of the international regulation of extinction may be expressed as the maximisation of the 
difference between the benefits (flowing from an alterred global portfolio) and the costs (of global 
management to induce changed domestic investment patterns). This objective was previously 
depicted in equation (6.1 la).
The cost-effectiveness of global investments in biodiversity management will be dependent upon the 
quality of the instruments used to implement them. That is, the global objective will need to be 
maximised subject to the available instruments for influencing state investments.
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Available Instruments:
(7.1)
m s =igw I)
a 0 ~ t 0(Mo)
where'. MG^  global management investedin inducing host state investments
J*
Mg a global management invested in maintenance o f transfer system 
Iq s  the incentive system for inducing Mt 
Tg s  the incentive system for inducing Mg
The global objective is then to maximise (6.1 la) by the optimal choices of Mq, MGr as defined in
(7.1). That is, the global objective requires the global community to choose the optimal instruments 
and investment levels for conserving global biological diversity. Then (6.1 la) may be re-written as 
follows.
Global Objective (Optimal Investments and Instruments):
Equation (7.2) shows that the global community intervenes through investments in mechanisms 
which will induce state investments in diverse resources. The trade-off here is between the 
effectiveness of those (global) investments and their costliness. This rendition of the global objective 
makes clear that a sub-object of the global community is to construct two optimal instruments for the 
maximisation of (7.2). One of these instruments ( I q *) will be used to obtain the most cost-effective 
inducement of optimal supply state investments in the diverse resources. The other instrument (T0*)
(7.2)
n Max
where: I L  a  netvalue o f altered investmentportfolios to global community
Mt = management by states ofgroup Southofdiverse resources 
Mg a management by globalcommunity ofdiverse resources 
Pm s  price o f management services 
r a  the opportunity cost o f capital
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will be used to obtain the most cost-effective inducement of optimal demand state transfers for 
diverse resource services. Their cost-effectiveness will be determined in regard to their capacity for 
generating global benefits with the least amount of aggregate investment (Mq).
Therefore, the regulation of extinction involves the creation of incentive systems for both halves of 
the world. This is because the nature of the regulatory problem is reciprocal. The states in group 
North (the already converted states) have the incentive to free ride on the provision of diverse stocks 
(x) and habitats (R), and the flows that they imply. The existence of these uncompensated flows then 
leads to the problem of state underinvestment in diverse resources, and hence global extinctions. 
However, should the states in group North decide to transfer funds to the group South in order to 
compensate for these flows, then the incentives to free ride are reversed, not eliminated. That is, then 
the states in the group South have the incentive to keep the funds, but apply the payments to uses 
other than diverse resource management (investing in the first-best portfolio from their own 
perspective).
A reciprocal incentive system is required in order to solve this problem. One part of the system must 
focus upon the inducement of optimal transfers from North to South (i.e. from converted to 
unconverted states). The other part must focus on the inducement of the selection of the globally 
optimal investment portfolio by the Southern states. The remainder of this chapter discusses the 
means for accomplishing the latter objective; the next chapter discusses the possibilities for pursuing 
the former.
7.4 The Nature of International Intervention
How is it possible for "global" spending to be translated into domestic management? For example, 
with regard to the four African states whose unofficial "open access" regimes resulted in the halving 
of the continent-wide elephant population, how could spending in one part of the world put additional 
patrols in place in another part of the world? This is a crucially important piece of the regulatory 
problem for the effective regulation of global terrestrial resources.
This section analyses the impact that different forms and patterns of "global” spending will have on 
domestic investments in diverse resources. For this purpose it is necessary to construct the "reaction 
function" of the owner-state, in order to determine how intervention will affect state choice. Any 
intervention must operate through the supplier state’s decision making framework regarding the
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worthiness of investments in diverse resource management; this framework is described in equation 
(5.16). It implies that owner-states will invest in the management of diverse resources to the extent 
that the resources render benefits sufficient to pay for that management This implies the following 
optimality condition for state management decisions; owner-state investment in management is 
simply a function of the marginal benefit from enhanced cooperation in the exploitation of that 
commons.
State Investment in Diverse Resource Management (w/o intervention):
(7.3)
a n
m ; - ~3m ~ = rp"
where: 3  the aggregate value to citizens o f state sfrom a diverse resource
= where \ t is the unit resource rental value in state s
State investments in the management of a resource yield some level of return, by reason of the 
increased levels of cooperation in the exploitation of the resource and the consequent movement 
toward first-best management Within this framework, management is a factor of production with 
regard to the diverse resource, with nondecreasing but diminishing returns.
In the absence of global intervention, no state will invest to achieve first-best management, on 
account of the costliness of such investments. Therefore, the marginal benefit of further management 
spending on diverse resources will remain positive at the state’s "local" optimum (due to the marginal 
costliness of that spending); this result is demonstrated in equation (7.4).
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The Marginal Benefit from State Investments in Diverse Resource Management 
(without intervention): (7.4)
.  3IX . . an
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fromequation (7.3) 
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Equation (7.4) also depicts the process by which state investments in management yield benefits 
within that state. Management is effective by means of the removal of uncooperative access to the 
resource, so that when additional resources are devoted to management the level of uncooperative 
exploitation decreases (i.e. n-p, the noncooperative fringe, decreases). Better cooperation in the 
exploitation of the resource in state s results in better per unit rental value for each individual within 
state s harvesting the resource (Xt increases). And this consequently results in higher aggregate 
benefits from the resource within the state. So long as there is increased cooperation from increased 
management expenditures (even though the returns may be diminishing), there is a positive return 
to state investments in management.
Nevertheless, these returns may not be sufficient to warrant investment by the state in certain diverse 
resources. The state’s decision problem (set forth in equation 5.16) requires that investments in 
diverse resource management be competitive with the returns available from other assets within the 
economy. It is the failure to meet this condition that dooms many biological resources.
In order to alter this result, the global community may intervene by way of institution-building that 
results in the enhancement of the returns to state investments in diverse resource management; this 
is the decision problem set forth in equation 6.11. In essence, the global community through its 
investments develops another flow to the supplying state’s investments, in addition to that shown in
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equation (7.4). Then one unit of state management spending will generate two distinct flows of 
benefits: one sourced in the owner-state’s internal production system and one sourced in the global 
community’s external support institution.
The Impact of State Investments in Diverse Resources (wyintervention): (75)
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where: (•), = the (state sourced) benefits derivedfrom state management (as in eq.7.5) 
(*)c =the (global community sourced) bene fits derived from state management
Equation (7.5) gives the basis for a reaction function for the owner-state. Optimal state investment 
decisions (as determined in Equation (7.3)) will now generate new levels of state investment spending 
on diverse resources dependent upon the level o f investment by the global community, i.e.
The effect of intervention is to enhance the perceived effectiveness of state investments in the 
particular diverse resource, thereby enhancing the incentives to make those investments. The global 
community does this through the construction of a mechanism that automatically responds to state 
investments with benefit enhancements. Those investments then determine the likelihood of the 
maintenance of the diverse resources within that state.
7.5 Alternative Instruments for International Intervention
International intervention (in order to induce the selection of the global optimum over the local) may 
take one of three general forms:
(Ij): direct inducement - the inducement of changes in the investment portfolio of the supplier 
state by means of direct payments for commitments to conserve diverse resource stocks 
(x,R).
(12): indirect inducement (rent appropriation) - the inducement of changes in the investment 
portfolio of the supplier state by means of market regulation in the consumer state for the
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purpose of maximising the appropriation of rents from diverse resource flows by the supplier 
states.
(I3): indirect inducement (flow appropriation) - the inducement of changes in the investment 
portfolio of the supplier state by means of investments in market regulation in the consumer 
state for the purpose of channeling the flow of benefits from diverse resources initially 
through the supplier states.
The distinction between the first and the latter two methods lies in the variable to which the global 
community responds. Direct inducement operates by enhancing supply state benefits in accord with 
retained stocks of diverse resources. Indirect inducement operates by means of enhancing supply 
state benefits that flow from diverse resource stocks.
The distinction between these three routes for intervention is formalised in equation (7.6). Here, the 
benefits to state s from a diverse resource flow ( / )  is broken down into three distinct components. 
First, there are the stock-related benefits (deriving from the mere existence of stocks R,x). Secondly, 
the flow of benefits is segregated into the appropriable component ( / “) and the nonappropriable (y ^ ; 
the former earns a return equal to the local rental value (lambda,). Third, the nonappropriable flows 
generate no locally appropriable returns. Intervention may occur by means of the attempted 
enhancement of the returns from any one of these three components.
Alternative Routes for Intervention:
(7.6)
1 X 0 ' ') =  M r^RA * y^iMc) * 0- y
= M ’c(Rji) * X/Ma')- [y '  - y *"}(*!c)
where: y d = y** + y ta
y d = the flow ofservicesfrom a diverse resource 
y** = the appropriable flow {under existing institutions) 
y** = the nonappropriable flow
Mq = the extent ofinternational intervention via instrument I .
As indicated in equation (7.3), the level of management spending by state s on the diverse resource 
is a function of the aggregate state benefits expected to be received from that resource. International 
intervention operates by enhancing those expected benefits, and each of the available instruments
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does this in a different fashion. Direct inducement (Ij) operates by making transfers directly related 
to stocks of diverse resources (and is thus indirectly related to service flows); this instrument is the 
subject of this chapter. Rent appropriation (Ij) acts by increasing the per unit resource rental value 
received by the supply state for each unit of appropriable flow generated; this instrument is the 
subject of chapter eight Finally, flow appropriation (I3) is directed toward shifting more of the 
diverse resource flow ( / )  from the nonappropriable to the appropriable vector; this instrument is the 
subject of chapter nine.
The global community’s investments add the second term to equation (7.3), effectively enhancing 
the benefits from state management spending. The precise nature of this term depends upon the 
instrument used for directing benefits to the supplier state. Each instrument has the global 
community respond to state investments with its own investment, but the nature of the global 
investment depends on the instrument.
Alternative Global Investments/Instruments:
(1) Direct Subsidy (7.7)
, (  an 1 _ 3E
v 1 m 7 ~$m 7
(2) Rent Appropriation Mechanism
f  A
(7.8)
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(3) Flow Appropriation Mechanism (7.9)
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There are three points to be garnered from this depiction of the alternative instruments for managing 
extinction.
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First, it is apparent that international intervention must take the form of a benefit supplement, i.e. it 
responds to domestic investments with international investments which supplement the domestic 
investment effects with globally supplied benefits. This is depicted in equation (7.5).
Secondly, it is also apparent that international intervention must operate dynamically. That is, in each 
period state management spending must be induced by the expectation of a global response (dMc/dM, 
in equations 7.7 through 7.9). This is probably the reverse of the causation that is usually assumed, 
i.e. that global expenditures will cause domestic conservation. The latter conception is only true to 
the extent that a history of past responses will build up an expectation of future responses, thus 
inducing state investments (this will be explored further in section 7.6).
Finally, this also demonstrates once again the nature of the three alternative routes for global 
intervention. All three are mechanisms instituted to generate benefits supplementing state-generated 
benefits from diverse resource investments. The global investment induced may be of the nature of 
a direct subsidy (eq. 7.7), or of an investment sustaining an already instituted mechanism for global 
transfers (eq. 7.8 or 7.9). Either through the subsidy or the mechanism, the benefits of domestic 
investments in diverse resources are enhanced.
In sum, global intervention takes the form of global investments contingent upon state investments 
in particular diverse resources. This section has defined both the three alternative routes generally 
available, and the general nature of global intervention in national resource management. The 
following sections demonstrate how these definitions result from an analysis of the problem of 
inducing state commitments to alternative investment portfolios.
7.6 International Intervention as Institution-Building
It is necessarily the case that global management must be perceived as responsive to state 
management spending in order to induce state management spending. This is so because the object 
of international intervention is to induce investments that are not perceived by the state to be in its 
own interest, i.e. in an investment portfolio that is optimal from the global but not the national 
perspective. Therefore, for a state to honour a contract against its own interest, there must be an 
enforcement mechanism for that contract. Making the global community’s investment responsive 
creates that enforcement mechanism as part of that contract.
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It is also necessary for global intervention to take the form of institution-building precisely because 
the re-shaping of the supplier state’s investment portfolio hinges upon the re-moulding of that state’s 
beliefs concerning the future. It is because states come to believe that the response to domestic 
investments will be enhanced benefits that their portfolios will be alterred . That is, global 
investments in conservation do not in themselves generate any changes in domestic state investment 
patterns; it is instead the effect of those investments on state expectations that matters most. It is the 
role of institutions to build and fulfill expectations.
This may be demonstrated with a simple hypothetical. Assume that the global community initiates 
its flow of enhanced benefits (Mq) in return for the domestic regime’s commitment to 
correspondingly increase conservation spending (i.e. dM1/dMG=l). That is, the global community 
promises to invest Mg in that state each period so long as the state commits these funds to 
conservation. Therefore, the state is promised a future subsidy so long as it adopts the constraint 
M=M0 in current decision making, but once the state adopts unconstrained decision making the 
subsidy goes to zero. In equation (7.10), the adoption of constrained decision making is indicated 
by the presence of a semi-colon in the argument of the state’s benefit function. The expected value 
of the future subsidy is equal to the present value of the flow of the promised subsidy (discounted by 
the "credibility” of the global community in honouring its promises, v).
Even if the owner-state gives its commitment to conserve biodiversity, the optimising owner-state 
will honour this commitment (and thus alter its investment portfolio) only if the expected future 
benefits outweigh the immediate benefits from investing in the locally perceived first-best investment 
portfolio.
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Time Consistency of Owner-State’s Commitment to Diverse Resource Management:
(710)
Honour Commitment to Invest M,=MG in Diverse Resources iff
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where: H  (•) s  the benefitsfromenhanced unconstrained investment
a  (•; •) m the benefits fromenhanced constrained investment
v s  the expectedlikelihoodofreceipt ofglobal investment
Equation (7.10) formalises the conditions under which the owner-state will honour its commitment. 
The LHS of the last equation represents the present value of the expected benefits from honouring 
the commitment (and assuming the portfolio constraint) while the RHS of this equation represents 
the present value of the costliness of the assumption of this portfolio constraint. The net benefits 
correspond to the expected value of the stream of payments from the global community; the net 
costliness corresponds to the difference for the owner-state between constrained and unconstrained 
optimisation. The state’s commitment to this constraint is time consistent only if its expectations 
justify its adoption in each and every period. [Kydland and Prescott (1978)].
In this sense, all interventions by the global community must be dynamically constructed. Since there 
is no explicit external enforcement mechanism for a contract between sovereign states, the contract 
between the states must itself provide this mechanism. This is not an insuperable obstacle, as many 
if not most private contracts also provide for internal enforcement mechanisms. However, the 
creation of internal enforcement mechanisms for international commitments represents institution- 
building, and the solution to the international extinction problem requires institution-building of this 
sort.
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The nature of the institution-building required to solve this problem is indicated by a closer inspection 
of (7.10). Again, the first term on the LHS represents the expected flow of benefits from enhanced 
global investments resulting from current domestic portfolio changes. This term is discounted by the 
perceived likelihood that the global community will make future contributions (v). Here it is assumed 
that the state’s expectations have a "knife edge" character to them, i.e. the global community loses 
all credibility (for all time) when it fails to honour its obligation just once but retains some 
probabilistic level of credibility (here assumed constant for simplicity) when it performs its 
obligation.
The motivation for institution-building is captured in this term. Consider initially the nature of the 
global community’s intervention if credibility is not a matter of concern; that is, in the first instance, 
assume that there is perceived certainty of future benefits. Then states will invest in diverse resources 
(against locally prevailing incentives) to the extent that these investments generate enhanced benefits 
(from expected future global investments) at a rate that meets the existing rate of return on productive 
assets.
Asset Selection - Consistency of Commitment to Conservation (with v=l):
(7.11)
Honour Conservation Commitment iff
I X  ( M a M M  -n  w c=0) >  r ( I X  W®) -  I X  - * „ )  ) V
Equation (7.11) captures the essence of institution-building for altering owner-state investments. In 
this equation, the LHS corresponds to the net value of the international subsidy when honouring the 
conservation commitment, while the RHS corresponds to the net value of that same subsidy if the 
commitment is dishonoured and the subsidy invested elsewhere. The owner-state’s decision problem 
concerns whether to invest the subsidy received in any given period back into the international regime 
(in hopes of receiving future similar subsidies), or whether to invest it elsewhere in the economy. 
This equilibrium condition states that the supplier state will invest in the international regime only 
to the extent that the global community assures a flow of future benefits (inclusive of subsidies) 
competitive with the return available from other productive assets (r).
As would be anticipated in decision making regarding the state’s portfolio, it is the future flows from 
portfolio decisions that matter, and these flows must all equilibriate at the prevailing marginal return 
on capital. Therefore, equation (7.11) demonstrates that the global community’s interventionist role
v / A
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is the enhancement of the flow of benefits from diverse resources, so that they meet the competitive 
rate of return on other productive assets in the economy.
In addition, this intervention must provide the correct level of benefit enhancement at each point in 
time. The solution to the global problem of extinction requires institution-building in the sense that 
the alteration of investment decisions (i.e. portfolio selection) requires that intervention take the form 
of a flow. That is, the system of incentives required must be in effect at each and every point in time, 
because assets will attract investment in each period only if their return is perceived to be competitive 
under that period’s conditions.
There is another important sense in which the resolution of this problem requires institution-building, 
i.e. the provision of assurance. Once the assumption of certainty is dropped (i.e. 0<v<l), it is 
necessary to provide and assure an enhanced flow of benefits to states altering their investment 
portfolios. It is easy to see from eq. (7.10) that, if there is little credibility in the global community’s 
offered flow of benefits (i.e. v —> 0), then there is no impact of the global community’s intervention 
on the supply state’s portfolio. The global community should invest resources in providing this 
assurance to the extent that they are warranted by the response of supply states (and hence the 
generation of global benefits).
In general, this would suggest that global investment in management should be distributed so as to 
maximise the likelihood of the supplier state observing its commitment, through investments directed 
both to increasing state benefits and to increasing assurance. Both an enhanced flow and the 
assurance of its availability in the future are equally necessary to generate changes in the supplier 
state’s investment portfolio. Therefore, international investments in diversity management must be 
allocated between benefit enhancement (pis(Mo)) and benefit assurance (v(M0)).
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Optimal International Investments in Benefit Enhancement and Assurance:
(7.12)
(1+r-v)
v
Equation (7.12) represents the global objective which is to maximise the expected value o f future 
benefits from the international regime. Expected benefits will be dependent upon the product of 
benefit level and likelihood, and the international community has the capacity to influence both. This 
indicates that the returns from investments in assurance should equilibriate with the returns from 
investments in state benefit enhancement. That is, the LHS of the last equation in (7.12) represents 
the increase in the perceived credibility of the global community in supplying future benefit flows, 
while the RHS represents the enhanced level of benefits. The global community must invest in both, 
because supplier state choice is determined by the product of benefits and credibility (i.e. expected 
benefits). There is no reason to invest in one without the other.
The method for providing assurance in contracting is termed institution-building. Here, institutions 
are forms of contracts which are intended to create credible commitments to a course of action over 
time (i.e. they create a higher degree of time consistent commitment to a particular policy). This is 
done by undertaking investments which increase the costs of dishonouring subsidiary commitments 
in regard to these investments.
In private contracting, this is usually accomplished via "bonding mechanisms", such as sunk costs 
(asset specific investments) which earn a return in only a single activity. (Williamson, 1986). 
Credibility is enhanced when investments are asset specific because the opposite party recognises that 
reneging on the commitment involves a cost; flexibility is lost when assets are made expressly 
nonliquid. (Kapur, 1991). The additional costliness of these asset-specific investments renders a
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policy time consistent over a wider range of possible conditions.
Contracts are of such a character when they involve substantial investments which are tailored 
specifically and committed irreversibly. An example of such a contract is a joint venture agreement 
that requires both parties to acquire assets that are useful solely in that venture (e.g. one party might 
acquire the land and the other the building in a joint venture). Such fixed overarching commitments 
make the other subsidiary commitments enforceable over a wider range of conditions.
Bonding mechanisms are equally applicable in public international law. They are useful whenever 
an external enforcement mechanism is either unavailable or costly. The global community is able 
to invest in the provision of assurance by using bonding mechanisms. That is, so long as the global 
community commits some assets irreversibly to a mechanism that promises an enhanced return to 
supply state investments in diverse resources (i.e. these assets of the global community are made 
"specific" to the diverse resources), then the supply states are assured of the level of flow which these 
assets are able to generate.
This section has demonstrated the necessarily dynamic nature of the mechanism required to regulate 
extinction. It has also shown that this mechanism is likely to be of the nature of an "institution", i.e. 
an independent agency with asset-specific investments of an indefinite duration. Independence and 
specificity are necessary to generate any level of assurance; indefiniteness is required in order to 
induce and enforce a commitment on the part of the supply states.
7.7 Optimal Direct Inducements: International Franchise Agreements
An example of an optimal mechanism for regulating extinction of the first (direct) type would be an 
international agreement to transfer development rights. This is an often-mooted alternative for 
conservation, based on the observation that global community frequently values the remaining 
wildernesses for other purposes (carbon storage, biodiversity) more than the owner-state does for 
development. (Panayotou, 1992; Schneider, 1992). This gives rise to the notion that some form of 
contract ought to be able to capture these "gains from cooperation".
Despite the differences in phrasing, the substance of the concepts discussed in these proposals is not 
distinguishable from that developed here. The difference lies in the analysis of commitment and
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enforceability. In an international transaction, the "transfer of development rights" must be conceived 
of as a schedule of payments constructed so as to maintain the optimality of the globally desired 
outcome. There is no other enforcement mechanism available to maintain the commitment of the 
owner-state over time.
The decline of diverse resources within an owner-state can be remedied through a system o f strategic 
international payments. This system of payments would necessarily be conditional upon the owner- 
state’s application of them to the purpose of management of (and investment in) diverse resources. 
That is, the payments would be restricted to use for purchases of land and management for a 
particular resource or region. Of course, a crucial feature of any international scheme of payments 
based on conditionality (here, payment conditional on specific application) is its necessarily dynamic 
nature. That is, it is only possible to re-structure the owner-state’s decision making process if the 
payment if offered at the end of each period that the state takes the specified action. The payment 
is the global premium, supplementing the state’s return, received for pursuing the global rather than 
the local optimum.
An example of such an international factor-subsidy scheme might be an international parks 
agreement. Such a programme would in effect buy the use of the land for the diverse resources that 
exist there. The role of the international community would be to pay the rental price of the land each 
year that the national park remained unconverted. In order to manage the park, it would probably be 
necessary for the international community to provide a subsidy for management services as well. If 
the international community wishes to maintain diverse resources at the lowest levels of exploitation 
(e.g. nonconsumptive activities such as tourism and filming), then it will be necessary to provide 
almost complete subsidies for the foregone land development opportunities and management services 
required.
However, the maintenance of a stock of diverse resources will often be compatible with a wide range 
of forms of resource utilisation, other than those that are of the lowest intensity. In that case the 
international subsidies may be reduced in accordance with the extent to which development 
opportunities are allowed in the region. This is, in essence, the development rights approach to 
diverse resource conservation; to the extent that the international community wishes to reduce the 
development intensity away from the local optimum (of high intensity conversion and use), then it 
must be willing to provide a stream of ex post payments to compensate for the foregone development.
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Another example of an international subsidy scheme would be a resource franchise agreement. This 
would be a three-way agreement (between owner-state, international community and franchisee) in 
which the international community would provide a stream of rental payments to the owner-state in 
return for its agreement to offer a piece of land for use only for restricted purposes specified within 
the franchise agreement That is, the land would be designated for use, but only for limited uses 
amounting to much less than complete conversion (e.g. extractive industries such as rubber-tapping 
and plant and wildlife harvesting). The land would then be franchised to an entity that is allowed to 
use it only for purposes compatible with the franchise. If the state fails to enforce the franchise 
agreement, it forfeits its year’s rental fee.
The benefit of a franchise agreement over an international parks scheme is that it provides a stream 
of benefits to fund the management of the operation. Under the franchise agreement, it is the 
responsibility of the franchisee to provide management services from the returns it generates in its 
operation of the franchise. In this fashion, the international community is able to "contract out" the 
provision of management services, while (through the rental fee and restricted use clauses in the 
franchise agreement) it retains the possibility of moving the local optimum closer to the global.
Therefore, a franchise agreement is simply a more generalised form of the international park 
agreement required for the acquisition of all development rights in a region. A franchise agreement 
could be used to specify die precise range of activities allowed and disallowed in the region, and it 
would be required of the international community to provide the "global premium" that is necessary 
to make up the difference between what an entity would bid for the franchise and what is the value 
of the land in unrestricted use. That is, an international franchise agreement allows for the division 
of the "development rights" pertaining to a particular region between the global and the local 
communities.
7.8 Conclusion
The problem of global extinctions is the problem of constructing the globally optimal portfolio of 
biological assets. This implies the necessity of international regulation in a sphere that to date has 
been managed entirely by individual states under the doctrine of national sovereignty.
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International intervention in national resource management is complicated in the case of biological 
diversity by three factors. First, on account of national sovereignty over terrestrial resources, 
international intervention must be directed to the alteration of the decision making frameworks of the 
supplier states, so that they themselves elect to construct an asset portfolio that is compatible with the 
global optimum. Specifically, the problem is to enhance the rates of return on internal investments 
in diverse resources so that the state invests in a different portfolio of assets. Second, the nature of 
the intervention is necessarily a long-term one, because it is an intervention to alter basic investment 
decisions. This also means that the mechanism for intervention must be both flexible enough to adapt 
to changing conditions, and stable enough to induce investments. Finally, the core problem of 
biodiversity lies in the intangibility of many of the goods and services flowing from diverse 
resources. This makes it very difficult to generate a compensating flow of funds in return for these 
goods and services. Equally, it makes it difficult to generate international support for the long term 
investments that are required for the institution of a long term solution to this global problem.
This chapter has outlined the nature of the solution to one half of this problem, i.e. the manner in 
which national portfolio selections might be alterred. In short, it has advocated institution-building 
capable of enhancing and assuring the benefits from diverse resource management It has defined 
the three general forms that this new institution-building might take. This first (discussed here) is 
centred on direct subsidies to the supplier-states for low-intensity utilisation (franchise agreements). 
The second (discussed in chapter eight) is centred in the consumer-states, and offers enhanced 
benefits from the trade in the tangible flows from diverse resources (wildlife trade controls). The 
third (discussed in chapter nine) is the possibility of rendering the nonappropriable flows from diverse 
resources appropriable (intellectual property rights).
Institution-building is the required solution in all three cases, of the nature of the development of a 
mechanism for continuously transferring global values (of diverse resources) into the decision­
making environment of local users of these same resources. Although the channel developed by each 
of the three instruments is distinct, the object is the same. The institution to be built must be able to 
register the global community’s preferences for the low intensity utilisation of the remaining 
wildernesses of the world. This requires the creation of a system of payments for the owner-states’ 
rights to more intensive development The general object, with regard to international institution- 
building for biodiversity conservation, is the development of institutions that create diverse pathways 
to development.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF THE WILDLIFE TRADE: 
RENT APPROPRIATION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION
8.1 International Intervention and the "External" Regulation of Domestic Resources
Ultimately, state investments into the management of diverse resources will be constrained by the 
benefits that such investments are able to generate. International intervention that is based upon the 
direct inducement of further state investments in diverse resources will be similarly constrained. 
However, there are instances in which external regulation of the resource (i.e. in its product markets 
rather than its place of production) will yield greater returns per unit of investment In that case, it 
may be optimal for the global community to utilise the instrument of external market regulation, 
generating supplier-state benefits through such intervention in consumer-state markets.
The regulation of the trade in the tangible goods of diverse resources (the "wildlife trade") is a case 
in point. Although these resources are sourced, by definition, in the world’s last refuges of diversity, 
the consumers of these products are often situated in the states with little diversity remaining. 
Turning once again to the African elephant for illustrative purposes, although the thirty host states 
reside within sub-Saharan African, the vast majority (about eighty per cent) of the tangible products 
from the African elephant have found their way to final consumers in the North: the U.S., Europe and 
Japan. (Barbier, et. al., 1990). Since the flow of the wildlife trade through this "pipeline" from 
South to North is fairly common for most diverse resources, this affords the possibility for 
"Northern"-based regulation of this exclusively "Southern" resource. When it is both more cost- 
effective and rent-productive to base regulation in the North, then an "external method of 
intervention" is the instrument of choice.
All of the necessary conditions for the construction of an effective international agreement apply 
equally here. In particular, this manner of global intervention must remain dynamically consistent 
through conditionality on state management spending. That is, as depicted in equation (7.8) above,
217
the global community must invest each period to maintain the external regulation mechanism, in 
response to the supply state’s management spending. This external mechanism must then 
automatically confer the enhanced benefits upon the investing supplier states.
However, there is another role that an external regulatory mechanism must fulfill. The creation of 
enhanced benefits from trading the tangible goods and services of natural habitats will not necessarily 
generate increased investments in those habitats. This is because the enhanced benefits of wildlife 
trade will also generate increased pressure on the natural habitats, and thus increase the costliness of 
managing natural habitat production. The rents from diverse resource flows are equal to the gap 
between revenues received and the costs incurred per unit of production, and it is very likely that both 
revenues and costs will move together in the context of natural habitat management
A constructive wildlife trade regime must be developed in order to fulfill this dual role: the creation 
of incentives for investment (through rent maximisation) and the minimisation of the costliness of 
diverse resource management. To some extent, these two objectives are in conflict, however the 
optimal institution for regulating wildlife trade will take both into consideration.
This chapter considers the institutional detail of the solution to this problem. It is the most detailed 
chapter, institutionally, precisely because there are international institutions already existing within 
this area. These are the institutions put into place under the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES). This chapter constitutes a comparative case study of both the nature 
of the institution that would satisfy the requirements of a constructive trade control mechanism and 
the institution that currently exists, i.e. CITES. It demonstrates the practical and institutional 
difficulties that underlie the creation and implementation of a regime for the transfer of enhanced 
benefits from North to South.
8.2 The International Regulation of Wildlife Utilisation - An Economic Framework
Contrary to popular perceptions, a strategy of wildlife utilisation often has much to commend itself 
as a conservationist tool. It generates revenues for conservation, and (in some cases) it creates 
incentives for the application of these revenues to that purpose. The latter objective is equally as 
important as the first. This has become apparent with the large number of conservation failures, such 
as the establishment of "paper parks" (i.e. established, but unmanaged national parks). It is the fact
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that it has the potential to combine these capacities, La fund raising and incentives generating, that 
makes a strategy of wildlife utilisation so appealing.
However, it is also apparent that a simple strategy of unregulated wildlife utilisation is not capable 
of generating these incentives in and of itself. Thus, wildlife exploitation remains a significant threat 
to many species. This happens whenever wildlife utilisation generates revenues but not rents. The 
difference is crucial, as revenues are simply returns that result from the labour expended in an activity 
(such as the hunting of wildlife) while rents result from the creation of a return to resource ownership. 
Where there are revenues to be earned from resource utilisation, but not rents, the incentives are to 
exploit but not conserve the resource.
Therefore, the object of a constructive wildlife trade regulation mechanism (in the sense of the 
creation of incentives to wildlife conservation) must be the creation of rents in the wildlife resource. 
What are the predictable difficulties that arise in the attempt at installing such a system? This chapter 
considers both "sides" to the problem (demand and supply) and discusses the nature of the 
international environmental agreement required to address them.
First, the "demand-side" problems of wildlife utilisation will be considered. Here, the primary 
limitation of a utilisation strategy is its inapplicability to species which have low "consumptive" use 
values. That is, some species happen to have developed prior usefulness and thus have a means of 
"paying their way"; others, however, have not. It is problematic that a strategy of wildlife utilisation 
extends expressly only to the conservation of the former and not to the latter.
The greater part of this chapter will focus, however, on the "supply-side" difficulties with wildlife 
utilisation. This is because it is often the case that the management of natural habitat utilisation is 
both difficult and costly to control, and this is one of the primary reasons why overexploitation has 
so often occurred in the context of natural habitats. Some of these difficulties are relatively easily 
remedied, for example by devolving the habitat from state to local community control. [Swanson and 
Barbier (1992)]. However, these problems can remain costly nonetheless, on account of the less 
intensive techniques used for control (e.g. lack of fences). And, in some instances, the conversion 
of natural habitats to more intensive forms of production (e.g. ranching or farming) will occur simply 
on account of these cost considerations.
A "constructive" strategy of wildlife utilisation must take these two factors into consideration, and 
develop mechanisms which address both. The demand-side considerations (concerning the
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Inonconsumptive values of certain species) can be addressed through rent creation policies, involving 
the construction of a quota system or its equivalent The supply-side considerations (concerning the
i
| costliness of natural habitat control systems) can be addressed through selective purchasing policies,
I
involving the invocation of conditionality in consumer purchasing systems. Together, an effective 
constructive wildlife regulation system is capable of creating rents and channeling them to the 
conservation of species. [Swanson (1989)].
8.3 Demand Side Management of Tradeable Wildlife Resources
The point of demand side management is simply the maximisation of the rents potentially 
appropriable by the owners of the resource. All species have value, and much of this value resides 
in the northern developed countries. One facet of this value is consumptive in nature, i.e. individuals 
are willing to pay for the species’ existence for the purpose of direct use of its characteristics. In 
order for the maximum number of any species to exist, the full extent of each type of value must be 
appropriated by its (and its habitat’s) managers. This is the process of maximising the rents to the 
owners.
Revenue maximisation is a precondition to rent maximisation, and it is achieved through the control 
of the price at which the tangible products from natural habitats are sold. All goods have a certain 
price at which revenue maximisation occurs, and if there are not good substitutes for them, that price 
can often be quite a bit higher than that which exists in the market. The fact that natural habitat is 
becoming more scarce, and is expected to become even moreso, contributes to the relative scarcity 
of its products, and this makes its revenue maximising prices (and the total revenues potentially 
appropriable from them) even higher. [Krutilla, 1967]. In short, one of the conseqences of centuries 
of conversions of natural habitat to more specialised production systems is to increase the inelasticity 
of the flow of goods from the former (as supplies of these goods and their closest substitutes become 
more restricted) and to decrease the elasticities of the goods from the latter (as their supplies "flood" 
the market). [Swanson (1991)].
This is the basis for the expectation that the demand for the tangible products of increasingly scarce 
natural habitats will usually be inelastic. This was found to be the case in a recent study of the 
demand for African elephant ivory, for example, where it was found that an increase of 100% in the 
price of ivory in Japan would result in a fall in quantities of only 70%, thereby resulting in an overall
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increase of 30% in the total revenues flowing to its suppliers. [Barbier, et. al. (1990)]. Therefore, 
there is both a theoretical and an empirical basis for the expectation that revenues from the sale of the 
products of natural habitats might be enhanced through carefully orchestrated price controls.
The maximisation of the revenues from the consumptive use of wildlife resources is important 
precisely because it is representative of so much value that is nonconsumptive in nature. That is, the 
regulation of the wildlife trade should be considered to be simply the regulation of those few bits and 
pieces of biological diversity that are valued on the market
The maximisation of wildlife utilisation revenues provides the means of indirectly compensating for 
these inappropriate values. When it is clear that there are important positive, inappropriate, 
external values closely associated with the provision of a tangible good, there is good reason for 
society to increase the reward to the tangible good in order to provide an implicit return to the 
intangible one. That is, when these products come jointly (tangible/intangible) but it is onl y possible 
to price one of the two goods (because the other is of the nature of a "public good"), then it can be 
the optimal "second best" policy to provide price supports to the tangible good in order to foster the 
incentives to invest sufficiently in the habitat which supplies both.
In essence, in this framework, all of the species inhabiting a given parcel of natural habitat are being 
viewed jointly. While all of these species have "value" (in the sense that we would like to see them 
continue to exist), some of them have "consumptive values" and others do not Since it is very hard 
to require payment of "existence values" to the owners of the natural habitat, an alternative means 
of acquiring additional value is to instead increase the amount of the "consumptive value" 
appropriated. To some extent the surplus consumptive values captured by the landowners with 
respect to a few species replaces the inappropriate nonconsumptive values of many other species, 
and restores the correct incentives for investing in unalterred habitat. The parcel of natural habitat 
is kept for the use of all of its resident species, and paid for by the price supports on the consumption 
of a very few of them. This is the rationale for encouraging the creation of mechanisms for rent 
appropriation in wildlife utilisation.
8.3.1 The Nature of Rent Appropriation Mechanisms
One of the most substantial obstacles to increased investments in diverse resources is the generally
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low rate of resource rent appropriation in the supply states. That is, very frequently, diverse resources 
are sold in product markets at or near the cost of harvesting them Qabour costs, capital costs); there 
is often no value received in these markets that is attributable to the natural resource itself. (Swanson, 
1992).
It is clear that an open access management system will produce this result With no coordination of 
the harvesting sector, the harvesters (if there are enough of them) will harvest until price is driven 
down to the costs of access, i.e. zero natural resource rent (Gordon, 1954; Clark, 1976). If there 
were sufficient returns available to the management of this commons, it is predictable that the state 
would invest in altering the prevailing management regime; this is demonstrable from the state’s 
decision problem set out in equation (5.16). However, it is very often the case that the supply state 
does not invest in its diverse resources.
One reason for this is that there are in fact two "layers" of commons involved in the production and 
marketing of the resource, and the individual supplier state only has control over one. There are 
limited returns available to expenditures on management when they only reach a part of the 
management problem.
The two layers of the natural resource commons can be demonstrated in a simple example. Consider 
first a state with a unique natural resource that is under first-best management ("full coordination"). 
The perceived market value of the products of this resource will be managed to achieve maximum 
unit value (which will then be equilibriated with the rental value of the resource).
Rental Value - Full Coordination: (8.1)
Y ’: Mf  p(Y)-Y -  c(x)-Y
subject to: x = -  Y
Y m: P i + _ L
This optimality condition states that the fully coordinated state perceives the true price elasticity of
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further production. When further production results in revenue reductions, this condition is 
recognised and internalised in the management decision. Since the resource is "unique" within this 
state, national first-best management will then correspond to global first-best management. The 
resource rental value prevailing under these circumstances is termed Xq, corresponding to the 
maximum "globally managed" rental value of the diverse resource.
Now consider a slightly more realistic situation, where there are a number of different states (N) 
harbouring the same natural resource, although initially it will be assumed that each of these states 
invests to achieve perfect internal coordination. In that case, each of these N states will be faced with 
the following production problem (solved with use of simple Nash assumptions).
Rental Value - N States, Internally Coordinated:
, Max .y - y  p(Y)-y -  c{x)-y
subject to: x  = H(xjl) -  y
-y + p(Y) -  c(x) = Xt
(8.2)
ym: p(y) -  c = X.
Under Nash assumptions, each of the N states assumes that the other supplier states will not respond 
to its expanded production. In that case each state has the incentive to continue expanding production 
beyond the point which is jointly optimal, because each fails to recognise that the others have the 
same incentives. In the end, each state is only recognising (1/N) of its full impact on joint revenues. 
The resulting unit rental value is termed Xi, corresponding to the rental value deriving from first-best 
national management in a context of uncoordinated global management
Now consider a far more realistic scenario, with N producer states each containing n potential
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producer individuals. The N producer states are not coordinated in their marketing of the diverse 
resource. It is not assumed however that open access conditions prevail internally; rather, each state 
invests in management to reduce the number of conflicting strategies in the internal commons to (n - 
p). Each of these individual harvesting units then makes the production decision (y). Within the 
context of these two layers of management, what will be the resulting harvest of the resource and 
what will be its unit rental value?
Rental Value - N States, (n - p) Individual Harvesters
y*: p{Y)-y. -  c{x)-yi
subject to: x -  H(xjl) -  y
j k * L d y y + p(Y) -  C  = j*L X.
dY Hy 0% 1 dy. ‘
(8.3)
1 + 1
eD N in -p )
-  C  = X:
Another layer of necessary management introduces another inefficient distortion into the exploitation 
framework. Individual producers fail to perceive their full impact on joint revenues both with regard 
to other domestic producers and also with regard to other extranational producers. They are 
uncoordinated, both internally and externally. The prevailing unit rental value (in state s) is termed 
Xi, corresponding to the rental value deriving from uncoordinated national and global management 
of the resource.
In practice, equation (8.3) probably represents the management incentives affecting almost all diverse 
resources. Individual states have an incentive to invest in management services (thereby decreasing 
the amount of uncoordinated harvesting n-p) in order to increase the market value of diverse 
resources. However, the impact of this incentive is diluted by the unmanaged access of other states 
to the global market. Even if internal management is first-best (n-p=l), there is still a distortion in
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Ithe incentive framework on account of the presence of N producer states in the product market. 
Therefore, evenif a diverse resource is potentially profitable, if production is properly managed, there 
may still be a disincentive to investments in domestic management by reason of noncoordination with 
other producer states.
This indicates the nature of the second route for intervention by the global comunity. In short, recall 
that the driving motivation for state management spending is to increase state benefits through 
increased unit resource rents (as in equation 7.6, above). Equation (8.3) demonstrates that the unit 
resource rent available within an individual state may be more easily regulated externally than 
internally (i.e. dX/dMo > dA/dMJ. Since the ultimate objective of global intervention is to increase 
the state benefits received from diverse resources (compare eqs. 7.6 - 7.8), external regulation should 
be used to do this when it is more cost-effective than internal.
The precise form that this manner of international regulation takes mirrors the state management of 
the domestic commons. The objective is to invest sufficient resources to remove some producer 
states from the international market place. That is, the object is to remove M producer states from 
the market, leaving the market to the remaining (N-M). In that case, the actual operation of this 
method of intervention is as follows (a revision of eq. 7.8 above).
Rent Appropriation Mechanism (as an inducement to MJ:
(8.4)
u h. 3IX d(N-M) dMc
"5X7 d(AHW)
Here, management spending is being induced from the supplier state by means of a commitment to 
restrict the number of operators in the international market, and these restrictions then generate the 
enhanced unit rents that benefit the supply state. In essence, the global community’s investment is 
directed to the replacement of \  with Xq for states investing in their diverse resources. Such a 
mechanism creates an incentive to invest (in order to get into the mechanism) and then sustains that 
incentive (through increased benefits from internal management expenditures).
In principle, it is possible for the global community to generate the fully coordinated resource rental 
value, as there is no reason why there need be more than one "supplier" to the international market.
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All that is required is that the consumer states agree to make all purchases from a single point of 
supply, which then acts as a conduit for all supplier states. At this point in the market, coordination 
of all states’ production occurs in order to maximise aggregate rents. In essence, then a market unit 
rental value of Xq is available to each of the states supplying this conduit, and die incentives for 
managing the resource are based around this value.
8.4 Supply Side Management of Wildlife Resources
The international community has the ability to use its power (as the consumers of wildlife products 
in international trade) to create rents in wildlife products. Difficult problems are created 
simultaneously, however, because the creation of rents will simultaneously create a group of 
opportunists who will seek to capture these rents, to the detriment of the range states and the wildlife 
resources.
Therefore, it is necessary for the international community to create a system for the careful 
discrimination between different groups of suppliers of the wildlife product; otherwise, it is 
predictable that a rent-creation strategy must fail. The cost of producing wildlife "sustainably" will 
always be greater than the cost of open access exploitation (because the latter includes an implicit rent 
to the resource). Without an effective mechanism for discriminating between the twa~types._Qf 
suppliers, the unsustainable producers will drive the sustainable from the market. [Akerlof, 1974.}.
The remainder of this chapter is an analysis of the necessary components of an international regime 
for the discrimination between producers, and a comparison of the existing regime to investigate how 
it performs as a constructive trade control mechanism.
8.4.1 Stock Conditionality
The international community wishes to confer the enhanced benefits from demand management only 
upon those states that generate global benefits from their diverse resources. This implies that there 
must be some conditionality on the assignment of enhanced benefits, and this conditionality must 
relate to owner-state investment in the maintenance and management of diverse resources. The 
requirement that diverse natural habitats be conserved for low-intensity uses will be termed stock
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conditionality. The essence of supply-side management is to create a system that effectively 
discriminates between the flow of wildlife goods from investors in diverse resource stocks, and the 
flows of such goods from all others.
Certification is the process that enforces stock conditionality. Suppliers would be certified on the 
basis of their demonstrated management of the natural habitat and wildlife resources for which they 
are responsible. Specific criteria indicative of the sustainable management of natural habitat 
(regarding the nature and extent of development in the species’ habitat) would need to be included 
within the trade control regime in order to provide the basis for differentiation between "certifiable" 
and "noncertifiable" suppliers.
This system of indicators must be applied periodically to determine whether a state is to be given 
"certified" status, and also to determine whether that status is to be retained. In this way, consumer 
state purchasing is made conditional on diverse resource stocks in each and every period. Such a 
tailored control regime fosters an international system of incentives toward sustainability, as potential 
suppliers pursue certified status and the already certified strive to retain it.
To this point, there is little to differentiate the analysis of this chapter from that of chapter seven, 
other than the attachment of the global premium to the wildlife product The remainder of this 
chapter however examines the particular costliness of this manner of benefit enhancement i.e. the 
costliness that comes from attempting to segregate between products that have been "sustainably" and 
"nonsustainably" produced.
8.4.2 An International Mechanism for Controlling Access to National Commons
A primary objective of an effective supply-side policy is to reduce the costliness (or to increase the 
cost-effectiveness) of owner-state management of designated natural habitats. This is because there 
are always two factors placing pressure on natural habitats: the costliness of its management in low 
intensity uses and the opportunity costs of its development for high intensity uses. In addition, 
attempts to combat the latter (via a wildlife rent creation strategy) will consequently increase the 
costliness of the former (by increasing pressure on the habitat). Therefore, the effectiveness of 
international regime to create rents depends upon the capacity of that regime to reduce the costliness 
of managing the pressures that it creates internally.
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This problem is complicated by the fact that it is not desirable to move toward simple, intensive 
management of the habitat. In general, it is inconsistent to speak of intensive controls in connection 
with natural habitat One of the primary attributes of such habitat is its unregimented nature; this is 
what allows diversity to flourish. Therefore, one of the requisites of an effective supply side policy 
will be its capacity to control supplies without intervening drastically within the habitat (by the use 
of fences, massive patrolling etc.)
A policy of selective purchasing solves the problem of management costliness in theory. A 
consumer-enforced commitment to purchase only from the designated supplier accomplishes this. 
In short, there is no incentive to engage in unauthorised harvesting if there is no market for the 
produce.
However, there are always "black markets" which undermine such controls. The extent of an illegal 
market is largely determined by the method of implementation and the consistency between the 
objectives of the controller and those being controlled. With regard to the latter, the vast majority 
of the ultimate consumers of many wildlife products reside in developed countries, where there is a 
widely expressed demand for more effective controls over natural habitat production. These persons 
can be expected to support a more effective system of trade controls.
This has been demonstrated in the case of the recent ivory trade controls implemented by the primary 
consumer states, (the EC, the US and Japan), where the end consumers have effectively shut down 
the trade by refusing to purchase ivory products. Prices of ivory products have fallen precipitously 
in the U.S. and E.C. end markets, while remaining fairly stable in the Asian. (Luxmoore, 1990).
Therefore, unlike consumer state controls on the import of substances widely demanded by the 
citizenry of those states (e.g. various narcotic substances), the objectives of the end consumers of 
wildlife products are often fully consistent with the reduced flows of those products. When this is 
the case, it is possible to implement low-cost regulation based upon selective purchasing agreements.
Even assuming that the objectives of wildlife producers (the investors in diverse resource stocks) and 
wildlife consumers (the consumers of the end products) are broadly consistent, there remain other, 
intermediate groups whose interests are conflicting. An international trade mechanism must still deal 
with the problems raised by entities that come in between a direct producer-consumer exchange.
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8.43 The Problem of Cross-Border Incursions
Even with a "designated supplier" system, there still remain incentives for the excessive exploitation 
of natural habitat This is because each supplier has no incentive to restrict flows derived from 
natural habitats other than its own. In essence, conditionality which is based upon the status of a 
states’s own diverse resource stocks provides no incentives to care for the resources of other states. 
Therefore, a system of conditionality with a "narrow" focus (on only the stocks of own-state 
resources) can encourage cross-border incursions as suppliers are willing to trade in any wildlife that 
does not visibly affect its own stocks.
The solution to this dilemma is for consumers to adopt flow conditionality as well. This would 
restrict the purchasing of quantities from a designated supplier to an amount that would correspond 
approximately to the quantities which could feasibly issue from the sustainable management of that 
supplier’s own diverse resource stocks.
The conditionality of certification must then be based on both the state of the diverse resource stocks 
and the maximum sustainable flows from those stocks. A consumer-enforced system of individual 
owner-state quotas is the result of the second requirement. Given individual quotas, the owner-state 
has absolutely no incentive to look elsewhere for supplies, as the correct management of its own 
diverse resource stocks will satisfy its quota (and correct management is a prerequisite to the retention 
of its certified status).
In addition, given that the same system is applied across all other certified owner-states, there is no 
longer any incentive for any of them to pursue others’ supplies. Each suppliers’ habitat is secured 
because the size of its market is secured; cross-boundary excursions cannot increase the size of that 
market and so there is no longer any incentive to undertake them.
Such a system could be effectively implemented through a number of different mechanisms. 
Individual quotas - based on the anticipated sustainable flow of products from the correct 
management of designated natural habitat - could be established by a technical committee. These 
quotas could then be enforced through the issuance of "coupons" or the construction of an 
"exchange". Coupons essentially take the place of the regulated commodity in the market. Once a 
given number are printed, then the consumer states enforce the regulatory system by refusing to admit 
the regulated good without a coupon. When the coupons are distributed to the designated suppliers,
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the task of controlling access to the species becomes one of controlling access to the coupons instead, 
which is usually a far less costly proposition. [Swanson (1989)].
Alternatively, the consumer states could instead construct an "exchange", which is a mechanism for 
assuring that goods on the market are "exchanged" only between consumers and designated suppliers. 
An exchange operates by allowing certified trade to occur only within its walls, while consumers 
enforce the exchange mechanism by refusing entrance to any goods other than those traded through 
the exchange. Again, the exchange would have to establish and enforce individual quotas for each 
designated supplier, disallowing sales within the exchange beyond the annual quota. [Swanson and 
Pearce (1989)].
8.4.4 The Problem of Manufacturer States
Both of the above options hinge upon the satisfaction of one of two conditions for their effective 
implementation: either 1) all existing and potential consumer states agree to enforce the quota (and 
this implies the necessary full cooperation of all states in the world as, for consumer state above, it 
should be assumed that this includes all consumers of the worked and the unworked natural product, 
and the latter has been demonstrably mobile in the past); or 2) all final consumers must agree to 
enforce the quota, and there is no allowed reexport of worked or unworked natural product (which 
implies the necessary full cooperation of only the primary consumers: the U.S., the EC, and Japan).
The first option above is a pipedream, and its pursuit has brought international trade regulation into 
ill-repute. It cannot work for two reasons.
First, any given state in the world can be a possible manufacturing state. That is, although the raw 
material and the final consumers are relatively fixed, the labor necessary to work raw materials is 
very fluid. Therefore, a regime based on regulating the manufacturers (rather than the final 
consumers) of natural habitat materials must necessarily have the active cooperation of all the states 
of the world. This is not possible. There are too many states, and there is also a positive return to 
be had from "breaking" the system. Controls based on this mode of operation will only redirect, not 
restrict, the trade. [Swanson (1991)].
Secondly, although the incentive to "free ride" exists (in favour of deviating from the system) 
irrespective of whether the state is a manufacturer or a consumer of the raw material, there is a little
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countervailing incentive in favour of conservation in the manufacturing state. In the consumer state, 
however, the raw material is valued for its final use, and there will be an interest in its long-term 
conservation. For the manufacturer, raw material is more of an object with which to mix labour prior 
to sale; usually, there is a good prospect for moving to another, different material if the first comes 
into short supply. The manufacturer is, in essence, selling its skills moreso than the raw materials (for 
which it is be paying the full value to the producer states).
Therefore, in most instances, only the latter option exists, restricting all reexporting of the natural
materials. Initially, this sounds more harsh than it is in actuality, as its only implication is that the 
manufacturing sector must move its facilities to the consumer markets and import the raw material 
there for working and final sale. Given the demonstrated fluidity of most of these manufacturing 
industries (in both wildlife trade and other industries), this should not ordinarily be a major problem 
if the manufacturer is truly interested in the commodity.
8.4.5 Layers of Selective Purchasing Programmes
In the event that a problem with the relocation of the manufacturing sector does arise, there is an 
alternative, but it is generally too costly and cumbersome to be effective. This alternative allows the 
manufacturing sector to remain within one state while exporting to another, but only on the condition 
of consumer state enforcement of the control system as against the manufacturing states. Again the 
system hinges on consumers’, rather than manufacturers’, support - but this time the consumers’ 
threat to withdraw custom applies to nonviable manufacturers, not to the producers of the raw 
materials. It requires the manufacturers to conform to the selective purchasing system (with regard 
to raw material purchasers) through a final consumer-based system of selective purchasing that is 
applied to the manufacturers.
This could operate through a "restricted marking" system, whereby each final product for sale in a 
consumer state is provided with a numbered mark corresponding to the license or permit under which 
it was imported into the manufacturing state. It would fall to the consumer states to maintain full 
records on their own imports of manufactured materials as well as the manufacturers’ imports of raw 
materials, and then to perform the complicated task of matching up manufactured quantities with 
licensed imports.
This is a much more complex and costly system, and so its costliness will often dictate a policy of 
prohibited reexport instead. However, it demonstrates that the conservationist interests of final 
consumers can always be brought into use in trade regulation, but sometimes in a multiple-layered 
regime.
8.5 Demand and Supply Side Management Combined
Therefore, just as there are a number of demand-side options for controlling the international trade 
in wildlife products, there are a number of supply-side options as well. For each "industry", 
constituted of range states/manufacturers/consumers, there will be a first-best system of controls 
which will combine some manner of demand-side controls with the best supply-side controls for that 
situation.
The combined system has as its objective the creation of rents in the wildlife resource and the 
channeling of those rents to the local managers through a system of conditionality. The key to the 
entire system is the enforceability of this conditionality in the context of natural habitat production. 
The system must create rents for the flows from diverse resource stocks, by focusing on the 
simultaneous support of prices and reduction of management costliness (but only for the certified 
producers).
The system commences with the commitment of fiinds by all of the consumer states to the system’s 
enforcement of the conditionality of purchasing. These funds are the means by which rents are 
created and allocated, and hence they generate the enhanced benefits from diverse resource 
management
The system is only as effective, in general, as is the weakest significant consumer’s enforcement 
efforts. For this reason, the restriction of the necessary consumers to the smallest number possible, 
and to the group whose objectives are most consistent with diverse resource conservation, is 
important Diverse resource conservation through wildlife utilisation is very likely an objective 
shared by producer states and end consumers. The regulatory problem often comes down to the 
elimination of intermediaries, whose interests are not similarly aligned.
One means by which the system can be made operable is through the elimination of intermediaries.
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A restriction on reexporting accomplishes this. This creates the possibility for a direct purchasing 
agreement between owner-state and final consumer.
Therefore, an optimal wildlife utilisation regulatory system should move toward consumer-enforced 
"commodity cartels", where the consumers states act to enforce the price supports adopted by the 
producers’ association on the condition that production occurs on a "sustainable" basis. This will 
increase the returns to particular consumptive goods of natural habitat (and implicitly compensate 
investments in the supply of related nonconsumptive goods as well) plus it will also decrease the 
costliness of natural habitat production.
8.5.1 An Example of a Rent Appropriation Mechanism - Wildlife Resource Exchanges
An example of this sort of mechanism would be a "resource exchange". Such an exchange would be 
the agreed supplier for all consumer states (group North), and the Northern states would then 
maintain the mechanism through continuous monitoring (expenditures) to prevent imports other than 
from the exchange. The exchange would purchase its supplies in an amount maximising aggregate 
rents. The aggregate quota would be allocated to participating states, and each would receive an 
enhanced unit rental value.
In consideration of the continued support by the Northern states for the exchange mechanism, the 
supplier states would allocate the exchange quota to sustainable producers of the resource, i.e. states 
investing in the management of their resource stocks and habitat. These producers would then 
receive an exchange-determined resource rent value (Kq), while other supplier states would receive 
an effective price near zero (depending upon the level of Northern funding invested in supporting the 
exchange mechanism). This would create incentives for other states to invest in diverse resources 
in order to join the exchange.
To the extent that an exchange requires start-up costs, such as physical site and equipment, these 
would represent the asset-specific sunk costs required to institutionalise the mechaism. Such 
institutionalisation creates the assurance that is necessary for international regulation.
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8.6 CITES as a Constructive Regulatory Mechanism for the Wildlife Trade
The only issue pursued in this section is the compatibility of CITES with the concepts developed in 
the previous section. That is, the questions addressed here are: Does CITES provide a constructive 
trade control regime, as defined above? That is, is CITES capable of generating rents in wildlife 
resources and directing these rents to wildlife conservation?
The CITES convention was signed in March, 1972 and came into force three years later. It provides 
the primary international control structure for the trade in wildlife products. It is apparent that CITES 
was drafted with little attention to the concept of constructive utilisation of the trade. It focussed 
instead on the identification of endangered species and the withdrawal of the demand for those. 
Recently, however, the Conference of the Parties has been taking steps toward a more constructive 
approach, with the attempted development of various sorts of quota systems. Although these are still 
in their formative stages, they represent important steps toward a rationalised international control 
structure.
8.6.1 The Control Structure within CITES
Of the large number of international environmental conventions, CITES has probably the single most 
detailed control structure. It was the first international wildlife treaty to provide for both express 
obligations and international monitoring. Therefore, CITES represents an important step along the 
road toward making substantive international law with concrete impacts. The purpose of this analysis 
is, however, to ascertain its consistency with an economic control structure - as outlined above - other 
authors may be referred to for a detailed analysis of the other workings of CITES. [Lyster (1986)].
CITES functions as a potential control mechanism primarily through the operation of two 
"Appendices", on which potentially endangered species are listed. Appendix I is intended as a list 
of those species which are currently threatened with extinction [Art. 11(1)], while Appendix II is to 
contain a list of species for which there is some indication that they might become threatened [Art. 
11(2)]. The Conference of the Parties to CITES makes these determinations at its biennial meetings.
Once a species is listed on either of the CITES Appendices, it becomes subject to the permit 
requirements of the convention. An Appendix I species may not be shipped in the absence of the
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issuance of an "export permit" by the exporting state. [Art. ni(2)]. And, this permit may not be 
issued, under the terms of the convention, unless both the exporting state certifies that the export will 
not be detrimental to the species and the importing state certifies (by the issuance of an import permit) 
that the import will not be used for commercial purposes. [Art ni(3)(c)]. Therefore, an appendix 
I listing acts as an effective "ban" on the trade in those species and, even if exporters wish to continue 
the trade, the importing states have the duty to deny all commerical imports.
An Appendix II listing, on the other hand, leaves the decision on trade control wholly to the 
discretion of the exporting state. That is, there is no role for the importing state, other than to ensure 
that an export permit is issued for each specimen. [Art. IV(4)]. And, these permits are allowed to 
issue so long as the exporting state itself certifies that the export will not be detrimental to the 
survival of the species within the exporting state. [Art. IV(2)].
The other important responsibility of member states is to provide annual reports to the CITES 
Secretariat on the amounts of trade in listed species. [Art. VIII(7)]. The Secretariat also sometimes 
acts as the intermediary between exporting and importing states, in order to confirm the authenticity 
of trade documents for example.
8.6.2 The Convention as a Trade Regulation Mechanism
As drafted, the CITES convention provides little in the way of a "constructive trade control 
mechanism". The history of the CITES convention has witnessed many species progress from 
Appendix n  to Appendix I, as potentially unsustainable trade levels raise concerns about the viability 
of the species. Most recently, this has occurred in the well publicized case of the African elephant, 
for which a 12 year listing on Appendix II ended in 1989 with its "uplisting" by the Conference of 
the Parties.
Such a progression from "potentially threatened" to "endangered" is predictable, given the structure 
of the CITES convention. This is because an Appendix II listing gives little in the way of a wildlife 
trade control framework; that is, it does nothing to manage either the supply or the demand pressures 
in the manners set forth above.
In regard to supply management, it leaves each range state operating independently, with no
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international assistance to perform the additional tasks that are required of the parties. Therefore, an 
Appendix II listing provides only additional tasks, and no real incentive framework, for the control 
of the traded supplies of listed species.
With regard to demand management, the impact of CITES could range quite widely. It is possible 
that an Appendix n  listing might result in individual consumers withdrawing their demand for the 
listed species; however, this is in general the current function of an Appendix I listing. What an 
Appendix II listing certainly does accomplish is to publicise the potential rarity of the listed species. 
For some species this might result in an increase in the speculative demand pressures. Therefore, the 
demand-side impact of an Appendix n  listing is uncertain, and it could range quite widely.
Where Appendix n  listing does encourage speculative demand, the combination of additional demand 
pressures with negligible control structures is a threatening one for Appendix n  listed species. Since 
most wildlife species exist in unmanaged circumstances, it is usually difficult to handle the existing, 
let alone any increased, pressures. Thus, the progression of species from listing on Appendix II to 
"endangered" status is not unforeseeable; for some species, it is entirely predictable.
An Appendix I listing promises much more in the way of international cooperation; however, the 
efforts are put to no constructive effect Tliat is, once the regulated species completes the progression 
from virtually uncontrolled Appendix n  species to endangered Appendix I species, the international 
community then launches into concerted action to "ban the trade".
Of course, this will address the problem of possible immediate extinction from overexploitation 
which might arise during an Appenidix n  listing; however, it does nothing to provide resources for 
the management of the species in order to avoid extinction in the medium term. For the vast majority 
of endangered species, the withdrawal of value necessarily hastens the process of its elimination. 
They are under threat from both overexploitation and habitat conversion. To address either of these 
forces, in anything other than short term circumstances, requires management and finances.
In the worst cases, the situation has gone from bad to worse; with the uplisting to Appendix I, the 
traded species is protected from short-term extinction from overexploitation, while simultaneously 
hastening the medium-term extinction of its habitat. Now what is lost is not only the single species 
generating consumptive value, but also many of the related species and systems whose shared habitat 
could be subsidised by this value.
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Therefore, CITES as drafted provides for a peculiar sort of international regime of trade controls. For 
traded wildlife species it initially provides virtually nothing in the way of an international control 
structure, together with a global notice of "potential rarity value" (with the posting of an Appendix 
II listing), while following that with the withdrawal of developed world purchases of the wildlife 
product (via an Appendix I ban) if the population then comes under even greater pressures. The 
former, at best, provides no positive incentive framework; the latter provides no possible constructive 
use of wildlife value.
As drafted (i.e. considering only the Appendix I/Appendix n  options), CITES provides for little in 
the way of a "constructive trade control mechanism". In essence, this means that it does not 
constructively address the two forces threatening most extinctions, and thus it does not adequately 
provide for their control. The direction for the reform of CITES - as a constructive trade control 
mechanism - will be to create a regime which simultaneously addresses both causes of extinction.
8.63 The Convention - Recent Attempts at Innovation
As early as 1979, the delegates from developing countries brought the anomoly of "indirect extinction 
in lieu of direct overexploitation" to the attention of the Conference of the Parties. In San Jose, Costa 
Rica, they argued that there must be an economic benefit from the controlled species if they were to 
be able to justify protecting their habitats from development. These concerns gave rise to the first 
step towards the reform of CITES, with the adoption of Conference Resolution 3.15 at the New Delhi 
Conference of the Parties in 1981. This resolution provides for the downlisting of certain Appendix 
I populations for the purposes of sustainable resource management. The criteria which specify how 
Appendix I species may be utilised in order to procure compensation for their habitat are known as 
the "ranching criteria", and each Conference of the Parties usually sees a large number of such 
proposals for review and possible acceptance. The first ranching proposal accepted involved the 
transfer of the Zimbabwean population of Nile crocodile to Appendix II in 1983. [Wijnstekers,W. 
(1988)].
Ranching proposals tend to be focussed on a particular state, or operation, and do not constitute 
mechanisms for the constructive control of the entire trade. In essence, they continue the "ban" in 
effect while allowing very limited, individual operations to recommence. While being of some 
utility, they do not constitute attempts at harnessing the value of an entire species for its own
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conservation.
In 1983, a species-based approach was first adopted with regard to the exploitation of the African 
leopard. Although listed on Appendix I, it was recognised in Conference Resolution 4.13 that 
specimens of the leopard could be killed "to enhance the survival of the species". With this, the 
Conference of the Parties approved an annual quota o f460 specimens, and allocated these between 
the range states. In 1985 this quota was then increased to 1,140 animals, and in 1987 to 1,830.
This approach to trade management was then generalised in 1985 with Resolution 5.21, which 
provided for the systematic downlisting of populations where the countries of origin agree a quota 
system which is sufficiently safe so as to not endanger the species. Under this Resolution, five 
different species have been subject to quota sytems: three African crocodiles, one Asian crocodile, 
and the Asian Boneytongue for which the Indonesians were allowed a quota of 1250 specimens (the 
latter being a fish much admired by the Japanese as a wall hanging).
None of these ranching systems went any further than the development of a species-based quotas. 
In particular, no external control structure was ever implemented, this being left to the discretion of 
producer states. Thus, predictably, these quotas can be abused. For example, Indonesia is believed 
to have issued permits for about 140% ofits first year’s quota of Bonytongues. [TRAFFIC (1991)].
The third avenue of innovation under CITES, and the most concentrated effort thus far at the 
development of an international control structure within the system, was the creation of a 
Management Quota System for the African elephant populations under Resolution 5.12. This system 
was founded upon the ideas of management-based controls with consumer-based enforcement. 
Annual quotas were to be constructed at the outset of each year, and producer states were then to 
issue permits not exceeding these quotas. Then consumer states were to disallow all imports unless 
accompanied by a Management Quota System permit.
At first glance, this may sound very similar to the constructive trade control regime outlined above, 
but there were several fatal differences (although the conceptual basis was indeed similar). These 
differences indicate the crucial importance of the detail in an effective control system. First, the 
Management Quota System provided no external checks on the discretion of the producer states. The 
determination of annual quotas and the issuance of MQS permits was within their unsupervised
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discretion. This resulted in most states basing their annual "management quotas" of ivory on the 
"expected" confiscations from poachers. That is there were no enforced incentives for sustainable 
use, and also no disincentives for cross-border exploitation. Burundi, with one elephant, became the 
largest exporter of ivory in Africa under this control regime.
Secondly, the system relied on the good faith of all consumers, including the trading states for its 
enforcement; predictably, the good faith of these persons was insufficient to manage demand 
pressures. Consumer states attempting to enforce management systems were unable to distinguish 
between properly issued and improperly issued permits. Many of the permits were patently 
fraudulent, but they could legitimised by the issuance of a reexport permit by any country that would 
accept them. On account of this, several states, such as the United Arab Emirates, became substantial 
exporters of ivory. And, whenever one of the trading states was pressured into compliance, another 
"hole" in the system was quick to develop.
The Management Quota System failed as a consequence of these clear inadequacies, resulting in a 
collapse of public confidence in the capacity for trade controls to work. [Barbier, E. et. al. (1990)]. 
These control system failures are not costless. It is essential that an effective control system is 
developed and implemented before all consumer confidence is permanently lost in the potentially 
constructive capacity of wildlife trade.
Another incentive system has been evolving in connection with, but not directly within CITES. This 
has occurred under the European Community Regulation 3626/82, which effectively requires (under 
Article 5) an import permit for all Appendix n  species. More importantly, for certain specified 
species (listed on Appendix C2 to the Regulation) there is an affirmative obligation on the exporting 
party to demonstrate that the export will not have a harmful effect on the population of the species 
in the country of origin.
This Regulation has acted to move the enforcement of sustainability from the producer to the 
consumer states (in regard to the EC), which is precisely what is required. This then allows for the 
imposition of the sort of "conditionality" regime that was outlined in the first part of the paper. The 
European Community does in fact negotiate, on a country by country basis, the terms upon which it 
will remove that country’s populations from Appendix C2. From this conditionality arises the 
possibility of state-by-state quotas created by the import permit obligation, and enforced by the EC.
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As with the Management Quota System, this regulatory system provides for many of the necessary 
parts of a successful trade regulation mechanism. Its drawbacks lie almost wholly in its piecemeal 
approach. That is, optimal quotas require that the entire potential production of the species be 
considered. And, successful incentives for sustainability require that all of the major consumers 
enforce conditionality; otherwise, supplemental conditions and enforcement by one consumer will 
often shift trade to others. In essence, however, the argument of this paper is for the generalisation 
and extension of the EC regime across the consumer states (the U.S., Japan and the EC).
The fundamental importance of all of these developments (ranching, quota and conditionality 
regimes) is that they represent a search for the "middle ground" between Appendix I and Appendix 
II regimes. Although that search is only just beginning, its existence is demonstrative of the parties’ 
awareness of the needs that the CITES system does not currently satisfy. CITES must continue to 
evolve to provide for an effective trade utilisation regime, rather than continue to act as the recorder 
of the process of species’ evolution from Appendix II to Appendix I status. In order to do so 
effectively, there must be a clear target provided, otherwise the fiasco of the Management Quota 
System will only be repeated again and again. The control of wildlife trade is a potentially important 
instrument for the conservation of species, but CITES must develop a very different control 
mechanism if it is to contribute to the harnessing of these values. The concept of quotas that has 
developed within CITES combined with the concept of conditionality that has been developed by the 
European Community is the preferred target
8.7 Summary • Current and Potential Wildlife Trade Mechanisms
8.7.1 The Current Control System
This chapter demonstrates two important points. First, there is a very definite and concrete economic 
meaning to be given to the concept of a constructive wildlife trade control mechanism. Second, the 
current CITES system does not, at present, conform to this meaning.
The clear and concrete meaning to be given to this concept is:
Optimal demand side policies - These consist of price support policies which maximise the per 
individual value of a species, thereby enhancing the prospects of the species in the competition for 
scarce resources, and hence in the competition for survival.
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Optimal supply side policies - These consist of trade control policies which which structure trade to 
make it conditional on demonstrated sustainable utilisation of the producer state’s natural habitat and 
the wildlife which it sustains.
CITES is not at present structured in the form of a constructive trade control mechanism. In general, 
an Appendix n  listing does little or nothing to supply incentives to actually constrict the trade. In 
general an Appendix I listing acts to withdraw demand from all suppliers of a species, the sustainable 
as well as the nonsustainable.
There is a fundamental need to understand the nature of the forces involved in a market, before there 
is any prospect for the development of constructive controls. CITES, despite the best of declared 
intentions, has failed structurally to provide these. Without constructive trade controls, there is an 
enhanced risk of species decline on account of both direct causes (overexploitation) and indirect (loss 
of habitat).
All of the proximate forces for extinction are closely linked to the quantities of efforts and resources 
put into the management and conservation of the species and its habitat. Overexploitation pressures 
must be met with well-financed management operations. Development pressures must be met with 
land acquisition operations. The presence of both of these forces throughout the developing world 
requires the development of a trade control mechanism which constructively addresses both forces, 
one alone is insufficient.
The failure of existing controls, domestic and international, to create and to constructively channel 
rents from wildlife resources to their management and to habitat conservation is at the heart of both 
forms of extinction threats, direct and indirect. It is for this reason that CITES must evolve to address 
these needs.
8.7.2 The Direction for Change
CITES must evolve in the direction of a constructive trade control mechanism in order to address the 
joint threats of overexploitation and habitat losses as causes of species extinctions.
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In general, this will imply the need for the development of a regime of conditionality, where 
developed consumer states withhold purchases from developing supplier states unless:
Stock conditionality - the supplier makes and enforces a commitment to conserve specified habitat 
for the species concerned; and
Flow conditionality - the supplier’s total annual product conform to an externally determined quota 
which is linked to the total sustainable offtake achievable from the designated habitat.
For many diverse resources, this form of regime would imply the creation of quotas in the range 
states - only to the extent that "Wildlife Management Areas" were designated as available for the 
species and then only in quantities which might flow from that habitat If any of these states were 
not to designate areas as protected habitat, then they would not achieve "certified supplier" status. 
When that status was conferred, it would only be for a quota that the designated area could 
sustainably generate. If activities incompatible with either "designated habitat" status or the allotted 
quota occurred, then the certified supplier status would be withdrawn for a small number of years. 
This system would provide incentives for noncertified range states to work toward sustainability, and 
for certified states to maintain i t
Then, it is the responsibility of the developed consumer states to enforce these quotas for the 
producers, creating and returning the rents from the resource to the managers of the resource. This 
would be done by the development of a rent maximising joint quota, which is then divided between 
the certified producers in proportion to their "sustainable quotas". As with most wildlife resources, 
almost the entirety flow to the developed countries: the U.S., the E.C. and Japan. These states would 
have the responsibility of investing substantial amounts of resources to the monitoring of imports, 
in order to assure that only certificated diverse resources enter their borders.
Since it is very difficult to monitor for many diverse resources once they have been rendered into 
"finished products", there are good reasons to simply disallow the reexport of manufactured goods 
made from these diverse resources. So long as manufactured goods are allowed to be exported, there 
is the possibility of disjunction between the manufacturer and the final consumer, and the former 
generally has less interest in the long-term survival of the resource.
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The disallowance of reexporting may seem harsh, but it only implies that the manufacturer must 
move facilities towards the final markets. In this era of fairly fluid capital markets, it is not very 
unusual for manufacturers to do this.
Alternatively, there is also the option of direct "green labelling" of products which are produced 
under a CITES certificate. Final consumer states would then match up labels with the quotas 
purchased by that manufacturer. This would require a good centralised data handling centre, and very 
substantial commitments by consumer states to monitoring (of both retailers and ports). It is a hugely 
expensive alternative that cannot operate effectively absent substantial commitments of funding, but 
it is the only option unless reexporting is disallowed.
However, this alternative might also be preferred for another reason. The use of "green labelling" 
at the individual consumer level would provide the consuming public with the important message that 
there are two kinds of wildlife products -those which are sustainably produced and those which are 
not. The former are pro-conservation and the former are anti-conservation. At present, most 
consumers do not understand that such a separation is necessary; this has resulted in the withdrawal 
of substantial value from wild species, thus further threatening their existence.
The essence of a constructive trade control mechanism is to provide the means of making this 
distinction - between sustainable and unsustainable utilisation. The development of an option which 
recruited broad-based consumer support for such a mechanism would be a positive step. For this 
reason, the expensive step of multiple levels of screening might be pursued with regard to some 
wildlife resources.
8.8 Comparing Regulatory Mechanisms
Chapters seven and eight have surveyed two very different regulatory mechanisms for conserving 
biodiversity. In essence, the two mechanisms surveyed thus far are based on two simple differences.
direct vs. indirect inducement - one mechanism focuses on direct transfers to induce the 
desired changes in the state’s investment portfolio, the other focuses on investments in 
mechanisms which alter the decision making framework of the state and thus indirectly 
impact upon its selection of portfolio assets.
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internal vs. external regulation - one mechanism focuses on enhancing the benefits from 
diverse resources through direct subsidies to the state for internal management of diverse 
resource stocks, the other focuses on enhancing those benefits by investments in mechanisms 
which regulate the external markets for the products flowing from diverse resource stocks.
The choice between these two forms of intervention depends on the relative cost effectiveness of the 
two. In general, this is a question of which form of monitoring (internal or external) is more cost 
effective. This will depend in turn upon the number of potential producer states that must be 
coordinated, and the costliness of monitoring imports rather than production. It is often so that a 
prima facie case can be made for the cost effectiveness of external regulation because those 
monitoring institutions already exist in the primary consumer states (customs offices), and the number 
of natural producer states of diverse biological materials is often very small (due to restricted ranges 
of many species). (Swanson, 1989).
In general, the instrument of direct inducement can never enhance state benefits from diverse 
resources by more than the marginal rate of return on capital (r). This is because a lump sum 
investment only assures a flow at that rate, and so this is the maximum perceived enhanced benefits 
that may be generated from that global investment, and hence the maximum rate of state investment 
that can be induced.The reason to consider the other instruments of inducement is the possibility of 
generating better rates of return through more resource-specific mechanisms.
There is one other possible reason to prefer a rent appropriation mechanism to direct inducement 
transfers: the importance of institutionalisation. A rent appropriation mechanism constructed around 
particular natural resources (such as an Ivory Exchange or a Medicinal Plant Clearinghouse) would 
require asset-specific investments by the Northern states, thereby creating some degree of assurance. 
It is difficult to create the same level of confidence in commitments to future flows of direct money 
transfers, because of the problem of time inconsistency and the fluid nature of the assets involved. 
If a direct transfer mechanism is to have any effect upon Southern state asset portfolios, then it must 
be carefully constructed to remove all elements of future discretion from the Northern states with 
regard to the assets committed (by use of an independent trust fund, for example).
Finally, neither of these mechanisms address both halves of the problem of extinction. That is, the 
discussion to date has focused upon the inducement of Southern state asset selections; it has not 
touched upon the question of inducing optimal Northern state transfers. Neither of the mechanisms
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discussed above is able to resolve the problem of free riding in the North. Rent appropriation 
mechanisms may be able to contribute to the solution of this problem, if consumers come to view 
purchases from the exchange mechanism as indirect investments in diverse resource stocks. That is, 
as with "free range" products, consumers may be informed that consumption of a wildlife product 
will also pay for the natural habitat that the wildlife require, allowing consumers to express their 
willingness to pay for the latter by purchasing the former.
At present, however, this is the opposite of the information that consumers receive, and so it would 
be difficult to alter the signals so drastically without substantial confusion in the market place. In the 
medium term it might be possible for rent appropriation to harness some of the stock-related flows 
to the Northern states, but it is important to address other instruments devised expressly for this 
purpose.
8.9 Conclusion
The solution to the global biodiversity problem is easily stated in theory. It requires only a system 
for the transfer of enhanced benefits from the global community to those owner-states investing in 
the supply of diverse resource stocks.
Chapter seven demonstrated the complexity introduced into such a system when the dynamics of the 
exchange were considered. In this context, consistency and assurance became important 
characteristics of the institution-building process.
This chapter demonstrated the complexity involved in the implementation of a system devised to 
perform these functions. It focussed upon a system which confers benefits through the creation of 
rents for the tangible goods flowing from diverse resource stocks, but the problems are general in 
nature. Any attempt to enhance benefits for investing states will fall prey to attempts by others to 
receive those benefits without incurring the costliness of the investments. Thus, a system for 
enhancing the benefits of investing states must be constructed in such a fashion as to effectively 
discriminate between investors and non-investors, and to target benefits only to the former. The 
catalogue of difficulties that this implies in the context of the wildlife trade indicates the difficulty 
of the task.
245
This is an important lesson to learn, precisely because the abstract simplicity of a problem of this 
nature is misleading. It is important to note that the true complexities involved in resolving many 
environmental problems are institutional in nature, and that it is the difficulty and costliness of their 
resolution that usually prevents or defers the solution to the environmental problem. The lesson to 
learn is that institutions must be created to evolve and change, with the increasing level of 
understanding and appreciation of the underlying problems to be resolved.
The twenty years of experience with CITES is a case in point Even though the convention was 
initially based upon a clear misunderstanding of the nature of the fundamental causes of species 
endangerment and extinction, it has slowly been evolving toward the creation of various forms of 
constructive trade regimes (especially quotas and trade certificate systems). It is important that this 
trend continues.
In short, the solution to the environmental problem of biological diversity losses is quite 
straightforward: it is the absence of a system of compensation for the nonappropriable services of 
diverse resources. However, underlying that problem and its solution is an institutional problem: the 
transfer of values for nonappropriable flows across boundaries in a multi-national world.
It is this international public good problem that must be resolved. It is the decentralised (multi­
national) regulation of land-use conversions that generates excessive diversity losses, because the 
"stock effects" are externalised. It is this same decentralisation that renders any solution costly to 
implement. Transfers between the investing owner-states and the beneficiary consumer-states are 
difficult to arrange and enforce (as indicated in chapter seven), but the existence of other "third party 
states" attempting to intervene in these agreements and intercept these transfers complicate the 
transaction still further (as indicated in this chapter).
Therefore, the solution to this (as with any other) global environmental problem is the evolution of 
a truly international institution in a multi-national world. It is the creation and implementation of this 
institution that is the most fundamental problem to be resolved.
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CHAPTER NINE
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF INFORMATION: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION
9.1 Introduction
The issue addressed in this chapter is whether there is a direct, market-driven response available for 
addressing the core problem of nonappropriable flows from diverse resources. That is, is there an 
instrument capable of rendering nonappropriable values appropriable? If there is, it would be of the 
nature of the regime known as intellectual property rights (IPR), and so the question becomes one 
of determining the applicability of this regime to object of biodiversity conservation.
These two topics are necessarily related by reason of their roles in information-generation: 
biodiversity is a producer of information, and intellectual property rights regimes are the systems used 
to reward the producers of information. Biodiversity is a producer of valuable information because 
it is the product of the evolutionary process. Four and a half billion years of evolution and co­
evolution have produced a very particular pattern of biological life forms, and it is this pattern that 
encapsulates the history of that process. Any country that preserves in unaltered form the natural 
products of evolution is maintaining this history for the information that it is capable of producing. 
An intellectual property rights regime is the system of awards made to the producers of information 
in western societies, rectifying the otherwise "public good" nature of information. (Arrow, 1962). 
Therefore, it is only logical to consider the potential applicability of this system to the conservation 
of evolutionary product, i.e. biodiversity. Sections 9.2 through 9.4 considers the nature of an 
intellectual property rights regime, and sections 9.5 and 9.6 its applicability to conservation.
There are two subsidiary questions that are addressed within this chapter. The first concerns the 
possibility of introducing an inducement of host state investments into diverse resources that is based 
upon traditional concepts of property rights. That is, is it possible to create an institution that renders 
a greater proportion of the flow of services from biodiversity appropriable by the host state? A
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property right is of this nature; it renders a directed flow of benefits to the owner of the asset. (Hart 
and Moore, 1990).
Irrespective of whether a property rights regime is feasible, the second important issue analysed here 
concerns the capacity to use the market to register consumers’ preferences for the conservation of the 
currently nonappropriable components of the value of biodiversity. This is an important objective 
because it addresses the "other side" of the diversity conservation problem, i.e. the problem of 
inducing optimal transfers from consumers to suppliers. The use of a market-based mechanism might 
supply some information regarding the appropriate scale of such transfers.
Therefore, the questions addressed in this chapter are three-fold. First, the chapter investigates the 
nature of an intellectual property rights regime, and discusses its potential applicability to biodiversity 
investments. Secondly, it assesses whether a property rights regime is available to internalise the 
flow of services within supplier state decision making. Thirdly, the chapter investigates whether a 
market-based regime is available to register consumer preferences for some of the (informational) 
services of diversity. These last two issues may appear to be identical, but this is not the case; the 
argument of this chapter is that there are market-based approaches to internalisation other than "pure" 
property rights. Interestingly, the analysis here indicates that the answer to questions one and three 
is affirmative, while the answer to question two is negative.
This result derives from the concept of a nonrival, but excludable, good. (Romer, 1990). A nonrival 
good is of the nature of a design or process, i.e. pure information. It is something for which its supply 
is undiminished in use, and thus its marginal costliness of consumption is zero. On the other hand, 
such a good may be made excludable, by virtue of government intervention, and it must be made 
excludable if there are to be incentives for investment in its production. A good example of a 
nonrival but excludable good is computer software; the marginal costliness of use is zero, but 
govemmei^ have put strenuous efforts into creating regimes for enforcing individual rights to the 
marketing of these products.
The form that excludability takes in regard to nonrival goods is unique. Since nonrival goods are 
without form or substance (as with information), it is not possible to demarcate boundaries around 
them. The dimension within which they exist ("information space") is not amenable to demarcation. 
It is instead necessary to substitute surrogate dimensions in which it is possible to mark boundaries, 
and use these to reward investments in information. In the case of software, for example, the rights
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would be given in the tangible manifestations of the underlying ideas, e.g. the written instructions, 
the design embossed on the computer chip or even the resultant display on the computer screen. All 
of these are surrogate, tangible dimensions being substituted for the intangible, underlying idea.
Some of the services of biological diversity are also nonrival goods, especially the information 
inherent within the natural diversity that is the product of the evolutionary process. However, in the 
case of natural capital-generated information (as contrasted with the human capital-generated 
varieties such as software), there has been no governmental intervention to effect excludability. 
These services of biodiversity remain nonexcludable goods, and thus they suffer from predictable 
levels of underinvestment as a consequence.
This chapter demonstrates the manner in which nonrival goods (such as computer software) may be 
rendered excludable; this analysis constitutes a theory of the institutions known as intellectual 
property rights. Secondly, the chapter demonstrates that the logic that supports government 
intervention for excludability applies equally to the analysis of natural capital-generated information 
as it does to human capital. There is no distinction, in logic, between the case to be made for the 
creation of intellectual property right regimes for biodiversity conservation or for any other 
informational investment
9.2 Flow Appropriation Mechanisms - "Intellectual Property Regimes"
The problem of appropriating international flows of wholly intangible services has been recognised 
and addressed for over one hundred years. The very first truly international convention, the Paris 
Patent Union, was on precisely this subject; it attempted to create in 1868 an international mechanism 
for repatriating compensation to those who invested to generate information. Since that time a very 
substantial body of national and international law has developed around the idea of generating such 
flows, and these laws are known collectively as "intellectual property rights" (IPR).
As will be demonstrated in this chapter, however, there is little in common between IPR and 
traditional property rights. The latter deal mainly with tangible commodities capable of exclusive 
possession and clear delineation. IPR deal almost exclusively with informational services, which are 
intangible and amorphous; they are not readily susceptible to either possession or delineation.
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An IPR regime deals with this difference through the mechanism of "surrogate rights", i.e. monopoly 
rights delineated in a dimension that is tangible in lieu of rights in a dimension that is not The one 
acts as a surrogate for the other, in order to encourage investments in the intangible resource.
This chapter first describes the theory and application of surrogate rights (in the remainder of section
9.2 - 9.4 ) and then demonstrates the application of this theory in the conservation of biological 
diversity (in sections 9.5 and 9.6). Again, IPR regimes are important mechanisms to consider because 
they might potentially address the core of the problem of extinction, i.e. inappropriate service flows 
from diverse resource stocks, and/or they might provide a market-based mechanism for registering 
consumer preferences for biodiversity’s services.
9.2.1 Failures in Property Right Regimes - Unchannelled Benefits
A generalised statement of the purpose of decentralised management regimes is the encouragement 
of investments at the most efficient level of society, i.e. by those individuals who have the 
information and capability to invest most effectively in a particular asset. (Hart and Moore, 1991). 
A very general statement of the nature of a decentralised management regime is a mechanism that 
targets individuals making socially beneficial investments with awards approximately equal to the 
benefits generated.
This is the nature of a property rights regime, i.e. it is a mechanism for channeling benefits in a 
concentrated form through the hands of investors. It accomplishes this through the monopoly right 
known as a property right, whichis a carefully delineated monopoly in the flow of goods and services 
from some specific asset With the institutionalisation of the monopoly (and thus the assurance of 
the expectation that the state will invest to channel the asset’s flow of benefits initially through the 
"owner"), the individual is given the identical incentive framework as society’s, i.e. the "owner" will 
invest in the asset until the marginal benefit equates with the marginal cost (which will produce a 
globally efficient result so long as there are sufficient numbers of competing producers in the same 
product markets).
For these reasons, property right regimes are very useful mechanisms for inducing efficient levels of 
investments in various assets. However, some forms of assets are not amenable to the application of 
property right institutions because their benefits are not readily channeled. In general, property right
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institutions operate well if the flow of goods and services is densely concentrated in at least one 
"dimension" at one point in that flow. Then it is possible to delineate and segregate the investor’s 
flow from others’, and hence to channel that flow. For example, most of the benefits from standard 
agricultural production (i.e. the produced commodities) are appropriable by the demarcation of 
exclusive rights in the land; the individual associated with a particular parcel of land (the "owner") 
has the exclusive right then to the entire flow of benefits (produce) from that parcel. In this instance, 
there is a close correspondence between the total benefits generated and the benefits individually 
appropriated at one point in the process (i.e. at the point where the commodities are being produced 
on the land).
Many assets are not of this nature. Some have the characteristic that their benefits are instanteously 
diffusive, so that investments in the asset generates benefits throughout a wide area. Others are of 
the character that their benefits diffuse rapidly and it is costly to segregate between beneficiaries and 
nonbeneficiaries of the flow. This is the general nature of assets that are not easily subjected to 
property rights institutions: the flow that they generate is too disorganised to be readily channeled. 
It is not easy to discern the point at which the award of a monopoly right will capture a significant 
part of the flow of benefits.
Consider again the first example of a globally-recognised public good, i.e. the information developed 
for industrial applications that was the subject of the Paris Patent Union. Investments in such 
information are not readily generated in the context of a property rights regime, and so industry 
lobbied for novel forms of institutions (although confusing the issue by use of the same name).
Information is a global public good for two reasons. First, information as a product has an innate 
capacity for diffusion, as remarked upon in Arrow’s Fundamental Paradox of Information. The 
paradox states that information is not marketable until revealed (because its value is unknowable prior 
to revelation), while the consumer’s willingness to pay can be concealed after revelation of the 
information (because the transfer has already occurred). In addition, information is often revealed 
on the mere inspection of a tangible product within which it is embedded. Therefore, the mere act 
of marketing of a product created from useful information often releases that information to the 
world, rendering it far less valuable.
Secondly, it is extremely difficult to segregate between information flows. This is because all 
information is built upon a common base (the common understanding that makes up all knowledge
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and language) and there are a multitude of potential pathways leading to the same conclusion. 
Therefore, an attempt to segregate between the path leading to one piece of information and the 
entirety of the remaining body of knowledge is an unlikely task, because it implies an attempt to 
untangle all ideas back to the common starting point
For example, consider the innovation of heat resistant, resilient plastics sometime during the past fifty 
years. Most people site this innovation with the U.S. space programme, where these substances were 
introduced in order to serve various purposes on the exteriors of space craft. However, on the use and 
observance of this information (i.e. the idea of durable uses for synthetic polymers), this idea diffused 
throughout the world economy. Soon, durable plastics appeared in the entire range of products, from 
automobiles to pots and pans. Even assuming that all of the consumer benefits from the use of these 
new products derived from the innovation at NASA, it would be very difficult to delineate clearly 
between the various uses (of a wide range of different polymers) or to trace their diffusion from the 
single point
The nearly instantaneous diffusion of this idea throughout the economy demonstrates the difficulty 
of using property right regimes to induce investments in a global public good, such as information. 
The benefits are never concentrated enough at one point in time to be channeled through the hands 
of an individual investor, because they diffuse so quickly and completely. For these reasons, other 
mechanisms than property right regimes must be used to encourage investments in assets that 
generate these types of flows.
9.2.2 The Role of Surrogate Right Regimes (and "IPR" Regimes)
An alternative to a property right regime is a surrogate right regime. Such a regime operates by 
channeling benefits to an investor from a monopoly right in a tangible good, as a reward for effective 
investments in an asset generating a nontangible flow. In short, the surrogate right regime sidesteps 
the problem of nonappropriability by substituting a surrogate monopoly right (in a dimension that is 
suitably appropriable) for the impracticable property right in information. This is the nature of an 
IPR regime: it substitutes an appropriable flow for an inappropriable one in rewarding information- 
generating investments.
In order to understand how an IPR regime operates, consider again the example of the innovation of 
durable polymers. An IPR regime does not attempt to protect the investment of the agent who
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generated this fundamental idea; this would be impracticable for the reasons mentioned above. 
Instead, the IPR regime allows the agent to stake a claim in a carefully specified area of "product 
space" where the idea is to be introduced. That is, the laws of patent do not offer rights in the idea 
itself ("durable synthetic polymers") nor to the entire range of products to which this abstract idea is 
subsequently applied ("all uses of resilient plastics from pots and pans to automobiles"). Instead, the 
applicant for a patent right must select a reasonable range of specific products that will make good 
use of the idea, and claim monopoly rights in the marketing of these. The inventor patenting the use 
of resilient synthetic polymers in pots and pans would not necessarily have any claim to a monopoly 
over their use in any other consumer goods, such as automobiles.
These benefit systems are not of the nature of property right systems, but instead constitute a type of 
hybrid system for making awards to investors in information generation ("inventors"). The general 
problem that the state must solve is how to create a cost-effective "prize system" that will target 
efficient inventors accurately (in terms of identity and size of award) when the basic product is of 
such a nature that a pure property rights system is impracticable. It is not at all clear a priori that a 
surrogate rights regime is the most efficient institution for addressing this problem, but it is an 
interesting and internationally important example of a method for flow appropriation. However, there 
are several trade-offs involved in this particular solution to the problem, which will be explored in 
section 9.4, but initially the nature of a surrogate right regime will be detailed.
9.3 The Incentives for Information Production - A Model
Consider a Lancaster-type indirect utility space, where the ultimate objective of consumers is to 
maximise some measure of indirect utility (V) through the acquisition of various bundles of concrete 
products and product characteristics in product space. These products are instruments for the 
acquisition of utility (U), which is the set of individual goals and objects for that consumer. For 
example, the underlying goals might be "transport between A and B" and "demonstration of standing 
in community", while the product that might be first-preference as the instrument for attaining these 
goals might be "new German sports car". That is, each consumer has individual preferences 
distributed across product space, distributed in accordance with the capacity for a given set of 
products (S) to perform as an instrument to accomplish an individual’s goals. The individual then 
maximises indirect utility (V) through acquisition of the optimal bundle of products (V(S)).
Consider also another distinct dimension termed information space. Sets of information do not have
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a representation in product space, nor do they generate any utility (direct or indirect) by themselves. 
Rather, information is a third concept completely distinct from products or utility. In fact, 
information may be conceptualised as a "bridge" between U and V, in that information defines the 
relationship between concrete goods and abstract goals. That is, with a given set of information (I), 
an agent is better able to understand how to obtain utility with the use of some or all of the available 
instruments (i.e. products and product characteristics). In essence, information acts as a shift 
parameter, making all levels of utility (derived from product consumption) relatively less costly to 
attain.
The Nature of Information:
(9.1)
U = V(S;I) where VSI > 0, but Vt = 0.
equivalently C0 = C(VQ,p^ I) where CpP CSI < 0
where:C0 = the cost of attaining V0 given a specific price vectorps 
U s  utility {afunction of individual goals andpurposes)
V = indirect utility (afunction ofproductcharacteristics and information)
I = information set for individual 
S s  products andproductcharacteristics
In this formulation, information is clearly a very valuable commodity. In its complete absence, there 
would be little understanding of how a given set of products or product characteristics could assist 
in meeting an individual’s goals. It is knowledge, combined with tools (products), that makes the 
attainment of goals possible.
Consider now the incentives for the generation of information of this nature. A producer might, for 
example, combine information with various producer goods in order to satisfy consumers’ 
fundamental preferences (for transport, nutrition etc.) at less cost. This information is often 
embedded in the producer’s "new" product, e.g. by its use of resilient synthetic polymers in the 
production of pots and pans. In fact, "novelty" may be conceived of as the presence of information 
in combination with a set of concrete product characteristics.
A producer may decide to invest in information generation, but if it does so much of that information
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will be revealed on the marketing of a product using it (as with the resilient plastics), allowing 
competing producers to benefit equally from the information. In addition, other producers in entirely 
different industries will also receive the information and benefit from it, without compensating its 
producer. The widespread diffusion of the information on its initial marketing makes appropriation 
of its benefits impracticable; its value is too disorganised to engender individual incentives for its 
appropriation.
The insufficiency of individual incentives for investment in information are easily demonstrated. 
Consider a producer who is able to combine information with its products, making them less costly 
to produce (in relation to the functions that they perform). That is, in this instance, price is 
determined by reference to competitive products (i.e. competing methods for accomplishing the same 
purpose) but the information content of the good makes it less costly to perform the same purpose. 
An example would be an automobile manufacturer who decides to substitute resilient polymers in 
the construction of its bodywork; the consumer is able to accomplish its objects, but at less cost to 
the manufacturer. Will the producer have sufficient incentives to generate and use such information?
This producer is assumed to compete in a discrete product market termed product y (say, 
automobiles) as one of n producers, but information that is incorporated in y may be useful 
throughout product space (S) in the use of many different products. For example, the incorporation 
of these resilient plastics in automobiles may give the same idea to the manufacturers of pots and pans 
and spaceships. The producer must decide on the amount of information to combine with its product, 
given that information is costly to produce (at price p[ per unit) and given its individual 
appropriability.
Equation (9.2) provides both the socially optimal level of individual investment I® and the 
unregulated level of individual investment, V- The unregulated level of investment is less than 
socially optimal for two reasons. First, with regard to the investing firm’s own industry, it can 
expect to receive only the industry average benefit (y/n) for its investment. Since the information 
diffuses rapidly, all other firms in the industry achieve equivalent cost reductions and sales. The 
benefits of the investment are not channeled through this firm in particular, but averaged across the 
industry. Secondly, with regard to other markets in which the firm does not produce, there is no return 
whatsoever, even though the information diffuses beneficially across product boundaries. Therefore, 
decentralised decision making regarding investment in information-generation will result in a socially 
inefficient level of investment on account of the diffusive nature of information.
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Investments in Information Generation:
(9J)
E  c %>s " P;
where: JJ. = thepresentvalueofi 's investments in information^)
y. s  i ‘s output ofproduct in industry y(n producers)
S = the set composed of all individualproducts (s)
I* = thedecentralisedoptimcdinvestmentlevel 
7n s  the globally optimal investment level
There is one more important point to be made concerning the nature of information, and that concerns 
the nature of the generating process. It is usually assumed that the primary input into the information 
production process is human capital (together with a modicum of capital equipment). Then, the 
information generation process is a very simple one, involving the purchase of optimal quantities of 
suitably trained labour at its going price, and the price of information is equal to the price of this 
labour divided by its marginal productivity.
Information Generation (with human capital as input): (9.3)
/ / /  =  F(L),
Then pr = —  
F'
f  p(y)y -  ciF(L))y -  — F(L) dt
F0
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Given this depiction of the nature of information, its production and value, it is straightforward to 
determine the optimal amount of information production that should occur. Information should be 
produced, and labour hired for its production, to the extent that the summation of the marginal 
benefits from further units of information produced exceed the marginal costs of their production. 
The problems to be dealt with in the optimal production of information are two: first, the creation of 
incentive mechanisms to generate optimal investments in information, and second, the incorporation 
of information-producing inputs other than human capital.
9.4 The Theory of Surrogate Property Rights
The problem of creating incentive mechanisms for the production of information is a very general 
one. The same problem has been analysed in regard to regulating the generation of information at 
different levels of a firm or distribution network. This analogue will be used in order to provide a 
private sector benchmark against which to compare the need for public sector institution-building. 
(Matthewson and Winter, 1986).
9.4.1 The Nature of Surrogate Property Rights
Consider, for a concrete example, the problem of a manufacturer of a sophisticated consumer product 
(such as a personal computer) that wishes to market this product efficiently. The maximum number 
of sales will occur only if substantial amounts of information are included with the sale, e.g. informal 
demonstrations, lessons and instructions provided to prospective purchasers. For maximum 
effectiveness, this information must be provided on a decentralised basis (i.e. at the retail level), 
where the interface with the consumer is direct (in order to tailor the demonstration to the needs of 
that customer). However, these optimal investments will not occur on a decentralised basis on 
account of the inappropriability of retailer-generated information. That is, retailers who invest in the 
provision of these informational services (training of sales personnel, provision of demonstration 
rooms and equipment) will not be able to compete with those who do not make these investments, 
because consumers will have the incentive to acquire the (unpriced) information at one retailer and 
make their purchase at the other. Manufacturers need to construct mechanisms that channel the 
benefits from informational investments through the hands of their investing distributors, the identical 
decentralised investment-in-intangibles problem faced by the state in a more general context.
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The private sector institution used to address this problem is the "exclusive territory" regime 
incorporated within vertical distribution agreements. Such a regime, established by the manufacturer, 
provides that no other retailer shall be allowed to market the manufacturer’s products within a 
carefully defined territory (from 50th to 195th street, say). This territorial monopoly right provides 
a local captive market from which to recoup the retailer’s investments in informational services. Note 
that the desired investments are in a wholly inappropriate dimension - information - while the 
monopoly is allowed in an easily demarcated and segregated dimension - physical territory. The 
problems of inappropriability in the former dimension are addressed by allowing surrogate rights in 
the latter.
Analogously, the state needs to supply concrete rights in a dimension that can be demarcated, and 
product space serves this purpose. In the case of an IPR regime, a market is allocated by the 
specification of a concrete boundary in product space (as opposed to geographical space in vertical 
distribution agreements). An IPR regime acts to remedy this distortion in information generation by 
granting monopolies in certain territories in product space. That is, in recognition of the 
impracticability of allowing monopolies in information, this regime instead allows monopolies in a 
range of products which incorporate this information. This supplies a remedy for the first problem 
of inappropriability (diffusion within industry) while supplying a premium to compensate the firm 
for the second problem of inappropriability (diffusion across industries).
An example of this is provided by the patent allowed to the innovator of the oversized tennis racquet. 
The actual innovation involved in that case was the idea that sports equipment sizes and shapes might 
be optimised; however, this concept (although widely implemented) is too abstract to be appropriable. 
Instead, the patent alloted to the innovator allowed exclusive marketing rights for all tennis racquets 
with head size between 95 and 130 sq. cm. in area. The tennis racquet actually marketed was of a 
single size, that fell in the middle of this territory, however the entire territory was alloted in order 
to create the monopoly rent
Therefore, the idea of giving "exclusive territories" as incentive systems for investment in certain 
assets may be applied even when there is a complete disjunction between the territory given and the 
asset requiring investment. The inducement of efficient investments requires institutionalised award 
mechanisms, and all institutions have their own forms of costliness. Surrogate property rights are 
clearly second-best types of solutions, but this is true of all institutions.
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The idea that a "property right" accomplishes a perfect match between asset and territory is illusory 
in every instance, giving rise to the prevalence of "externalities". To advocate "well-defined property 
rights" is equivalent to advocating "perfect competition". It is important to recognise all property 
rights for nothing more than what they are: institutionalised incentive mechanisms for making awards 
(imperfectly) to investors. Surrogate property rights are substantively indistinguishable from all other 
property rights; they are both "exclusive territories" operating as award mechanisms for beneficial 
investments. Tlie difference is quantitative, in the quantity of externalities prevailing under the 
institution.
9.42 Surrogate Property Rights as Incentive Systems
Under an IPR regime, informational investments can be induced by awarding surrogate rights of a 
specific breadth and duration in the distinct (and concrete) dimension of product space (S). The 
breadth of a surrogate right is given by the set of products and product characteristics that are 
demarcated as being the investor's "exclusive territory" (RJ. The length of a surrogate right is given 
by its established period of duration (T). The regulator’s task, using this institution, is to determine 
the values of the variables breadth and length in order to establish incentives for information 
generation.
Equation (9.4) demonstrates the way in which the allocation of a clear and concrete territory in 
product space alters the decision problem of the agent contemplating an information-generating 
investment In order to establish the "prize" associated with an allocation of an exclusive territory 
in product space, assume that consumer preferences are distributed uniformly over that dimension 
(according to density function f). Hence, an allocation of a specific unit of territory in S (i.e. the 
exclusive right to produce products of those characteristics) to a given producer implicitly allocates 
a unit of consumer demand.
However, consumers whose preferences are sited at a particular point in product space are not captive 
at any price, the constraint in (9.4) states that the "effective price" (product price plus the cost of 
distance from individual consumer’s first-best product - tau) charged to the marginal consumer must 
equate with the "effective price" of its nearest rival (located outside of the allocated territory). That 
is, the consumer is willing to incur a premium of (tau) per unit of product space in order to have its 
first preference in product characteristics. Subject to this constraint, the producer can charge the 
monopoly price to its captive market.
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The producer’s incentives to invest in information are then enhanced by the availability of this captive 
market. The exclusive territory acts as a reward for such investments.
The Incentive System Established under a Surrogate Rights Regime:
(9.4)
dtf  H  <M> 3 f «■" Ip, -  cd)} ds -  p,/
o o
subject to: p { + zRi = p. + z ( j-R )
where: = the benefits channeledto agent i
Ri = the territory in product spaceS allocated to iforperiodT 
j  a  the location in S o f nearest competitor fori 
x = the consumer cost o f monopolyper unit distance 
T  s  the duration o f the monopoly right
The creation of such surrogate rights generates incentives to invest in information, in both an ex post 
and an ex ante sense. It is an ex post award system, in that it creates a prize to reward demonstrably 
effective investments that have already occurred. The ex post nature of this award system operates 
as with any other public prize awarding system. Contestants are judged and selected for the amount 
of "public good" (external benefits) generated, and awarded prizes in compensation for those 
activities. The amount of the prize awarded, under an IPR regime, is equal to the difference in the 
expected returns from the enterprise with the BPR (i.e. with T>0 and R>0) and without (i.e. with T=0 
and/or R=0).
An IPR system is also a fully ex ante system, in two senses. First, the prospect of such awards acts 
as an incentive system to generate informational-investments in anticipation of such an award. That 
is, to the extent that there exist expectations that exclusive territories will be awarded for all efficient 
investments, these ex post awards will be given full effect ex ante. However, it is not necessary to 
adjudicate awards for every successive investment The IPR system also incorporates an explicit ex 
ante component in that it creates a territory within which future investments are automatically 
rewarded. That is, the award of the monopoly rent (irrespective from where it originates) rewards 
past investments, and the award of the specific territory rewards effective investments occurring 
within that region in the future.
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Equation (9.5) indicates the efficiency of the system after the award of an exclusive territory under 
a surrogate right regime. As indicated below, these incentives cannot equate with the socially optimal 
unless either the information is sufficiently concentrated in the territory allocated, or the territory 
allocated is all of product space. Neither of these conditions can be met, because of the diffusiveness 
of information and the costliness of allocations. This is a purely second best approach based on the 
award of distortionary monopolies as prizes for effective investments.
Efficiency of Ex Ante Incentives under Surrogate Right Regime:
(9.5)
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Despite these drawbacks, it is nevertheless apparent that a surrogate rights regime can be an effective 
mechanism for inducing informational investments. Given that any institution used for inducing 
investments in information will be costly, the important issue is the comparative costliness of the 
various institutions available for accomplishing this object A regulator should invest in the 
institution of a surrogate rights regime to the extent that it generates returns (from induced 
investments) sufficient to cover its institutional costliness.
Equation (9.6) is a depiction of the regulator's problem in considering the institution of a surrogate 
rights regime. The establishment of an institution requires substantial initial investment, and it is thus 
represented as a "stock variable". The establishment of a surrogate rights regime thus involves the 
allocation of an adequate stock of management services to this institution. Equation (9.6) also 
demonstrates that the benefits from such a regime flow through both the information diffusing
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globally (kd), and also through the benefits internalised to innovators via surrogate rights (tcs). The 
costs of the mechanism (rpj^Mc), including the distortionary costs, must be balanced against these 
gains.
Institution of Surrogate Rights Regime:
(9.6)
Mu g IL® - /  + H,® - W a ) *
0
where: IL (1) = the net globalvalue o f induced investments in information
IL (R) s  the value to investors in information of allocated territories (R)
IL (/) = the value to consumers of information generated 
MqR = global investment in institution o f surrogate rights regime
Since information diffuses globally, equation (9.6) is aregulation problem for resolution by the global 
community. The analysis is identical to that involving consumer market regulation, discussed in 
section 7.5. Producer’s investment incentives are being altered by means of the allocation of 
exclusive markets within consumer states. Market allocations have a much reduced impact if other 
states produce and export competing goods. This explains why the Paris Patent Union was the first 
international convention concerning international resources, and also why allegations of piracy by 
nonmember states have always been one of the major concerns of that convention. The more 
cooperation that exists between states in the institution of a surrogate rights regime, the more 
effective the regime.
Finally, it should be noted that the problem in (9.6) is identical to the problem involved in the 
regulation of global biological diversity. Both concern the global community’s regulation of a 
resource that generates an ^ appropriable flow of services. After a brief discussion of the efficiency 
characteristics of surrogate right regimes in the next section, the application of this instrument to 
conservation goals will be discussed in section 9.5.
9.43 The Comparative Costliness of Surrogate Right Regimes
A surrogate right regime is not an attempt to institute a first-best mechanism for information 
generation. A first-best approach would instead be of the nature of a periodic prize competition. This
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would consist of the award of ex post cash prizes to all effective innovators in the amount of the 
estimated global benefits generated. In this statement of the scheme, it satisfies the requirements of 
a first-best incentive system for generating efficient investments. In fact, such prize systems had been 
used as the primary inducement mechanism in the Soviet Union during the communist era, and the 
U.K. experimented with such a scheme in the post-war period.
The problem with the first-best ("inventors’ prizes") approach is that it ignores the questions of 
institutional costliness. There are three categories of institutional costliness under which surrogate 
right regimes are likely to perform better than more general prize systems.
First, there is the costliness of valuing the benefits of informational investments. In a pure ex post 
system, this valuation must be accomplished entirely outside of the market. With surrogate rights 
regimes, it is possible that some future investments will be rewarded through the monopoly over the 
captive territory. Therefore, there is some incorporation of the willingness to pay criterion involved 
in the surrogate right regime that is not incorporated in a pure prize system, and this may reduce the 
costliness of valuation.
Second, to a large extent, the surrogate right regime is merely a prize system with a lag between 
award dates, and the reason for the incorporation of such a lag concerns the importance of fixed costs 
in the process. If the process is undertaken at low cost and repeatedly, there will be a costliness 
involved in the inaccurate targeting of prizes, (i.e. awards given to ineffective investors and the 
failure to give awards to effective investors). If the process is undertaken at high cost some of these 
inaccuracies may be removed. However, the fixed cost element of accuracy improvements suggests 
that there are gains to be had from less frequent awards (i.e. selecting some individuals for awards, 
and then allowing those selections to stand - with continued awards from the allocated territory - for 
a fixed period of time). It is the importance of accuracy that suggests that an infrequent, surrogate 
rights approach might be preferable over a frequent, prize system approach. In essence, if a state 
incurs the costs of high accuracy, then it may be optimal to make the award an active and ongoing 
one (by the award of the exclusive territory).
It is rational to incur the costs of high accuracy because mistaken allocations are costly, especially 
in regard to the ex post element of the prize. This is because, whether the prize is in cash or territory, 
once it is awarded it cannot be transferred. Contrary to Coaseian analysis, the improper allocation 
of an intellectual property right cannot be remedied by subsequent transfer, precisely because it
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represents in part an award for effective ex post investments. If misallocated but subsequently 
transferred, the territory may be properly allocated but the monopoly rents (based on past uses) stay 
with the initial holder.
Therefore, the primary reason to consider the use of a surrogate right regime is this fixed cost element 
to the selection mechanism. The greater the costs of accurate selections, including the costliness of 
inaccurate selections, the more that an occasional, dynamic mechanism will be preferred.
Finally, a surrogate rights regime involves the creation of a substantial amount of international 
infrastructure, in the form of a legal process for the evaluation, allocation and demarcation of market 
territories. This is an important step toward the institutionalisation of the award system, and it creates 
the assurance required to generate investment. It is probably for this reason alone that these regimes 
are known as "intellectual property".
9.5 The Application of Intellectual Property Rights to Biodiversity Conservation
The entirety of the theory developed in this chapter applies directly to the problem of biodiversity 
conservation This is because investments in stocks of diverse resources (species and habitats) 
generate not only tangible goods and services, but also intangible ones (specifically, insurance and 
information). On account of the diffusiveness and nonsegregability of these services, it is not 
possible (under existing institutions) to channel these global benefits initially through the hands of 
individuals living within their host states.
However, this flow of information is only maintained by way of investments in diverse stocks by 
individuals in the host states. If these diverse assets are not included within state portfolios, then the 
flow of these services will cease. It is equally important to reward investments in natural capital that 
generate informational services as it is to reward investments in human capital-generated information. 
The base problems are identical, only the physical character of the asset involved is changed.
9.5.1 Biodiversity as Evolutionary Information
In the context of the model developed in section 9.3, the only element to add is the potential 
production of valuable information from inputs other than human capital. As has been indicated at
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several points in this book, this is essential value of biological diversity - its informational content. 
It must be recognised that human capital alone may not capable of producing all important and 
valuable information. There is also a base biological dimension which generates information I(R).
This biological dimension is the evolutionary process which, through biological interaction and the 
process of selection, generates communities of life forms that contain substantial amounts of 
accumulated information. Because the competition for niches is constant and pervasive (occurring 
at all levels), the naturally evolved life forms contain biological materials which act upon many of 
the species with which they share the community. A community that has co-evolved over millions 
of years contains an encapsulated history of information that is not capable of synthesisation.
Supplanting a naturally evolved habitat, and slate of species, with a human-chosen slate may confer 
tangible productivity gains, but it also removes the information that was available from that 
community. The information from co-evolution, the product of the evolutionary process, is lost with 
the conversion.
Therefore, the conversion of the last remaining unconverted natural habitats equates with the 
retention of this evolutionary product, i.e. the information generated by co-evolution. The mere 
existence of this habitat represents information production, in the sense of the retention of an 
otherwise irreplaceable asset Valuable information may be produced by investments in natural 
capital as well as through investments in human capital.
9.52  Incentives for the Conservation of Biodiversity
Consider how the global community can use a surrogate rights regime in order to conserve optimal 
biological diversity. The global community is faced with the same regulatory problem as listed 
above, in eq. (9.6), but with slightly different dimensions involved. In equation (9.7), the benefits 
to supplier-states (Pis) flow primarily from allocations of exclusive markets in consumer states (R*), 
while the benefits to consumer-states (PID) flow primarily from the retention of natural habitats in 
supplier-states (RN). This is analogous to the object outlined in (9.6); the problem is to invest in 
institutions to maximise the aggregate benefits from informational production for both consumers and 
suppliers.
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International Regulation of Global Biological Diversity:
(9.7)
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where: E  = the value to supply state of allocated territory in product space (JR. 0
E  = the value to consumer states ofinformationflowing natural habitat (R  ^
= the global community' s investment in surrogate rightregime
In essence, the global community is allocating territories in Northern product markets (R1*) in 
exchange for the conservation of designated territories (RN) in Southern natural habitats. These rights 
constitute both ex post awards for past effective investments, but also ex ante awards to encourage 
investigations for further useful information in those territories. Such awards function in precisely 
the same way as intellectual property rights in encouraging investment, except that in this case the 
regime is focusing upon natural resource (rather than human resource) generated information.
As with the mechanisms discussed in section 7.5, surrogate right regimes apply international 
management of product markets to the inducement of investments in domestic resource commons. 
The state incentive structure, under a surrogate right regime, appears in eq. (9.8). The owner-state 
of a significant area of unconverted habitat receives enhanced benefits (flowing from the global 
regime) from all investments in the management and preservation of that habitat.
Investment Incentives for Supply State under Surrogate Right Regime:
(9.8)
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The supplier states now have incentives to invest in their diverse resources. They have two sets of
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incentives. States have the incentive to maintain their resources and investigate them in order to be 
awarded product market territories, and states have the incentive to continue to invest in their diverse 
resources in order to generate new information useful in respect to their market allocations.
The extent of these incentives depends entirely upon the breadth and length of the awards. The 
breadth is determined by the extent of product market allocation, and the length is determined by the 
duration of the allocation. Different criterion should be used in determining breadth and length. 
Length should be determined primarily with regard to the costliness of selection and allocation, as 
discussed in section 9.4. Breadth should then be used to establish the desired amount of the award.
As with any surrogate right, it is a more efficient instrument if it is able to capture a large proportion 
of the information’s value in the product space allocated. However, by the definition of information 
(i.e. its diffusive nature), this is not generally possible. It must be recognised that the ultimate object 
of any surrogate right (intellectual property right) regime is to accurately target prizes to efficient 
investors in information generation, and that it is only institutional costliness that warrants the use 
of surrogate dimensions for this purpose. Therefore, intellectual property rights can be an effective 
instrument for the generation of a flow of value to states investing in the conservation of biological 
diversity. This instrument should be considered with the others as a potentially cost-efficient method 
for conservation.
9.6 Intellectual Property Rights in Biodiversity Conservation - Informational Resource Rights.
A surrogate rights regime based on natural resource investments would allocate product market 
territories in response to effective natural habitat investments. Effectiveness would be demonstrated 
initially through the establishment of an effective conservation and investigation programme, shown 
to be capable of identifying and conserving useful life forms. When such a programme is established, 
the potentially useful life forms need to be tendered to an international natural resource panel, 
together with a suggested range of uses for the species. The panel would then determine several 
issues: 1) whether an award should be made to the programme; 2) what the product characteristics 
are that might be generated from the natural resource; 3) what breadth of award in regard to these 
specific product characteristics are to be lodged with the programme.
The determination of issue one depends upon the believed usefulness of the natural habitat and
267
programme applying for the award. Issue two turns on the derived chemical usefulness of the specific 
products tendered. Issue three will consist of a determination of the specific royalty payable to this 
programme by companies operating in the zone of the protected product characteristics. Of course, 
the length of the award is a separate, institutional issue determined uniformly by the costliness of the 
selection process. In this fashion, a constant source of funding for natural habitat conservation could 
be maintained in a fashion that both links funding to usefulness and also creates incentives to invest 
in the source habitat.
9.7 Conclusion
The answers to the issues outlined in the introduction are now apparent. It is clear that there is no 
distinction in substance between investments in information-generating diversity and other 
information-generating assets (such as other research and development activities). Therefore, there 
is no logical reason why intellectual property right regimes should not be applied to the conservation 
of biological diversity.
The major advantage that IPR regimes demonstrate is their capacity to bring market-based 
preferences into the calculations concerning the value of diverse resources. Although the link is 
tenous and institution-dependent, these arguments apply equally to all "intellectual property rights". 
For example, it can be no more difficult to value and assign rights in the services rendered by natural 
diversity than it is in regard to the "look and feel" of a computer-user interface (patent granted to 
Apple Computers). The analogy is direct between the computer software industry and biodiversity 
conservatioa Both "industries" produce information - one in the variety of the code and one in the 
variety of the life forms. Both forms of diversity are useful - one in the operation of a computer and 
one in the operation of the biological production system. But the values from both forms of 
informational services are largely inappropriable (after first sale) unless governments make a 
concerted attempt to reward the producer.
The primary difference between the application of IPR regimes to software versus biodiversity is the 
identity of the rewarded producer; a biodiversity-related regime would produce largely North-to- 
South flows while the existing regime produces substantially North-to-North flows (and substantial 
South-to-North flows). Possibly for this reason, there are massive resources being spent on the
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reform of the international IPR laws concerning software protection, but little interest in investments 
in the creation of IPR in natural resources.
However, if this is the case, then this myopic view of Northern self-interest concerning international 
IPR regimes completely misses the point The rationale for an international institution should be the 
appropriation of the "gains from cooperation", and in the case of biodiversity, the gains from 
cooperation inhere when Northern states transfer funds to the South in return for the Southern states 
conservation of diverse resource stocks. If properly calibrated, these transfers will be made in a 
fashion that will reward and induce compensating investments in diversity. For this reason, IPR 
regimes for natural resources should generate a net gain for Northern states, although the flow of 
funds under their auspices will be unidirectional North-to-South.
The solution to the global biodiversity problem requires the construction of mechanisms to address 
"both sides" of the problem: optimal supplier state conservation and optimal Northern state payments. 
It cannot be assumed that whatever level of funding that happens to emanate from the North is 
optimal in any sense. It is therefore equally important to invest available funds in the development 
of incentive systems that induce optimal behaviour in the North, as it is to invest in the development 
of such systems for the South. It is for this reason the the instrument of IPR regimes for biodiversity 
conservation is especially appropriate.
However, all three of the instruments discussed in the preceding chapters have much in common. 
They are three different methods for attaching an internationally-created "global premium" to the 
local benefits received from diverse resource management. The "direct" approach of chapter seven 
involves the payment of this premium for the conservation of diverse resource stocks at low intensity 
uses. The "trade" approach of chapter eight attaches this premium to the tangible, appropriable 
components of the flow from these diverse resource stocks. The "IPR" approach of this chapter hives 
off a percentage from the commerce in derived tangible products for compensation of the intangible 
inputs into its production that flow from diverse resource stocks.
Once again, the real difference between the three different approaches is an institutional one. Each 
constitutes a potential conduit for transferring the values placed on low-intensity uses of diverse 
resources back to the owner-states, i.e. each is a candidate for the creation of internationally 
transferable development rights. The direct approach accomplishes this through periodic payments 
in return for these rights. The regulated trade approach does this through alterring the rates of return
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to low-intensity uses of diverse resources (as opposed to conversion). The IPR approach does this 
by creating a hybrid system for making awards to compensate both the past and the future retention 
of diverse resources. The essential solution to the problem is the same (i.e. the attachment of the 
"global premium"), only the institution used to perform the task is distinct in each of these cases.
Therefore, it is important to recognise that, irrespective of the instrument chosen, the essential task 
remains the same. It is necessary to create an international institution or institutions capable of 
measuring, allocating and enforcing the global premium required to conserve biological diversity.
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CHAPTER TEN
THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF EXTINCTION - CONCLUSIONS
10.1 Introduction.
The object of this book has been the development of a framework for the explanation of the nature 
of the biodiversity problem, in a such a manner that the explanation might itself suggest its own 
solution. To this end, it is necessary here to recount only that the problem of biodiversity is a clear 
example of the divergence between the locally and the globally optimal. Due to various externalities 
within the process, each state has the incentive to convert its diverse resources to a slate of sameness. 
For this reason, over the past ten thousand years, the amount of global diversity has been slowly 
converging upon a small slate of specialised species.
As the final refugia of the world’s diversity are reached, the rate of extinction will escalate 
geometrically. Since diversity is the essential component of evolutionary product, the potential 
costliness of its loss is unlimited. The global process of convergence must be halted well before this 
point is reached. This is the problem that we must resolve.
If it is accepted that all human societies have equal rights to development, then there is a unique 
solution to the suggested problem. This is the creation of international institutions capable of 
channeling the values of diverse resources to their host states. The creation of such alternative 
pathways to development maintains both the important natural asset as well as the essential human 
right. It is the fostering of development compatible with diversity, by means of investments by the 
already-developed states.
The conclusions within this chapter describe the nature of the regimes that might be developed to 
implement this solution. Section 3 constitutes a guide for the development of protocols to the 
international convention on biodiversity, that would be consistent with the solution of the problem 
outlined in this volume. Equally important is the understanding of the impacts of existing policies 
on the outlined problem. These impacts are outlined in section 2.
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Clearly, there are many other problems that might be included on a wide-ranging rubric such as 
"biological diversity". The intent here is not to attempt solutions to all problems relating to biological 
resource management, but rather to attempt the solution of one very specific problem with very 
important implications for this resource system: the management of the global conversion process. 
This is the problem of biodiversity losses discussed here, and the solutions concepts outlined here are 
directed to this one specific purpose.
10.2 The International Regulation of Extinction: Existing Policies
The international regulation of extinction must be addressed to the fundamental cause of diversity 
decline. This means that biodiversity policies must be directed to influencing decisions by owner- 
states concerning conversions. These states must be convinced that development is possible in the 
context of retained diverse resources, otherwise the conversion of these resources will occur. 
Therefore, the policies suggested by this approach must be directed to the channeling of the values 
of diversity through the owner-states.
It is also important to consider the effect of existing endangered species’ policies that are not focused 
on the fundamental causes of extinction. Some of these policies are developed to instead address the 
consequences of conversion decisions, e.g. overexploitation. Policies that have been devised to 
address overexploitation often have little or no positive impact on the forces causing extinctions. The 
existing extinction policies must be overhauled in order to redirect their focus to the more 
fundamental causes of extinctions.
This section surveys existing policies, and how they impact upon the conversion process that effects 
extinctions. The first two sections concern prevailing policies concerning information appropriation 
and agricultural insurance, and how they relate to diversity-generated services. The last section 
discusses the existing international wildlife trade system, especially as it performs as an policy for 
rent appropriation.
10.2.1 Information and Intellectual Property Rights
The purpose of the legal regime known as intellectual property rights is the protection of information- 
generating investments. As discussed above, there are no market-based incentives for investment in 
assets that generate valuable information because of the inability to appropriate the benefits that result
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from that effort.
Intellectual property rights address this problem by creating a link between investments in 
information creation and flows of revenues from the use of that information. Specifically, the 
government awards a monopoly right for the marketing of a particular range of tangible goods in 
order to compensate a person for investments which are obviously effective in the generation of 
information. These protected markets (or intellectual property rights) then provide the basis for 
compensating both the past informational investments, as well as any future ones made in that area.
Intellectual property rights are used to reward informational investments in a wide variety of markets. 
For example, in the area of computer software, entrepreneurs invest efforts in the creation of effective 
software packages which they would then like to sell to the public. These software packages are 
essentially lists of "instructions" that cause a computer to perform a valued function. That is, they 
represent almost pure information. For this reason there is no market-based mechanism that is 
capable of channeling the value of these recipes to their discoverers, no matter how highly valued the 
information might be. Once the information is marketed to a single person, it is potentially available 
to all. In effect, the initial marketing of the "recipe" releases the idea, which is then free for use by 
all (through pirating or even the mere communication of the idea and imitation in a slightly different 
form).
Recently, legislatures and courts have been struggling to create more enforcable rights in software, 
because of the perceived value of these investments. (For example, the Copyright, Patents and 
Designs Act of 1988 (U.K.) and the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act 1984 (U.S.A.).) They have 
been extending rights back toward the "idea" itself rather than the particular form it takes. This is 
accomplished, for example, by giving exclusive rights in the marketing of anything with the same 
general "look and feel" of the protected creation, rather than its specific manifestation. (Apple 
Computers v. Franklin, 714 F.2d 1240 (1984).) The law is not yet settled, but the direction of the 
efforts is clear; the developed countries are putting tremendous efforts into creating protection for this 
industry because of a belief in the value of the information that it can generate, if its markets are 
protected.
Analogously, investments in the retention of lands with diverse resources and the exploration of their 
usefulness also generate information. The diversity that exists in the wilds of the world contains the 
information necessary for insuring our crops, health, and lifestyles. The discovery of new uses for
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these natural resources is equivalent to the identification of a new recipe for a useful function. A 
good example is the discovered usefulness of the chemical combinations found in the Rosy 
Periwinkle, a medicinal plant from Madagascar and discovered to be useful in the treatment of several 
forms of cancer in 1963.
It would appear to be of little consequence for the purpose of policymaking whether the valuable 
information were to be derived from an understanding of plants or computers. Explorations regarding 
biological materials can be as useful as explorations regarding machinery. For example, the health- 
related benefits from the chemicals identified from the discovery of the Rosy Periwinkle generate an 
estimated $88 million per annum. However, almost without exception, current governmental policies 
expressly disallow protection of discoveries concerning the usefulness of naturally occurring 
resources.
It is not possible to claim rights in the information generated by the identification of new uses for 
naturally occurring substances, irrespective of the value of the discovery. For example, Article 53(b) 
of the European Patent Convention states that no protection is available for "plant or animal varieties 
or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals". Similarly, in the 
landmark U.S. decision of Diamond v. Chakrabartv. the Supreme Court declared that it was indeed 
possible to claim patent rights in live plants and animals, but the basis for awarding a patent in a 
living organism was that "the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different 
characteristics than any found in nature ... His discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; 
accordingly, it is patentable subject matter under patent law." (emphasis added).
There is no conceptual basis for the distinction that is being drawn between informational investments 
in natural versus manmade resources. There is also no practical basis for distinguishing between the 
two. The creation and protection of a system of intellectual property rights in discovered usefulness 
of naturally occurring resources would certainly be no more difficult than the attempts to do the same 
with computer software. The basic resource - information -is identical, and the natural resource is 
probably more easily defined and contractually licensed than is the software product In essence, 
once the right is recognised, the impacts would be twofold: first, there would be an exclusive right 
to market discoveries derived from analysing natural resource usefulness; and secondly, there would 
be a subsidiary right to license "prospecting" for useful biological materials in existing natural 
habitats.
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Not only has the international community refused to recognise the first right above, it has also taken 
steps to reduce any residual value that might remain for prospecting in natural habitats. This is most 
evident in the policies of the international system that has been created for the purpose of preserving 
plant genetic diversity, the International Board for Plant Genetic Research. The IBPGR strategy for 
conserving genetic resources has been to remove plant germplasm from its natural site to a 
germplasm bank, and then to provide "free access" to the collection. (Juma,C 1989.) This policy 
has effectively disenfranchised the host countries from their own biological assets, and greatly 
reduced the value of prospecting in the country itself. The value of the exploration rights that have 
been denied is indicated by the number of requests for access to these gene bank collections.
10.2.2 Insurance and Crop Insurance Programmes
The provision of insurance is an important aspect of social welfare. As surveyed above, biological 
diversity serves to provide insurance with respect to crop productivity. The failure to return this value 
to the countries generating it results in a lack of incentives to maintain the service.
It is important to recognise that there are substitutes for certain insurance services of biodiversity. 
Insurance can be provided by "pooling" risks across a large enough group. For example, food 
producers can self-insure through the market by purchasing crop insurance against pests, weather and 
other hazards. This market-provided insurance is equally effective in reducing certain individual 
risks through aggregation. By means of pooling, each individual farmer takes a small loss with 
certainty (the insurance "premium") rather than the chance of a large loss. This reduces the risk 
experienced by each individual farmer, which is one of the roles of a system of insurance.
However, there are certain risks that cannot be insured through the market This is the case when 
risks across the insured group are correlated; Le^  if, when they occur for one of the insured, they are 
more likely to occur for the others. These are sometimes known as "environmental" risks because 
of their general nature. Pooling does not operate to reduce these risks because all of the participants 
in the pool are likely to be afflicted simultaneously. This type of insurance cannot be provided 
through the market.
The risks to crops are precisely of this nature. As the environment changes (climatically, biologically 
or otherwise), there is the chance that the then-utilised specialised strains will not be well-adapted to 
the new environment. Change within the environment is its inherent nature, and some of these
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changes occur on vast scales: regionally, nationally, and globally. In general, it is not possible to 
insure against these risks through the mechanism of pooling.
Nevertheless, some governments are attempting to substitute market-provided crop insurance for that 
which can be provided through diversity. For example, the U.S. Federal Crop Insurance Corporation 
currently subsidises the purchase of market-based crop insurance by 30%. During the 1980s, the U.S. 
government spent $3.7 billion on attempts to make this market work. (Table 10.1).
Table 10.1: US Government Expenditures and Subsidies on Market-based Crop Insurance 
Policies (000s of US dollars)
Year Subsidy Losses Admin. Reinsur. Total
1980 46995 30471 87000 3667 169417
1982 91990 132250 115000 23138 363546
1983 63669 297971 95000 35603 492946
1984 98296 205314 98000 78887 480364
1985 100224 242438 97000 102888 542270
1986 88043 233806 95000 97711 515352
1987 87536 4669 72000 97418 262099
1988 107830 585678 76000 121545 891830
Totals 684538 1731597 740000 560583 3.717.824
Source: "Report of the Commission for the Improvement of the Federal Crop Insurance 
Programme", FCIC: Washington,D.C. (1990).
By means of this subsidy, the U.S. government is encouraging the substitution of a pooling-based 
system for a diversity-based system of insurance on a nationwide basis. However, since the risks to 
crops are necessarily correlated, this system cannot operate through the market alone. It will always 
require a governmental subsidy.
This subsidy then acts to reduce the demand for diversity. The end result is that the system for 
determining the optimal amount of biodiversity is again biased downwards.
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The most important problem is one of so-called "moral hazard", the problem that insured people
do not take adequate precautions against possible hazards precisely because they are insured. A crop 
insurance programme can lead to complacency about potential large-scale environmental risks, 
because the small-scale risks that occur more frequently are adequately dealt with. However, when 
an environmental risk of national or global impact occurs, there is nothing that a pooling-based 
programme can do about this. Biodiversity-based insurance services are being substituted for, even 
though there are many events for which there are no substitutes for biodiversity.
In short, governmental policies should encourage payments for the already provided biodiversity- 
related crop insurance. Governmental policies should not subsidise the substitution of market-based 
crop insurance, as this is necessarily ineffective and self-defeating. Insurance that can only be 
provided through the conseration of diversity must be obtained through a policy directed to this end.
10.2.3 Diverse Resources and Wildlife Trade Regimes (CITES)
This source of policy failure is far more obvious and straightforward than the previous two. The 
decision to convert natural habitats will depend upon the landowner’s relative valuation of the 
resources in the two states: wildland or agricultural land. Most governmental policies on the subject 
operate to reduce the value of wildlife while subsidising the value of specialised agricultural 
commodities.
There has been much written on the subject of subsidies to agriculture in the OECD countries. In the 
developing world, the problem is as severe as it is in the developed. For example, it has been shown 
that in the case of the Brazilian Amazon, it would often be financially nonfeasible to convert the 
forest to cattle ranching in the absence of prevailing governmental subsidies. (Browder, J. 1988.)
Very likely, the less well-known and more important problem is the unwillingness of governments 
to place any significant effort into capturing the substantial values of already-produced wildlife 
resources. For example, it has been demonstrated that several Asian states capture only a small 
portion of potential rents (10-30%) from the marketing of tropical timber. (Repetto,R., 1988.) The 
same is true with regard to most animal species. Most of the African states captured only a small 
proportion of the value of exported elephant ivory (5-15%). (Barbier,E., Burgess,J., Swanson,T. and 
Pearce,D., 1990.) Parrots from Irian Jaya are exported for $2 and then sold in the U.S. at $500 
wholesale. (Swanson,T., 1992.) This is a very general phenomenon in the world wildlife trade.
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It is self-evident that these governmental policies are based in an underlying belief that development 
is not possible within the context of diverse resources. These governments are indicating that they 
believe that conversion must occur as a prior condition to development of the territory.
The international regime currently in place to regulate the trade in diverse resources should be built 
upon the premise that this perception must be reversed; development must be seen to be compatible 
with diversity. The existing regime was not built upon this foundation, rather it was developed to 
address the consequences of decisions not to invest in diverse resources rather than the causes of these 
decisions.
The Convention on Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) was adopted in 1972 and provided a single 
international instrument for the regulation of trade in diverse resources: the trade ban. In effect, 
CITES provides that a species listed as "endangered” (as an Appendix I species) should be banned 
from international trade. All other trade proceeds unregulated.
This sort of policy accords well with a theory of extinction based upon "overexploitation". 
Overexploitation is viewed, in this model, as deriving from the application of market pressures to 
wildlife (i.e. uncontrolled) species. When the market pressures threaten to overwhelm the species, 
the policy reforms suggested by this model are to criminalise the supply of and demand for the 
resource. In this way market pressures are relieved and the resource is allowed to restore itself.
Of course, this approach to extinction policy does nothing to address the underlying causes 
endangering the species, which is the unwillingness of the owner-state to invest in the management 
of the pressures on the resource. In fact, actions rendering the resource less valuable reinforce the 
perception of the owner-state that the resource is not worthy of investment. The initial state (of 
overexploitation) was the result of this perception, and the "endangered species" laws developed 
under CITES have only acted to bolster this viewpoint.
Therefore, the existing legislation regarding species decline does not address the fundamental causes 
of endangerment, but instead deals only with the consequential. So long as these subsidies to 
specialised agriculture (in the developing countries) and bans on wildlife commodities (in the 
developed countries) are in place, the perceived relative value of diverse resources will be reduced. 
An international regulatory policy for conserving biodiversity must reverse or reform these policies.
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103  The International Regulation of Extinction: The Necessary Reforms
The international regulation of extinction must be directed toward encouraging those undeveloped 
countries with substantial quantities of diverse resources to consider alternative pathways to 
development that do not require the conversion of their resources. This implies the development of 
policies for enhancing the benefits that these states receive when they invest in their diverse resources 
(as opposed to disinvesting in these resources).
There are three methods available to the international community for conferring enhanced benefits 
upon investing states. First, the international community might simply confer direct subsidies upon 
those states retaining stocks of diverse resources intact through low-intensity utilisation; the form of 
the international agreement that would divide the use of a diverse habitat between the international 
and the local communities is known as an international franchise agreement. Second, the 
international community might intervene by means of regulating the trade in the tangible 
commodities that flow from diverse habitats in order to maximise appropriable rents; this would 
occur through reforms to the international wildlife trade regime. Third, the international community 
might intervene by methods directed to reach the core of the problem, i.e. by the creation of 
mechanisms for the channeling of the inappropriate values of diversity (insurance and information) 
to the states that supply them. This would imply the development of intellectual property right 
regimes for purposes of diversity conservation.
10.3.1 International Franchise Agreements
If the international community wishes to acquire the "development rights" of individual states with 
regard to particular diverse resources, then it will be necessary to do so within the context of a 
dynamic international agreement That is, there will have to be some overarching framework that 
provides for the systematic compensation of the owner-state at the end of each period that the diverse 
resources remain unconverted. It is only through the creation of such a dynamically consistent 
scheme of payments that the agreement concerning development rights can be made enforceable.
An international franchise agreement is the contract form that will allow for this system of 
governance. A franchise agreement is a contract that provides for a limited term of use by the holder 
of the franchise, subject to restrictions placed upon that use for the benefit of a third party. In this 
context the franchise agreement would divide the rights of use of a territory between the international
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community and the local community, with the owner-state standing as the intermediary within the 
contract (i.e. the owner-state is a party to the contract with the local community and with the global 
community). Both sides of this three-party agreement are made enforceable by means of the periodic 
payments made by both global and local communities in exchange for their partition of the rights of 
use; that is, the owner-state has an incentive to enforce the agreed partition of rights in order to 
receive payments from both sets of users.
The international franchise agreement option is flexible enough to allow for virtually any manner of 
division of rights of use between local and global communities. If the global community is willing 
to outbid the local community for all rights of use, then the area may be effectively "zoned" as 
wilderness territory. If the global community bids a relatively small amount (compared to the area's 
use value), then the area may be zoned for all uses other than clearing and conversion. As mentioned 
above, whatever the partition between global and local communities, it is automatically enforceable 
because the partition is based upon an auction of the rights to use the land. The state must effectively 
enforce the agreed partition in order to receive payments from both sides to the franchise agreement.
This first route to the international regulation of extinction is based entirely on the idea that the flow 
of services from diverse resource stocks are directly related to the quantity of stocks remaining. 
Then, the optimal provision for diversity’s services will equate with the conservation of diverse 
resource stocks. If this is the case, then the form of agreement by which the international community 
may acquire "development rights" within owner-states is creation of international franchise 
agreements.
10.3.2 Wildlife Trade Regimes
An alternative route for providing enhanced benefits to those investing in diverse resource stocks is 
to provide an enhanced return to the appropriable goods and services that flow from these stocks. 
These returns would then be attributed, within the decision making framework of the owner-state, 
to the investments in diverse resource stocks, and this would maintain the incentive framework for 
their retention.
The development of a "premium" attaching to diverse resources would be straightforward. This could 
be implemented through exclusive purchasing agreements between consumer states and producer 
state cooperatives. The members of the producer cooperative would then restrict production to the
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extent that maximises joint profits from their diverse resources.
The complexities of such a wildlife trade regime arise with the incentives that it creates for 
appropriating the "premium" without incurring the investment Any state would have an incentive 
to attempt to sell diverse resources to the consumer states that were the result of another state’s 
investments in its natural habitats. This implies the construction of an elaborate set of conditions for 
sales to the consumer-states, essentially individual supplier-state quotas based upon the natural 
habitats that they maintain and their capacity for production.
A wildlife trade regime should operate in this fashion because it is essential that there be price 
discrimination between those supplier states investing and those not investing in their diverse 
resource bases. The formation of producer cooperative consisting solely of the former creates a 
premium to that membership, and thus creates incentives for noninvesting states to change strategies 
in this regard.
The current system under CITES does not adequately discriminate between investing and 
noninvesting states in regard to legitimate wildlife trade, and its blanket "bans" on endangered 
wildlife trade constitutes a disproportionate punishment for the investing states (since they are then 
unable to acquire the returns on the investments they made). It bolsters the general impression 
throughout the developing world that diverse resources can not be developed economically, and thus 
affirms the perception that conversion is the sole pathway to development. For these reasons, wildlife 
trade reforms of the sort indicated above are essential for biodiversity conservation.
10.3.3 Informational Resource Rights
The most direct approach to the regulation of extinction would be the creation of an international 
mechanism for rewarding investments in the generation of the inappropriate services of diverse 
resources. In a first-best world, this would take the form of a mechanism which renders the 
nonappropriable services from diverse resources appropriable.
It is generally believed that intellectual property regimes perform this latter function, when in fact 
they actually perform the former. That is, the function of an intellectual property regime is to create 
a mechanism for rewarding investments in the generation of inappropriables, not the appropriation 
of these services. It accomplishes this by giving "exclusive territories" within which to market the
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!products that result, in part, from the investments in inappropriables. So, investments in research on 
the better solution to a specific engineering problem (with the potential for a wide range of 
applications) are rewarded by giving the investor rights in a few selected products that incorporate 
this information.
Information can result from investments of various forms. Although it is generally perceived to flow 
from investments in human capital, it is also one of the fundamental service to flow from investments 
in diverse resources. This information also serves as an input into the creation of many useful 
products. Therefore, it is perfectly consistent to speak of extending intellectual property regimes to 
encompass rewards for naturally-generated information, as well as human-generated.
Informational resource rights require the creation of an international agreement to award rights in 
product markets to those states successfully investing in the retention of diverse resource stocks for 
the purpose of information generation. Just as with patent competitions, states would have to 
compete for these awards by virtue of the demonstration of their retention of diverse habitats and their 
development of the capacities to effectively prospect within these habitats. In a periodic competition, 
the successful states would be awarded rights in specific chemical combinations that can be traced 
to prospecting.
In essence, informational resource rights constitute an alternative to the idea of "transferring 
technology". This idea says that each part of the world should invest in its own comparative 
advantage, rather than perceive the need to integrate for enhanced appropriability. That is, at present, 
a developing country that wishes to capture the informational value of its diverse resources must 
become fully integrated vertically, because the exclusive rights do not attach before the final 
consumer product is developed. The idea of an informational resource right is to allow developing 
countries to specialise in the identification of active chemical combinations (shown to be derived 
from their stocks of diverse resources) without the necessity of proceeding to the development of the 
final consumer product Then these informational resouce rights (in the specific chemical 
combination) may be licensed out to various other users nearer to the product market, for 
investigation and potential development into marketable products. Since the values of the 
informational resource rights are wholly market-dependent, there is no value to the conferment of 
these rights unless the owner-state has created that value in the discovery of the chemical 
combination.
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Informational resource rights are of particular importance because they go to the core of the 
biodiversity problem, i.e. the existence of inappropriable services. They are also important because 
they could provide a first example of an institution that would encourage new forms of development 
through the utilisation diverse resources but by means other than conversion.
10.4 Conclusion
The international regulation of extinction is simply the regulation of the global conversion process. 
Just as decisions taken by individuals in a decentralised society are able to generate environmental 
problems, decisions taken by states in a multi-national world can have the same effect International 
institution-building is a necessity on account of these externalities.
As the same development process continues across the face of the earth, the urgency of international 
institution-building emerges. The costliness of conversions is increasing, and reaches potentially 
unlimited levels of costliness as the last remaining diversity is depleted.
This is because diversity is one of those systemic resources for which there are no human substitutes. 
It is valuable in part because it is the product of a specific process - four billion years of the 
evolutionary process. Humans may be able to create substitutes for the information and insurance 
services that evolution has generated, but it cannot recreate this specific process or its product.
For this reason, the developed world must act, and act in a very specific fashion. It must invest in 
international institutions that foster development down diverse pathways. Although the stream of 
funding for these institutions may have the appearance of a one-way street, the unidirectional 
character of this flow represents an attempts to create the other half of a two-way flow, i.e. the 
compensation required for providing the services of global diversity.
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